Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Gramling

• Decision Date: 08 March 1918
• Citation: Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Gramling, 78 So. 337, 75 Fla. 409 (Fla. 1918)
• Parties: MASSACHUSETTS BONDING & INS. CO. v. GRAMLING.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

78 So. 337

75 Fla. 409

MASSACHUSETTS BONDING & INS. CO. v. GRAMLING.

Florida Supreme Court

March 8, 1918

Appeal from Circuit Court, Jackson County; C. L. Wilson, Judge.

Suit by A. L. Gramling against the Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Company. Demurrer to declaration and motion to strike overruled, and verdict and judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

Where the meaning of an insurance policy is doubtful, it should be construed most favorably to the insured.

COUNSEL Paul Carter, of Marianna, for appellant.

W. E B. Smith, of Marianna, for appellee.

OPINION

BROWNE C.J.

This is a suit brought by A. L. Gramling against the Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Company, on a health and accident policy for indemnity for four and a half months nonconfining illness, under part X of the policy, which is as follows:

Health Insurance.

Part X Full Indemnity.

Sec (a). Or, for the period during which the assured shall be necessarily and continuously confined within the house and therein regularly visited by a legally qualified physician solely by reason of 'such illness,' the company will pay illness indemnity at the rate per month specified in part 1.

Partial Indemnity.

Sec. (b). Or, for the period not exceeding two consecutive months, immediately following said confinement, or by reason of nonconfining illness, during which the assured shall be regularly attended by such physician and wholly and continuously disabled and prevented from performing any and every duty pertaining to any business or occupation, the company will pay one-half of said monthly illness indemnity.

Provided, that indemnity under this part shall not be paid for the first seven days of disability, nor for a longer period than six consecutive months.

The appellant, the defendant below, demurred to and made motions to strike parts of the declaration, upon the grounds that the policy limited recovery for nonconfining illness to a period not exceeding two months. The demurrer was overruled, and the motions to strike denied, and defendant refusing to plead, verdict and judgment were rendered for the plaintiff for four and a half months illness indemnity, and defendant took writ of error.

The question involved is the construction of section (b) of part X of the policy; the appellant contending that the indemnity for nonconfining illness is limited to a period of two months, and the appellee that the limit of the period for which recovery can be had is six months.

If there were any serious doubt about what was meant by the language used in part X as a whole, or if it were susceptible of either construction, we would have to uphold the judgment of the lower court upon the well- settled doctrine that where the meaning of a policy is doubtful it should be construed most favorably to the insured. Queen Ins. Co. v. Patterson Drug Co., 73 Fla. 665, 74 So. 807 L. R. A. 1917D, 1091; L'Engle v. Scottish Union & National Fire Ins. Co., 48 Fla. 82, 37 So. 462, 67 L. R. A. 581, 111 Am. St. Rep. 70, 5 Ann. Cas. 748. A careful analysis of part X, however, makes it unnecessary to apply this rule, as it seems clear to us that the limitation of the time for which the company will pay one-half the illness indemnity to a period not exceeding two consecutive months applies to a period immediately following an illness during which the insured was confined within the house. Section (b) of part X makes provision for two separate contingencies, upon the happening of either the...