Mass. Port Auth. v. Turo Inc.

• Citation: 166 N.E.3d 972,487 Mass. 235
• Decision Date: 21 April 2021
• Docket Number: SJC-13012
• Parties: MASSACHUSETTS PORT AUTHORITY v. TURO INC. & others.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

487 Mass. 235

166 N.E.3d 972

MASSACHUSETTS PORT AUTHORITY

v.TURO INC. & others.¹

SJC-13012

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk..

Argued January 8, 2021.

Decided April 21, 2021.

The following submitted briefs for amici curiae:

Elizabeth B. Prelogar, of the District of Columbia, for Turo Inc.

David S. Mackey (Christina S. Marshall & Melissa C. Allison also present), Cambridge, for Massachusetts Port Authority.

Daniel Reimer, of Colorado, for Airports Council International -- North America.

Mason A. Kortz for Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press.

Ryan Spear & Erin K. Earl, of Washington, & Thomas J. Tobin for Technology Network & others.

Present: Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, & Georges, JJ.

GEORGES, J.

The plaintiff, the Massachusetts Port Authority (Massport), and the defendants, Turo Inc. (Turo), RMG Motors LLC (RMG), and John Doe Nos. 1 through 100 (John Doe defendants) (collectively, defendants), have been in a dispute regarding the unregulated pick up and drop off of passengers at Boston's Logan International Airport (Logan Airport). Massport eventually filed suit against the defendants. Turo appeals from a preliminary injunction granted by a judge in the Superior Court in favor of Massport that restricts Turo from conducting any commercial activity at Logan Airport without written authorization from Massport.

Turo contends that the judge erred in issuing the injunction for three reasons: first, because Turo is immune from liability under 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1), commonly known as § 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA); second, because Massport was unlikely to succeed on its claim that, by facilitating the motor vehicle rental transactions at Logan Airport, Turo aided and abetted the other defendants’ acts of trespass; and third, by concluding that Massport need not demonstrate irreparable harm to succeed on its motion for a preliminary injunction. We disagree and therefore affirm the judge's order. Having carefully considered the record before us, however, a modification of the terms of the preliminary injunction is necessary to comply with the requirements of the CDA; the modification is detailed infra.²

Background. Massport is an independent public authority tasked with the control, operation, and maintenance of Logan Airport. See St. 1956, c. 465, § 5. Consonant with its authority, Massport has promulgated a set of regulations governing the operations of Logan Airport. One such regulation prohibits any person, "unless duly authorized by the Executive Director" of Massport, from "[c]arry[ing] on any commercial activity or conduct[ing] operations of a commercial nature" that occur "in or upon any area of the Airport." 740 Code Mass. Regs. § 21.04(1)(b) (2013).

Massport also has adopted several regulations and standard practices related to motor vehicle rentals that occur on airport grounds, including 740 Code Mass. Regs. § 23.08(1)(b) (2004), which states in relevant part: "No Operator or Driver shall solicit or transact car rental business at Logan Airport except as authorized pursuant to a current and valid agreement specifically permitting such activities." These agreements require rental car companies to conduct operations at Logan Airport only from a central location. To transport rental car users to and from the terminals to that location, Massport provides a shuttle system and concomitantly prohibits car rental pick-up and drop-off activity at the main airport buildings or the terminal curbsides to reduce traffic. These agreements also require all rental car companies to pay to Massport various fees, which collectively generate more than $80 million in annual revenue.

Turo describes itself as "an online platform that operates a peer-to-peer marketplace connecting [hosts] with [guests] seeking cars on a short-term basis." Turo has no office, rental counter, or other physical presence at Logan Airport. A guest seeking to rent a motor vehicle from a host would search Turo's website or available listings, select and book a particular vehicle, and then coordinate the pick-up location and time with the host. Turo does not require its hosts to deliver vehicles to their guests, nor does Turo determine the parties’ particular rendezvous location.

Turo's hosts use its platform to list their privately owned vehicles for rent as well as to set their vehicles’ availability, pricing, and pick-up and drop-off locations, including Logan Airport. The John Doe defendants represent a number of unknown individual hosts who have utilized Turo's platform to list and deliver vehicles for rent at Logan Airport. Turo's hosts, however, include not only individual vehicle owners, but also commercial car rental companies like defendant RMG. Approximately once or twice per month, RMG uses Turo's platform to provide a number of luxury automobiles for rent by Turo's guests at Logan Airport.

Turo's website describes "three options for meeting [guests]": (1) delivery to a custom location; (2) delivery to nearby airports; or (3) pick up at the host's location. Turo highlights on its website that it offers curbside pickup at Logan Airport by way of a designated "button" that allows its guests to directly search for vehicles available at Logan Airport. Turo promotes both that it has more than 200 motor vehicles available to rent from Logan Airport and that its guests are able to meet their hosts at Logan Airport. Indeed, this is one of the conveniences Turo touts as a distinct advantage it offers to travelers over traditional car rental agencies.

Turo also extends an array of support services to its users. For example, it offers its hosts payment-processing assistance, access to significant liability insurance coverage for their motor vehicles, and guest screenings, as well as emergency support for its users -- including roadside service that is available twenty-four hours per day, seven days per week. Moreover, Turo imposes rigorous eligibility standards for any vehicles listed for rent through its platform. Turo also has adopted certain standardized policies applicable to all rentals, including policies regarding cancellations, cleaning, late returns, security deposits, smoking, pets, privacy, and terms of service.

Despite the fact that Turo has refused Massport's repeated requests to enter into an agreement and has not otherwise received affirmative authorization from Massport for its operations, Turo has facilitated its hosts’ and guests’ vehicle rental transactions at Logan Airport since 2016. Since then, Turo's volume of facilitated motor vehicle rentals at Logan Airport has increased steadily. In 2018, Turo facilitated 3,783 trips that involved vehicle "handoffs" at Logan Airport. In 2019, that number rose to 4,706, representing approximately one-half of Turo's business in Boston.

Prior to filing suit, Massport attempted unsuccessfully to enter into a written agreement with Turo to authorize and govern Turo's operations at Logan Airport; these efforts included cease and desist letters. Turo consistently responded that, because it is not a car rental business, it is not subject to Massport's rules and regulations.

Procedural history. In June 2019, Massport commenced a civil action in the Superior Court, alleging that the defendants were operating an unauthorized rental business at Logan Airport. In its amended complaint, Massport asserts violations of its regulations prohibiting commercial activity without authorization, 740 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 21.04(1)(b) and 23.08(1)(b) ; common-law trespass; aiding and abetting trespass; unjust enrichment; and violations of G. L. c. 93A. The prayer for relief sought preliminary and permanent injunctions, as well as damages and attorney's fees.

Massport subsequently filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, seeking to enjoin the defendants’ actions at Logan Airport. After a nonevidentiary hearing, a Superior Court judge granted Massport's motion for a preliminary injunction in January 2020. The judge ruled that Turo was not immune from suit under § 230, that Massport had demonstrated a strong likelihood of success on the claim against Turo of aiding and abetting an ongoing trespass by the other defendants, and that Massport was not required to demonstrate irreparable harm in order to obtain a preliminary injunction because its claim was based on a continuing trespass to land. In February of 2020, Turo filed a notice of appeal from the order granting the preliminary injunction. Thereafter, Turo sought a stay of the injunction pending appeal; that motion was denied, and Turo's appeal from the order allowing the preliminary injunction entered in the Appeals Court in June 2020. We transferred the matter to this court on our own motion.

Discussion. 1. Standard of review. We review a decision on a motion for a preliminary injunction to determine whether there was an error of law or whether the judge abused his or her discretion -- that is, whether the judge applied proper legal standards and whether there was reasonable support for the judge's evaluation of factual questions. See King v. Town Clerk of Townsend, 480 Mass. 7, 9, 99 N.E.3d 783 (2018). We consider the same factors as did the judge: whether the party seeking the preliminary injunction is likely to succeed on the merits; whether irreparable harm will result from a denial of the injunction; and whether, in light of the moving party's likelihood of success on the merits, the risk of irreparable harm to the moving party outweighs the potential harm to the nonmoving party in granting the injunction. See Garcia v. Department of Hous. & Community Dev., 480 Mass. 736, 747, 108 N.E.3d 945 (2018). "In conducting our review, we decide ‘whether the judge applied proper legal standards and whether there was reasonable support for his evaluation of factual questions.’ " Fordyce v. Hanover, 457 Mass. 248, 256, 929 N.E.2d 929 (2010), quoting Commonwealth v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, 452 Mass. 733, 741, 897 N.E.2d 548...