Massey v. Massey
| Decision Date | 27 March 2013 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:12cv078-SAA,CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:12cv013-SAA,CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:12cv077-SAA,CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:12cv076-SAA |
| Parties | BRANDI LANE MASSEY, PLAINTIFF v. MICHAEL J. MASSEY, TERRI MASSEY, LYNDALE FARMS OF SENATOBIA, MISSISSIPPI, A General Partnership, LYNDALE FARMS OF SENATOBIA, MISSISSIPPI, INC., LYNDALE FARMS EQUIPMENT, LLC, MICHAEL MASSEY, JR., LYNDALE FARMS (2004), MICHAEL MASSEY, INC., MIKE AND MICHAEL, INC.; MIKE AND ELIZABETH, INC., and LYNDALE FARMS (2009) DEFENDANTS MICHAEL J. MASSEY, D/B/A LYNDALE FARMS OF SENATOBIA, MISSISSIPPI, PLAINTIFF v. BRANDI LANE MASSEY AND SYCAMORE BANK, DEFENDANTS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi |
LEAD CASE, CONSOLIDATED
Defendants Michael J. Massey, Terri Massey, Lyndale Farms of Senatobia, Mississippi a General Partnership, Lyndale Farms of Senatobia, Mississippi, Inc., Lyndale Farms Equipment, LLC, Lyndale Farms (2004), Michael Massey, Inc., Mike and Michael, Inc., Mike and Elizabeth, Inc., and Lyndale Farms (2009) (hereinafter "defendants") have moved to dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint and Brandi Lane Massey's Counterclaims. Docket ## 35, 62, 136.1 Plaintiff has filed a responsive brief and all parties have provided additional briefing at the request of the undersigned.2 After reviewing the motion, response and additional briefing, the court finds that defendants' Motion to Dismiss should be granted in part and denied in part.3
This case arises out of a dispute between Brandi Massey ("Brandi") and her uncle, Michael J. Massey ("Mike") growing out of Mike's conduct as trustee of Brandi's estate and as her co-tenant of property ("the Land") which Mike and his brother, Brandi's father Steve Massey ("Steve"), had owned together. Mike and Steve bought the Land on January 7, 1998 and secured a loan for the purchase with a Deed of Trust to Senatobia Bank. The Land was deeded to Mike and Steve as tenants in common with no right of survivorship.
After they bought the Land, Mike and Steve formed Lyndale Farms of Sentobia, Mississippi, a general partnership, with the partnership agreement effective on December 31, 1998. According to its own terms, the partnership was created "for the purposes of farming, row crops, and the raising and selling of livestock." On January 2, 1999, they formed a corporation, Lyndale Farms of Senatobia, Mississippi, Inc. Neither the corporation nor the partnership had any ownership interest in the Land. On March 1, 1999, Mike and Steve executed a shareholder agreement governing the corporation. After learning that Steve had cancer in early 2001, Mike and Steve amended the agreement governing the general partnership and the shareholder agreement governing the corporation on September 1, 2001 to provide for the handling of the deceased member's interests.
Steve died on December 7, 2001, leaving Brandi a one-half interest in the Land in his Last Will and Testament ("the Will"). Under the Will, Mike would hold Brandi's one-half interest in the Land in trust along with the proceeds of a life insurance policy until Brandi reached 30 years old, at which time the trust estate was to be distributed to Brandi and the trust was to terminate. Brandi turned thirty on September 11, 2007. Brandi, however, had been involved in a car accident in January 2002. Due in part to the disabilities suffered in the accident, she decided by agreement dated November 29, 2007 to allow Mike to continue to manage the trust and act as trustee. The parties disagree as to whether the original trust continued or whether a new inter vivos trust was created on November 29, 2007. Brandi terminated the trust on January 6, 2011 and filed suit on January 26, 2012.
Defendants have moved to dismiss plaintiff's Amended Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted. A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the legal sufficiency of a complaint and raises an issue of law. To give a defendant fair notice of a claim, a complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). The Fifth Circuit has held that complaints "must contain either direct allegations on every material point necessary to sustain a recovery . . . or contain allegations from which an inference fairly may be drawn that evidence on these material points will be introduced at trial." Campbell v. City of San Antonio, 43 F.3d 973, 975 (5th Cir. 1995). When reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court "accepts all well pleaded facts as true, viewing them in light most favorable to the plaintiff." Guidry v. American Public Life Insurance Co., 512 F.3d 177, 180 (5th Cir.2007). "Factual allegations must be [substantial] enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on assumption that all allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d. 929 (2007). The Fifth Circuit summarizes its standard for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) as follows: "viewing the facts as pled in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, a motion to dismiss or for a judgment on the pleadings should not be granted if a complaint provides enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Jebaco, Inc. v. Harrah's Operating Co., 587 F.3d 314, 318 (5th Cir.2009).
Plaintiff contends that Mike permitted his wife, Terry Massey, individually and as part of three partnerships, along with Lyndale Farms, Inc., Lyndale Equipment, LLC, Michael Massey, Inc., Mike and Michael, Inc. and Michael and Elizabeth, Inc. to use and occupy the Land from December 2001 to present without having paid Brandi any rent. Docket 55, p. 4, 11, 12. Brandi seeks to eject these defendants from the Land and payment of rent for years during which the alleged trespass occurred. Id. at 13. Defendants respond that because these defendants were on the Land with Mike's permission, they were not trespassers and do not owe any rent, nor may they be ejected.
Under the rules governing tenancies in common, each cotenant is entitled to use, possession, and occupancy of the whole property. Eden Drainage Dist. v. Yazoo County v. Swaim, 54 So.2d 547, 550 (Miss. 1951). Additionally, cotenants are entitled to possession of the entire property, but not to the exclusion of the other cotenants. Williams v. Sykes, 154 So. 727, 728 (1934).
Trespass to land is the intentional entry upon land in the exclusive possession of another without privilege or consent to enter. Phillip McIntosh, Encyclopedia of Miss. Law § 41:43 (2012). A trespass occurs when a person intentionally invades the land of another without a license or other right. Reeves v. Meridian Southern Ry., LLC, 61 So.3d 964, 968 (Miss. App. 2011). Further, as elaborated by the court in Leffler v. Sharp, "[a] trespasser is a person who enters the premises of another without license, invitation, or other right, and intrudes for some definite purpose of his own, or at his convenience, or merely as an idler with no apparentpurpose, other than, perhaps, to satisfy his curiosity." 891 So.2d 152, 158 (Miss. 2004), quoting Kelley v. Sportsmen's Speedway, 80 So.2d 785, 791 (1955).
Although trespass is a suitable cause of action when an individual enters upon land without authorization, no action lies when authorization has been given; numerous Mississippi courts have held that the consent of one joint owner or tenant in common is sufficient to bar a claim for trespass. See McCorkle v. Loumiss Timber Co., 760 So.2d 845, 853 (Miss. App. 2000) (). See also Bollinger-Franklin Lumber Co., 87 So. 486, 486 (Miss. 1921) (); Fly Timer Co. v. Waldo, 758 So.2d 1067, 1071 (Miss. App. 2000) ().4 Because these defendants were on the property with the express permission of Mike Massey, a cotenant, Brandi may not maintain a claim for trespass, and her claim for trespass should be dismissed.
Further, Brandi's claim for ejectment must be also dismissed. "To justify action of ejectment by tenant in common against cotenant, plaintiff must have been either actually turned out of possession of land by defendant, or defendant's possession must have been evinced in such way as to amount to total denial of right of plaintiff to possession." Sam v. Allen, 120 So. 568, 569 (Miss. 1929). The Allen court's statement that "[t]he receipt by the defendant of all therents and profits of the land, claiming them as his own, and his refusal, upon demand, to let the plaintiff enter possession, constitute a sufficient ouster of the latter by the former," id., does not apply to this action because Mike has not prevented Brandi from entering or using the land at any time. As such, defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's claims for trespass and ejectment is GRANTED.
Plaintiff alleges that Mike Massey, as her cotenant, "exercised exclusive control over the Land and failed to pay rent, account for the income or pay her the income she is due derived from her interest in the Land as a tenant in common [and] has received CRP credits and farm subsidies and converted and misappropriated Brandi Massey's interest in those funds." Docket 55, p. 14.
Defendants assert that there is no legal basis for a conversion claim against a co-tenant. The Mississippi...
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