Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Industrial Commission

Decision Date09 April 1957
Citation82 N.W.2d 191,275 Wis. 505
PartiesMASSACHUSETTS BONDING & INS. CO. et al., Appellants, v. INDUSTRIAL COMM. and Bernard J. Klees, Respondents.
CourtWisconsin Supreme Court

Brennan, Brennan & Brennan, Milwaukee, for appellants.

Stewart G. Honeck, Atty. Gen., Mortimer Levitan, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondents.

FAIRCHILD, Justice.

The award which appellants challenge was made under sec. 102.61, Stats., which provides in part:

'An employe who is entitled to receive and has received compensation pursuant to this chapter, and who is entitled to and is receiving instructions pursuant to the provisions of the act of congress known as the vocational rehabilitation act, and amendments thereto (Public Law 113-78th Congress) as administered by the state in which he holds residence or in which he resided at the time of becoming physically handicapped, shall, in addition to his other indemnity, be paid his actual and necessary expenses of travel and, if he receives such instructions elsewhere than at the place of his residence, his actual and necessary costs of maintenance, during rehabilitation, subject to the following conditions and limitations: * * * (3) He may not have expenses of travel and costs of maintenance on account of training for a period in excess of 40 weeks in all. (4) The commission shall determine the rights and liabilities of the parties under this section in like manner and with like effect as it does other issues under compensation.'

It is clear that Klees was entitled to workman's compensation and received it; and that at the time of the hearing his tuition at the university was being paid by the state board of vocational and adult education. If he is entitled to that benefit under the federal Vocational Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 31 to 42, it will follow from the provisions of sec. 102.61 that expense of travel and costs of maintenance up to 40 weeks must be paid by his employer and insurer. Appellants point out that Klees has been gainfully employed during several periods since his injury. They argue that he is not entitled to the type of education he is being furnished because he is not so incapacitated as to be unfit to engage in a remunerative occupation. In essence they dispute the interpretation placed upon the federal act by the state board in considering that Klees is entitled to aid.

The federal act, sec. 31, makes an appropriation: 'For the purpose of assisting the States in rehabilitating physically handicapped individuals so that they may prepare for and engage in remunerative employment to the extent of their capabilities, thereby increasing not only their social and economic well-being but also the productive capacity of the Nation.' Section 32 provides for allotment of money to states for expenditure under an approved plan. Sec. 35 provides for the aproval of a state plan for vocational rehabilitation services by the secretary of health, education and welfare if the plan meets specific requirements. Sec. 41 defines the term, 'Vocational rehabilitation services' so as to include, among other things, 'training * * * for physically handicapped individuals.' The term 'physically handicapped individual' is defined as 'any individual who is under a physical or mental disability which constitutes a substantial handicap to employment, but which is of such a nature that vocational rehabilitation services may reasonably be expected to render him fit to engage in a remunerative occupation.'

Sec. 41.71, 1953 Stats., is designated the Rehabilitation Law. By it the state accepts the benefits of the federal act and authorizes the state board to cooperate with the federal agency in carrying out the purposes of the federal act. 'Handicapped person' is defined as 'any person who, by reason of a physical or mental defect or infirmity, whether congenital or acquired by accident, injury or disease, is or may be expected to be totally or partially incapacitated for remunerative occupation, and who may reasonably be expected to be fit to engage in a remunerative occupation after receiving vocational rehabilitation service.' The board is required to acquaint handicapped persons with rehabilitation facilities and counsel them regarding the selection of a suitable location and prescribe such training as may be necessary to insure their vocational rehabilitation.

The question which arises at the outset is the scope of any review by the industrial commission (acting under sec. 102.61) of the action of the state board in furnishing Klees with tuition for university training. It must be presumed that the state board, before spending public funds for that purpose, concluded that such action was authorized by the federal and state rehabilitation laws and the state plan. The duty of administering those laws has been imposed on the state board. Necessarily the performance of that duty involves the interpretation of those laws. The industrial commission has not been given any general power to review the acts of the state board. If, under sec. 102.61, it should determine that Klees, who is receiving benefits, is not entitled to them, it would be determining that the state board, another administrative agency, was making an unauthorized expenditure of public funds. Such a determination would not under the statutes have any legal effect upon the continued expenditure by the state board but would only have the effect of relieving the employer of the obligation to provide the expense of travel and maintenance for 40 weeks.

Under these circumstances it does not seem that the legislature intended to give the industrial commission any power to interpret the rehabilitation laws. We conclude that any power of review given to the industrial commission is limited. Unless it is shown before the commission that highly material facts were misrepresented to or withheld from the state board or that the state board has applied an interpretation of the rehabilitation laws which is entirely outside the reasonable scope of interpretation and hence a clear abuse of administrative power, the industrial commission must find that any applicant who is...

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  • Kurtenbach v. Frito-Lay, FRITO-LA
    • United States
    • South Dakota Supreme Court
    • 3 Dicembre 1996
    ...Brown, 660 P.2d 655, 658 (Okla.Ct.App.1983) (from forklift operator to jewelry making course); Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 275 Wis. 505, 82 N.W.2d 191, 192-93 (1957) (from pilot to social work program); see also Beloit Corp. v. State, Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n,......
  • Johnson v. Labor and Industry Review Com'n
    • United States
    • Wisconsin Court of Appeals
    • 16 Giugno 1993
    ...LIRC's interpretation of the statute, but the cases which do exist span a number of years. See Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 275 Wis. 505, 82 N.W.2d 191 (1957); Dane County Hosp. & Home, 125 Wis.2d 308, 371 N.W.2d 815; Beloit Corp. v. LIRC, 152 Wis.2d 579, 449 N.W.2......
  • Beloit Corp. v. State, Labor and Industry Review Com'n, 88-1885
    • United States
    • Wisconsin Court of Appeals
    • 5 Ottobre 1989
    ...during rehabilitation instruction under sec. 102.61(1). IV. DRS'S ABUSE OF DISCRETION In Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Industrial Comm., 275 Wis. 505, 512, 82 N.W.2d 191, 194-95 (1957), the court held that the industrial commission's [now LIRC's] power to review a vocational rehabilit......
  • Dane County Hosp. and Home v. Labor and Industry Review Com'n
    • United States
    • Wisconsin Court of Appeals
    • 20 Giugno 1985
    ...of eligibility for vocational rehabilitation services. The supreme court stated in Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Industrial Comm., 275 Wis. 505, 512, 82 N.W.2d 191, 194-95 (1957): [I]t does not seem that the legislature intended to give the Industrial Commission any power to interpret......
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