Masonoff v. Dubois

• Decision Date: 17 September 2004
• Docket Number: No. CIV.A.94-10133-RCL.,CIV.A.94-10133-RCL.
• Citation: 336 F.Supp.2d 54
• Parties: Christopher MASONOFF, Sr., et al, Plaintiffs, v. Larry DUBOIS, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

336 F.Supp.2d 54

Christopher MASONOFF, Sr., et al, Plaintiffs, v. Larry DUBOIS, et al., Defendants.

No. CIV.A.94-10133-RCL.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

September 17, 2004.

Christopher Masonoff, Sr., Norkolk, MA, Pro se.

Alan Joel Finkel, Herbert E. Zimmerman, Framingham, MA, for Plaintiffs.

Robert Foster, Pro se.

Anthony Smith, Roxbury, MA, Pro se.

Michael Tarrant, Bridgewater, MA, Pro se.

Michael C. Donahue, Michael C. Donahue P.C., South Easton, MA, for Defendants.

William C. Marangiello, Bridgewater, MA, Pro se.

Robert C. Desrosiers, Bridgewater, MA, Pro se.

Robert M. Bruzzese, Bridgewater, MA, Pro se.

David I. Carroll, Bridgewater, MA, Pro se.

Henry Varney, Gardner, MA, Pro se.

William Marangiello, Bridgewater, MA, Pro se.

Robert Gendreau, Quincy, MA, Pro se.

Bruce Wallace, Bridgewater, MA, Pro se.

Shawn Hickey, Bridgewater, MA, Pro se.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

LINDSAY, District Judge.

I. Introduction

This matter was brought as a class action by inmates formerly incarcerated at the Southeast Correctional Center ("SECC") located in Bridgewater, Massachusetts, to challenge the conditions of confinement at that institution. Specifically, the plaintiffs claim that unsanitary toilet facilities, fire hazards, contaminated drinking water, and exposed asbestos in existence at SECC at the time of their confinement violated their rights under the Eighth Amendment to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.

For purposes of the declaratory and injunctive relief sought by the plaintiffs, I certified a class consisting of all inmates confined at SECC at any time during the period January 1, 1977 to July 1, 2002.¹ The defendants are: Larry DuBois, Commissioner of Correction in Massachusetts from July 1991 to July 1997; Lynn Bissonnette, Superintendent of SECC from July 1993 to June 1996; and Richard G.J. Grelotti, Complex Administrator of the Bridgewater Correctional Complex (a facility that included SECC) from 1991 to February 1994.

On December 13, 1994, I bifurcated this matter. In phase one, the parties were to address all questions of liability and the appropriateness of any declaratory and injunctive relief. In phase two (for which no class was certified), the individual plaintiffs and the defendants were to address the question of monetary relief to the plaintiffs if liability and damages were established. During phase one of these proceedings, I determined that the use of chemical toilets violated the objective prong of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual treatment, and that there were triable issues of fact as to the subjective prong — that is, whether the defendants acted with deliberate indifference to the plaintiffs' rights regarding the cleaning and maintenance of the chemical toilets. I also determined that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether the alleged fire hazards, drinking water contamination, and asbestos contamination violated the Eighth Amendment. See Masonoff I, 899 F.Supp. at 802.²

Now before me are the defendants' motion to dismiss, on mootness grounds, the claims for declaratory and injunctive relief and the defendants' motion for summary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity. In their motion to dismiss, the defendants assert that the plaintiffs' claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are moot because the medium security facility at SECC was closed on July 1, 2002, and all its inmates were transferred to other facilities. The plaintiffs concede that their claims for all but monetary damages are moot. Thus, I GRANT the defendants' motion to dismiss as moot the plaintiffs' claims for declaratory and injunctive relief.

In their motion for summary judgment, the defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to the named plaintiffs' Eighth amendment claims regarding the chemical toilets.³ In the alternative, the defendants seek summary judgment in their favor on the merits of the issue of deliberate indifference, insofar as the plaintiffs' claims relate to the chemical toilets. On the record now before me and for the reasons stated below, I decide that, as to the claims arising from the use of chemical toilets at SECC, the defendants Bissonnette and Grelotti are not entitled to qualified immunity. I also affirm my previous conclusion that there are triable factual issues regarding the alleged deliberate indifference of Bissonnette and Grelotti to the risks posed by the use of chemical toilets at SECC. Thus, I DENY the motion for summary judgment with respect to these defendants. Because I conclude that the plaintiffs have provided no evidence that the defendant Dubois had actual knowledge of serious health risks posed to the plaintiffs, I GRANT the defendants' motion with respect to him.

When I certified the plaintiffs' class for purposes of declaratory and injunctive relief, I denied a number of motions of individual inmates to intervene in their own names. There has been no motion to certify a class for purposes of monetary damages.⁴

I will dispense with the customary recitation of the facts. They are set out in detail in Masonoff I. I hereby incorporate the facts set out there and will refer to them and any new facts, as needed, to resolve the motions now before me. My inquiry here will be limited to the issue of qualified immunity.

II. Qualified Immunity

The defendants claim that they are entitled to the defense of qualified immunity, which would bar the plaintiffs' claims for monetary damages. In essence, the defendants argue that they were entitled to rely on the holding in Langton v. Fair, No. 86-24234 (Mass.Super.Ct.1991), aff'd sub nom Langton v. Comm'r of Correction, No. 93-P-1635 (Mass.App.Ct.1995),⁵ a state court ruling in which the court held that the conditions attending the case of the chemical toilets at SECC did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.

"Qualified immunity specially protects public officials from the specter of damages liability for judgment calls made in a legally uncertain environment." Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 185, 115 S.Ct. 2031, 132 L.Ed.2d 136 (1995). The defense shields government officials from paying monetary damages when "their actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with the rights they are alleged to have violated." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987).

To determine whether the defendants here are entitled to the shield of qualified immunity, I must inquire: "(1) whether the facts as alleged make out a constitutional violation; (2) whether that right was clearly established; and (3) whether a similarly situated reasonable official would have understood that her conduct violated clearly established law." Fabiano v. Hopkins, 352 F.3d 447, 453 (1st Cir.2003).

A. Was there an Eighth Amendment Violation?

Taking the facts alleged in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, I first consider whether the governmental conduct at issue violated the Eighth Amendment. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). As I have pointed out previously in this case, an Eighth Amendment claim has both objective and subjective components. See Masonoff I, 899 F.Supp. at 787-88 (quoting DesRosiers v. Moran, 949 F.2d 15, 18 (1st Cir.1991)). In Masonoff I, I found that the conditions attending the use of chemical toilets at SECC were so unsanitary as to deprive inmates of essential human needs, as those needs are defined by contemporary standards of decency. See id. at 797; see generally Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 36, 113 S.Ct. 2475, 125 L.Ed.2d 22 (1993). Accordingly, I granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs on the objective prong of the Eighth Amendment inquiry. I also ruled that there were triable issues of fact with respect to the subjective component of the claimed Eighth Amendment violation, namely whether the defendants were deliberately indifferent to the plaintiffs' constitutional rights. See Masonoff I, 899 F.Supp. at 798.

The conclusions reached in Masonoff I generally suffice to dispose of the first step in the qualified immunity inquiry: whether the facts alleged establish an Eighth Amendment violation. Subsumed in my conclusions that the plaintiffs had established the objective prong of their Eighth Amendment claim and that there were trialworthy issues regarding the subjective prong was a predicate observation that the facts, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, did indeed establish an Eighth Amendment violation. The defendants, however, have put the question of their deliberate indifference in issue again in the context of their assertion of the qualified immunity defense. Although I am reluctant to reconsider conclusions I reached, at least implicitly, in 1995, I do so here for the sake of completeness, in my consideration of the question of qualified immunity. Consequently, I review the record anew, but in the present context, I explicitly view favorably only the facts as alleged by the plaintiffs. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151.

"The question under the Eighth Amendment is whether prison officials, acting with deliberate indifference, exposed a prisoner to a sufficiently substantial `risk of serious damage to his future health.'" Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 843, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (quoting Helling, 509 U.S. at 35, 113 S.Ct. 2475). To establish deliberate indifference, the plaintiffs must show "that the official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm." Id. at 842, 114 S.Ct. 1970. The First Circuit has articulated the inquiry in such a way as to collapse the objective and subjective prongs into one three-part test for deliberate indifference. The plaintiff must show (1) a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the defendants' actual knowledge of that...