Massey v. State
| Decision Date | 19 October 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 49A05–1012–PC–808.,49A05–1012–PC–808. |
| Citation | 955 N.E.2d 247 |
| Parties | Alan MASSEY, Appellant–Petitioner,v.STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Respondent. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Hilary Bowe Ricks, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant.Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Ann L. Goodwin, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
Alan Massey shot and killed his girlfriend after she told him that she wanted to end their relationship and that he needed to move out of their residence. The State charged Massey with murder. At trial, Massey argued that he was emotionally devastated when his girlfriend told him that their relationship was over and shot her under sudden heat. Massey asked for and the trial court gave the jury an instruction on voluntary manslaughter. The jury found Massey guilty of murder. The trial court sentenced Massey to the fifty-five-year presumptive term for murder.
Massey brought a direct appeal, but his conviction was affirmed. He then sought post-conviction relief, which was denied. He now appeals the denial of post-conviction relief, arguing that his trial and appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance. Specifically, he asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to ensure that the jury was correctly informed regarding the proof required for a voluntary manslaughter verdict. Massey also contends that his appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to argue that the trial court erroneously imposed the presumptive sentence by balancing an invalid aggravating factor with a valid mitigating factor.
We conclude that even though the jury was improperly instructed regarding the elements of voluntary manslaughter, Massey was not entitled to the voluntary manslaughter instruction in the first place because his girlfriend's words ending their relationship do not constitute sufficient provocation to induce sudden heat. Accordingly, we conclude that Massey did not receive ineffective assistance of trial counsel. As for appellate counsel's failure to raise the sentencing issue, we conclude that Massey has failed to carry his burden to show that the issue was significant and obvious on the face of the record and clearly stronger than the other issues raised. Thus, Massey did not receive ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Finding no error, we affirm the post-conviction courts judgment.
The facts underlying Massey's conviction were set forth in the memorandum decision issued on direct appeal as follows:
Massey and Shirley Mitchell (“Mitchell”) were involved in a romantic relationship for approximately nineteen years. They lived together at an Indianapolis residence on 27th Street, with their son, M.M., and Mitchell's daughter, [L.M.].
In late January of 2004, Mitchell gave Massey a letter indicating that their relationship was over and requesting that Massey find another place to live. Massey moved to his mothers house. On January 31, 2004, Massey returned to the Indianapolis residence and used his key to get inside. He went into the kitchen, prepared a drink, and wrote the following note:
Shirley:
Family:
Clock–in–Out
Use my milatary [sic] picture on my obituary.
Sorry
Love to All
(States Ex. 9.) Massey then went upstairs. M.M. told [L.M.] that Massey was there, and [L.M.] approached her mothers bedroom door and knocked. Mitchell did not answer, but [L.M.] could hear her crying softly. [L.M.] tried to open the door, but it was locked.
[L.M.] heard a gunshot and ran down the stairs. She then remembered that M.M. was upstairs, so she ran back up the stairs and “dragged him down the stairs.” (Tr. 41.) Once they reached the living room, [L.M.] heard more gunshots and heard Massey yell, “call the police.” (Tr. 42.) [L.M.] dialed 9–1–1.
Responding police officers kicked in the bedroom door after Massey assured them that he had put down his gun. The officers discovered that Mitchell had been shot in the head, and Massey had been shot in the stomach. Mitchell subsequently died of her injuries.
Massey v. State, No. 49A04–0506–CR–322, slip op. at 2–3, 844 N.E.2d 1080 (Ind.Ct.App. Feb. 21, 2006). On February 5, 2004, the State charged Massey with murder. Trial by jury was held May 2 and 3, 2005. At trial, Massey did not deny that he shot and killed Mitchell, but argued that he was guilty of voluntary manslaughter, rather than murder, because he shot Mitchell under sudden heat. The trial court provided the jury with an instruction regarding voluntary manslaughter, but the jury found Massey guilty as charged. At the sentencing hearing on May 20, 2005, the trial court found one aggravating factor, Massey's conviction for operating while intoxicated, to be in equipoise with one mitigating factor, Massey's military service, and sentenced Massey to the presumptive term of fifty-five years.
Massey appealed, raising three issues: (1) whether the trial courts instruction on voluntary manslaughter constituted fundamental error; (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion by refusing his tendered instruction on the lesser-included offense of reckless homicide; and (3) whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting certain evidence. Id., slip op. at 2. Another panel of this Court concluded that the voluntary manslaughter instruction failed to properly instruct the jury on the elements of voluntary manslaughter but that the error was not fundamental. Id., slip op. at 6. The panel also concluded that the trial court properly refused to instruct the jury on reckless homicide, and that Massey failed to show reversible error in the admission of evidence. Id., slip op. at 11. Accordingly, the panel affirmed Massey's murder conviction.
On September 30, 2009, Massey filed his petition for post-conviction relief (“PCR”), alleging that (1) his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to ensure that the jury was properly instructed regarding the elements of voluntary manslaughter and (2) his appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to argue that the trial court erred in sentencing him. Appellant's App. at 26–27. On June 11, 2011, a hearing was held on Massey's PCR petition. The parties each filed proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. On November 10, 2010, the PCR court issued its judgment denying Massey's petition.
Massey appeals. Additional facts will be provided.
This is an appeal from the denial of a PCR petition.
We observe that post-conviction proceedings do not grant a petitioner a “super-appeal” but are limited to those issues available under the Indiana Post–Conviction Rules. [Ind. Post–Conviction Rule 1(1) ]. Post-conviction proceedings are civil in nature, and petitioners bear the burden of proving their grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence. Ind. Post–Conviction Rule 1(5). A petitioner who appeals the denial of PCR faces a rigorous standard of review, as the reviewing court may consider only the evidence and the reasonable inferences supporting the judgment of the post-conviction court. The appellate court must accept the post-conviction court's findings of fact and may reverse only if the findings are clearly erroneous. If a PCR petitioner was denied relief, he or she must show that the evidence as a whole leads unerringly and unmistakably to an opposite conclusion than that reached by the post-conviction court.
Shepherd v. State, 924 N.E.2d 1274, 1280 (Ind.Ct.App.2010) (citations omitted), trans. denied.
Massey contends that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to ensure that the jury was correctly instructed regarding voluntary manslaughter. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the right to counsel and the right to effective assistance of counsel. 1 To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance, the petitioner must demonstrate that (1) counsels performance was deficient by falling below an objective standard of reasonableness based on prevailing professional norms; and (2) counsels performance prejudiced the defendant such that there is “a reasonable probability that, but for counsels unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Ritchie v. State, 875 N.E.2d 706, 714 (Ind.2007) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. “[A] court need not determine whether counsels performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052. “If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, ... that course should be followed.” Id.
Massey was charged with murder. To obtain a conviction for murder, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Massey knowingly or intentionally killed another human being. Ind.Code § 35–42–1–1. The only difference between murder and voluntary manslaughter is the existence of sudden heat, which for purposes of voluntary manslaughter is manifested by emotions such as anger, rage, sudden resentment, or terror sufficient to obscure the reason of an ordinary person, prevent deliberation and premeditation, and render the defendant incapable of cool reflection. Evans v. State, 727 N.E.2d 1072, 1077 (Ind.2000). Voluntary manslaughter is defined in Indiana Code Section 35–42–1–3, which provides in relevant part, ...
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