Mason v. Tucker and Associates, 20401

Citation871 P.2d 846,125 Idaho 429
Decision Date24 March 1994
Docket NumberNo. 20401,20401
PartiesGary MASON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TUCKER AND ASSOCIATES, Sheri L. Schneider, John C. Tucker, Grace M. Tucker, and Diane E. Tucker Cromwell, Defendants-Respondents.
CourtCourt of Appeals of Idaho

Richard D. Vance, Pocatello, and Linda Q. Jones (argued), Provo, for plaintiff-appellant.

Daniel L. Hawkley, Boise, for defendants-respondents.

LANSING, Judge.

This action stems from alleged errors in the court reporter's transcript of a criminal trial conducted in federal court. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants. For the reasons stated below we affirm in part, reverse in part and remand.

I. BACKGROUND

In 1986 Gary Mason and two co-defendants were tried on federal criminal charges before the United States District Court for the District of Idaho. Mason was convicted of the charges and imprisoned. He appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed the conviction. 1 Defendant Sheri Schneider was the court reporter for the trial court. She apparently was employed by defendant Tucker and Associates ("Tucker"), a court reporting firm. The relationship between the remaining individual defendants and Ms. Schneider or Tucker is not alleged in the complaint or otherwise revealed in the record.

On February 22, 1992, Mason filed the present action based upon his assertion that the trial transcript prepared by Schneider and utilized by Mason in his appeal omitted a crucial portion of the trial. He contends that the transcript did not include a statement made by the trial judge in the presence of the jury to the effect that there was sufficient evidence to convict the defendants. Mason alleges that a motion for mistrial based on the improper comment, arguments on the motion, the trial court's denial of the motion, and the judge's curative instructions to the jury were also omitted from the transcript. Mason's complaint sought monetary damages from Tucker and Schneider based on three causes of action: breach of contract (alleging that Mason was a third-party beneficiary of a court reporting contract between the federal court and the defendants), negligence and "tortious interference with the rights of citizenship." Later an amended complaint was filed alleging three additional causes of action: fraud, and violations of Mason's civil rights remediable under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985.

On March 20, 1992, before filing an answer, the defendants moved for summary judgment on grounds that the statutes of limitation had expired on all causes of action.

The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on all counts. However, the court did not ground its decision on the statutes of limitation, which had been the basis of the defendants' motion and the issue to which the parties directed their affidavits and briefs. Instead, the court opined that a statute of limitation issue may only be reached if the claims "are properly grounded." The district court then granted summary judgment against Mason, resting its dismissal of each cause of action either on the ground that the allegations of the complaint failed to state a cause of action as a matter of law, or on the ground that Mason had not presented evidence to prove all elements of the cause of action. With respect to the claim for breach of contract, the district court held that Mason had presented no evidence that he was an intended beneficiary of the contract between the federal court and Tucker, and that he was not such a beneficiary as a matter of law. The two actions in tort were precluded on the ground that a court reporter's duty is statutory and runs only to the court and not to a criminal defendant. As to the claims for fraud and violation of Mason's rights under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, the district court held Mason had failed to allege sufficient facts to state a cause of action.

II. ERROR IN DISTRICT COURT'S GROUNDS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Mason asserts on appeal that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on bases not asserted in the defendants' motion. We agree. So far as we can discern from the record on appeal, the district court granted summary judgment on issues raised sua sponte, without giving notice to Mason of the need to present evidence or legal authority in support of his position on these issues. The statute of limitation defense raised by the defendants' summary judgment motion created no need for Mason to present evidence on the unrelated factual issue of whether he was an intended beneficiary of any contract between the federal court and the defendants. Nor did the defendants' motion alert him to a need to submit legal authorities and argument regarding the adequacy of his allegations to state a claim or regarding the existence of a duty of care owed to him by the court reporter.

Rule 7(b)(1), I.R.C.P., requires notice to the nonmoving party of the grounds for a motion. It states: "An application to the court for an order shall be by motion which ... shall state with particularity the grounds therefor...." In Patton v. Patton, 88 Idaho 288, 292, 399 P.2d 262, 264 (1965), our Supreme Court noted that this requirement of particularity in Rule 7(b)(1) is "real and substantial" and good practice "demands that the basis of a motion and the relief sought shall be clearly stated" so that the other party may not complain of surprise or prejudice. The Supreme Court then reversed the trial court's order, which had modified the child support provisions of a divorce decree following a show cause hearing, because the show cause order had given notice only of an issue as to child custody and not as to child support. Similarly, in Hellickson v. Jenkins, 118 Idaho 273, 796 P.2d 150 (Ct.App.1990), we held that the magistrate erred in considering evidence outside the pleadings on a motion under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) without expressly converting the motion to one for summary judgment under I.R.C.P. 56 and giving the parties a reasonable opportunity to present evidence pertinent to a summary judgment motion. See also Kelly v. Hodges, 119 Idaho 872, 876, 811 P.2d 48, 52 (Ct.App.1991) (vacating summary judgment entered on counterclaim where the motion had requested judgment only on the plaintiff's complaint).

We do not suggest that summary judgment may never be entered by a court sua sponte or on grounds other than those raised by the moving party. However, in such event, the party against whom the judgment will be entered must be given adequate advance notice and an opportunity to demonstrate why summary judgment should not be entered. See WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, 10A FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2720 at 27-28.

III. STATUTES OF LIMITATION

The district court's error in granting summary judgment based upon rationales not raised by the motion does not necessarily require reversal. If the district court's order for summary judgment was correct, though based upon an inappropriate theory, this Court will affirm upon the correct theory. Andre v. Morrow, 106 Idaho 455, 680 P.2d 1355 (1984); Southern Idaho Realty of Twin Falls, Inc.--Century 21 v. Larry J. Hellhake and Associates, Inc., 102 Idaho 613, 636 P.2d 168 (1981); Robison v. Compton, 97 Idaho 615, 549 P.2d 274 (1976); City of Weippe v. Yarno, 96 Idaho 319, 528 P.2d 201 (1974). Therefore, we will consider whether the summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's claims should be affirmed on the statute of limitation grounds advanced by the defendants below.

Because the standards to be applied to summary judgment by the trial court are the same as those applicable on review, see Anderson v. City of Pocatello, 112 Idaho 176, 179, 731 P.2d 171, 174 (1987); Ray v. Nampa School District No. 131, 120 Idaho 117, 119, 814 P.2d 17, 19 (1991), we may consider the statute of limitation defense presented by the defendants' summary judgment motion even though the trial court did not address that defense in its order. Summary judgment must be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. I.R.C.P. 56(c). Standards applicable to summary judgment require the district court and this Court upon review, to liberally construe facts in the record and to draw all reasonable inferences from those facts in favor of the nonmoving party. If the record gives rise to conflicting inferences, or if reasonable minds might reach different conclusions, summary judgment must be denied. Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539, 541, 808 P.2d 876, 878 (1991).

The defendants' motion for summary judgment and Mason's opposition to the motion were presented on minimal evidence. Viewing the slight evidence presented in the light most favorable to Mason, we glean the following facts. On August 27, 1986, defendant Schneider certified the transcript from Mason's criminal trial as complete and without omission. The transcript, however, was incomplete, for a number of the volumes were missing. The entire transcript was not delivered to Mason's counsel until about June 30, 1987, a few days before the oral argument on Mason's appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The volumes delivered to Mason's attorney at that time were also incomplete, as the comment by the trial court regarding the adequacy of the evidence to convict the defendants, and resulting mistrial motion and argument, were omitted. On November 20, 1987, the Ninth Circuit affirmed Mason's conviction. Following this unsuccessful appeal, Mason was imprisoned in March 1988. He did not personally receive a copy of the trial transcript until October 1990.

A. ESTOPPEL

We must first address Mason's argument that there are genuine issues of fact regarding his contention that equitable estoppel precludes the defendants' assertion of a statute of limitation defense. A defendant...

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