Massey v. State
| Citation | 473 N.E.2d 146 |
| Decision Date | 30 January 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 1083S373,1083S373 |
| Parties | Kevin Tyrone MASSEY, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below). |
| Court | Supreme Court of Indiana |
Richard D. Gilroy, Indianapolis, for appellant.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Michael Gene Worden, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
The defendant, Kevin Massey, was convicted at a bench trial of robbery, a Class A felony, Ind.Code Sec. 35-42-5-1 (Burns 1984 Supp.), kidnapping, a Class A felony, Ind.Code Sec. 35-42-3-2 (Burns 1979 Repl.), and resisting law enforcement, a Class A misdemeanor, Ind.Code Sec. 35-44-3-3 (Burns 1984 Supp.). He was sentenced to concurrent terms of twenty-five years, twenty-five years and six months. In this appeal, he raises the following two issues:
1. Whether the trial court erred in admitting into evidence a waiver of rights form which defendant signed as well as defendant's statement to the police; and
2. Whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain the convictions.
A brief summary of the facts from the record most favorable to the state shows that defendant and three accomplices approached the victim as he was walking from his apartment to his automobile. Two of the men had handguns and ordered the victim to open the trunk of his car. When the victim refused, the men took the keys from him, struck him over the head with one of the guns and forced him to get into the trunk. The men took his wallet, gloves, ring and watch; then they locked the trunk and drove away in the car.
One of the victim's neighbors observed the incident and called the police. A police car chased the suspect vehicle and eventually forced it to stop. Two of the men jumped out of the car during the chase and the other two ran from the car as soon as it stopped. The police eventually apprehended the driver of the car and he was identified as defendant. The victim was released from the trunk and was bleeding from a cut to his head where he had been struck with the gun.
Defendant gave a statement to the police in which he said that the robbery and kidnapping were happening when he walked by on his way to a liquor store and he was told by the other men to get in the car and drive. He stated that he did not have any prior knowledge of the robbery, was not armed, and did not receive any of the loot. He was able to give the police the names of two of the other robbers.
Defendant first contends that he did not sign the waiver of rights form voluntarily and that his statement was not voluntarily given because of the coercive tactics of the police. The record shows that defendant was given a waiver of rights form before any questioning began when he was first taken to the police station. Defendant read the form and it was read to him before he signed it. He said that he understood all the rights that he was waiving by giving the statement and that the statement was voluntarily given. The record also shows that the police told defendant they would like his cooperation in locating the three other robbers and explained that he was charged with Class A and Class B felonies and the possible penalties that would go with these crimes.
Defendant now contends that the general remarks about the police wanting his cooperation and the possible penalties he could receive amounted to such a level of coercion that his statement was not voluntarily given. We do not agree.
It is well settled that the question of the admissibility of a statement or confession is controlled by determining from the totality of circumstances whether or not the confession was given voluntarily and not through inducement, violence, threats or other improper influences so as to overcome the free will of the accused. Anderson v. State, (1984) Ind., 466 N.E.2d 27; Grassmyer v. State, (1981) Ind., 429 N.E.2d 248; Schutz v. State, (1981) 275 Ind. 9, 413 N.E.2d 913. The question of voluntariness is one for the trial court. We review the question on appeal as we do other sufficiency matters. We do not weigh the evidence, but rather determine whether there was substantial evidence of probative value to support the trial court's finding. Long v. State, (1981) Ind., 422 N.E.2d 284; Johnson v. State, (1978) 269 Ind. 370, 380 N.E.2d 1236.
It is true that a confession is inadmissible if obtained by a promise of immunity or mitigation of punishment. Ashby v. State, (1976) 265 Ind. 316, 354 N.E.2d 192. However, we have consistently held that vague and indefinite statements by the police about it being in the best interest of the defendant for him to tell the real story or cooperate with the police are not sufficient inducements to render...
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