Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Colorado Loan & Trust Co.

• Decision Date: 20 April 1894
• Citation: 20 Colo. 1,36 P. 793
• Parties: MASSACHUSETTS MUT. LIFE INS. CO. v. COLORADO LOAN & TRUST CO. et al.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

36 P. 793

20 Colo. 1

MASSACHUSETTS MUT. LIFE INS. CO. v. COLORADO LOAN & TRUST CO. et al.

Supreme Court of Colorado

April 20, 1894

Error to district court, Arapahoe county.

Action by the Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company against the Colorado Loan & Trust Company and T. C. Henry. There was a judgment for defendants, and plaintiff brings error. Reversed.

Action upon a promissory note executed and made payable at Springfield, Mass. The first defense is a plea of payment. The second reads as follows: 'And for a second and further defense herein the defendants allege that the said note in said complaint mentioned was made, and the said cause of action set forth in said complaint upon said note accrued without the state of Colorado, more than three years prior to the commencement of said suit; that the said note mentioned in said complaint became due more than three years prior to the commencement of said suit, and that the said action thereon is barred by the statutes of limitations of this state.' To this second defense a demurrer was interposed upon the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a defense to the action. This demurrer was overruled in the court below, and, the plaintiff electing to stand by the demurrer, judgment was entered for the defendants. Plaintiff brings error.

Byron L. Carr, for plaintiff in error.

J. P Brockway, for defendants in error.

HAYT C.J.

The question upon this appeal is, what is the statute of limitations in this state upon contracts executed outside of the state? Section 1686, Gen. Laws of 1877, reads as follows 'It shall be lawful for any person, against whom any action shall be commenced in any court of this state, where the cause of action accrued without the state, upon a contract or agreement, express or implied, more than two years before the commencement of the action, or upon any sealed instrument in writing, or judgment or decree of any court, more than three years before the commencement of the action, to plead the same, and give the same in bar of the plaintiff's right of action.' The following was passed in 1879: 'Section 1. It shall be lawful for any person against whom any action shall be commenced, in any court of this state, where the cause of action accrued without the state, upon a contract or agreement, express or implied, or upon any sealed instrument in writing, or judgment or decree of any court, more than six years before the commencement of the action, to plead the same and give the same in bar of the plaintiff's right of action. Sec 2. Section sixteen, of chapter sixty, of the General Laws of 1877, concerning limitations, and all acts inconsistent with this act, are hereby repealed.' Sess. Laws 1879, p. 109. It is contended that the act of 1879 was not passed as required by the constitution, and that for this reason it is of no force or effect. The constitutional provisions invoked to defeat the act are as follows: Section 17, art. 5: 'No law shall be passed except by bill, and no bill shall be so altered or amended on its passage through either house as to change its original purpose.' Section 20, art. 5: 'No bill shall be considered or become a law unless referred to a committee, returned therefrom, and printed for the use of the members.' Section 22, art. 5: 'Every bill shall be read at length on three different days in each house; all substantial amendments made thereto shall be printed for the use of the members before the final vote is taken on the bill; and no bill shall become a law except by a vote of a majority of all the members elected to each house, nor unless on its final passage the vote be taken by ayes and noes, and the names of those voting be entered on the journal.'

The claim that the bill was amended in the senate during its passage so as to change its original purpose is easily disposed of. There is no journal entry or other competent evidence showing the nature of the amendment, but should we concede the amendment as claimed by appellee, his position is equally untenable. The amendment claimed to have been made reads as follows: 'Provided, that this act shall not affect any contract or agreement heretofore barred by the provisions of said section.' Not only does this fail to change the original purpose of the bill, but it fails to change the construction to be given the act in any...