Massachusetts Loan & Trust Co. v. Hamilton

• Decision Date: 03 May 1898
• Docket Number: 424.
• Citation: 88 F. 588
• Parties: MASSACHUSETTS LOAN & TRUST CO. et al. v. HAMILTON.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

88 F. 588

MASSACHUSETTS LOAN & TRUST CO. et al. v. HAMILTON.

No. 424.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

May 3, 1898

Ransom Cooper and McConnell, Clayberg & Gunn, for appellants.

Edwin W. Toole, Thos. C. Bach, and Jos. K. Toole, for appellee.

Before GILBERT and ROSS, Circuit Judges, and HAWLEY, District Judge.

HAWLEY District Judge.

Appellee in an action against the Great Falls Street-Railway Company to recover damages for personal injuries received, obtained a judgment for $7,500, with costs, and brings this suit in equity to enforce the judgment lien against appellants, as a prior and superior claim and lien, upon the property of the street-railway company, to the mortgage lien and claim of the Massachusetts Loan & Trust company. Whether a judgment rendered against a street-railway corporation for personal injuries has priority over the lien of a mortgage upon the corporate property depends upon the interpretation to be given to the provisions of section 707 of the fifth division of the Compiled Statutes of Montana of 1887, which reads as follows:

'A judgment against any railway corporation for any injury to person or property, or for material furnished, or work or labor done upon any of the property of such corporation shall be a lien within the county where recovered on the property of such corporation, and such lien shall be prior and superior to the lien of any mortgage or trust deed provided for in this act.'

Does this section apply to street railroads? Was it the intention of the legislature, at the time of the adoption of this section, that it should apply to all railroad corporations within the state,-- to street railroads, as well as to commercial and steam railroads, operated by means of locomotives and cars, for the transportation of passengers and freight? Is there anything in the laws of Montana which sheds any light upon the question of the intent of the legislature? If not, how is the intent to be ascertained? What do the authorities say upon this subject?

In May 1873, the legislature of the territory of Montana passed 'An act to provide for the formation of railroad corporations in the territory of Montana' (St. Mont. 1873, p. 93). The provisions of this act are general in their character, and are all specially applicable to steam railroads. At the time of the passage of this act there were no railroads of any kind within the territory. In 1887 the legislature of the territory passed 'An act in relation to railroads,' consisting of six sections, which, in the Compiled Statutes of Montana, is treated as a supplement to the railroad act of 1873, and numbered sections 702 to 707; the last section, heretofore quoted, being the one under consideration. Sections 702 to and including 706 are specially applicable to steam and commercial railroads. At the time of the passage of this act there were no street railways within the territory of Montana, but at the same session (1887) the legislature passed an act providing for municipalities licensing and authorizing the construction of street railroads. Section 325 of the municipal act provides, among other things, that 'the city council of all cities incorporated under this act shall have the following powers' (subdivision 14): 'To regulate and control the laying of railroad tracks and prohibiting the use of engines and locomotives propelled by steam or to regulate the speed thereof when used;' (subdivision 16) 'to license and authorize the construction and operation of street railroads and require them to conform to the grade of the streets as the same are or may be established. ' The legislature of Montana in 1893 passed an act, approved March 2, 1893, extending the provisions of chapter 36 of the Compiled Laws of 1887, relating to the conditional sale of railroad equipments, to street-railway equipments. This act was entitled 'An act relating to certain contracts for the conditional sale, lease or hire of railroads and street railway equipments and rolling stock, and providing for the recording thereof. ' Section 393 of the Civil Code of 1895 provides, 'The purposes for which the private corporations mentioned in the last section are' (subdivision 15) 'the construction and maintenance of a railroad and of a telegraph line in connection therewith and a street railroad of any kind. ' The constitution of Montana (section 12, art. 15) declares that 'no street or other railroad shall be constructed within any city or town without the consent of the local authorities,' etc.

But little is gained by a reference solely to the meaning of the word 'railroad.' The word, of itself, has no such fixed definition as to enable the court to determine whether, by its mere use in a statute, it applies to street railways or not. It may or may not include them. It may be used in the statute in its broadest sense, or it may be used in its technical or popular sense. 19 Am.& Eng.Enc.Law, 77 et seq.; Bishop v. North, 11 Mees.& W. 418; Lieberman v. Railway Co., 141 Ill. 140, 147, 30 N.E. 544; Bloxham v. Railroad Co., 36 Fla. 519, 539, 18 So. 444; Funk v. Railroad Co. (Minn.) 63 N.W. 1099. In its broadest sense, it undoubtedly includes a street railroad, and every other kind of a road or way on which rails of iron are laid for the wheels of cars to run upon, whether propelled by steam, electricity, horse, or other power, carrying light or heavy loads of freight or passengers, or both. 2 Bouv. Law Dict. tit. 'Railroads.' In its technical sense it does not apply to street railroads. Louisville & P.R. Co. v. Louisville City Ry. Co., 2 Duv. 175; Ror. R.R. 1422; Elliott, Roads & S. 558.

It may be, as counsel for appellee claim, that searching for legislative intent is often like 'hunting for a needle in s haystack'; but it is nevertheless the duty of courts to make the search by applying the usual magnets of construction, and drawing therefrom, through the ordinary channels of thought, such intent. There is no other way to determine the question, and the fact that it is difficult simply makes it more necessary that a thorough search be made. If there is any doubt about the true meaning of the word or term used in a statute, the legislative intent is not to be determined from that particular expression, but from the general legislation of the state concerning the same subject-matter. It may in some connections have a broad and comprehensive meaning, and in others a narrow and limited meaning. As a general rule, statutes are presumed to use words in their popular sense, and courts often apply this rule in order to arrive at the object and intent of the legislature. End. Interp. St. Sec. 76. But in all cases the safest rule is to take the entire provisions of the statute where it is used, and thereby ascertain, if possible, what the legislature intended. The meaning of the word must always depend upon the context and the legislative intent of the statute in which it is used, from the occasion and necessity of the law, from the mischief felt, and the object and remedy in view. Potter's Dwar. St. 194, note 13. Following these, or other similar, rules of construction, the courts have in many instances held that the word 'railroad' does in certain statutes include street as well as steam railroads, and in others that it refers only to the railroads of commerce. No particular stress should be given to the difference in the motive power of the respective roads. The difference between street railroads and railroads of commerce for general traffic is well understood. The difference consists in their use, and not in their motive power. A railroad, the rails of which are laid to conform to the grade and surface of the street, and which is otherwise constructed so that the public is not excluded from any part of the street as a public way; which runs at a moderate rate of speed, compared to the speed of traffic railroads; which carries no freight, but only passengers from one part of a thickly populated district to another, in a town or city and its suburbs, and for that purpose runs its cars at short intervals, stopping at the street crossings to receive and discharge its passengers,-- is a street railroad, whether the cars are propelled by animal or mechanical power. Williams v. Railway Co., 41 F. 556. The railroads of commerce derive their powers from, and are governed by, national or state legislation. The street railways are regulated and controlled, principally, by municipal laws. It has been held that street-railway companies are 'railroad corporations,' within the meaning of 'An act to enforce against railroad corporations' certain provisions of the state constitution, where such constitutional provisions include all corporations organized for business in its prohibition, and no words are used in the body of the act which were intended, or could fairly be used, as making any distinction between steam and other railroads, and where it is apparent that both street railroads and steam railroads are within the mischiefs recited in the preamble or other parts of the act, and within the remedies provided for in the act. Cheetham v. McCormick, 178 Pa.St. 187, 191, 35 A. 631. In Tennessee it is held that an act relating to railroads, which requires certain precautions to be used in the movement of trains in the city of Memphis, is applicable to a dummy train of street cars. Katzenberger v. Lawo, 90 Tenn. 235, 16 S.W. 611. And in Ohio, that a statute giving a lien to mechanics, laborers, etc., for work done upon 'any railroad, turnpike, plank road, canal or any public structure,' applies to street railroads. New England Engineering Co. v. Oakwood St. Ry. Co., 75 F. 162.

The words 'railroad' and 'railway' are synonymous, and, under all ordinary circumstances, they are to be treated as...