Massey v. Suffolk Cnty.

• Decision Date: 17 September 2019
• Docket Number: 18-CV-0742 (JS)
• Parties: OBATAIYE MASSEY, Petitioner, v. SUFFOLK COUNTY, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

OBATAIYE MASSEY, Petitioner, v. SUFFOLK COUNTY, Respondent.

18-CV-0742 (JS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

September 17, 2019

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner:

Obataiye Massey, prose

#18-A-2714

Wallkill Correctional Facility

Route 208

Box G

Wallkill, New York 12589-0286

For Respondent:

Lauren Tan, Esq.

Suffolk County District Attorney's Office

200 Center Drive

Riverhead, New York 11901

SEYBERT, District Judge:

Pursuant to a Plea Agreement with the Government that included a waiver of his right to appeal or collaterally attack his conviction and sentence, Obataiye Massey ("Petitioner") entered a guilty plea to one count of Criminal Possession of a Firearm in the Second Degree in violation of New York State Penal Law § 265.03(3) and two counts of Criminal Sale of a Firearm in the Third Degree, in violation of New York State Penal Law § 265.11(1). Following the guilty plea, Petitioner was sentenced to four years of incarceration with five years of post-release supervision as to count one, running concurrently with three years incarceration, followed by three years post-release supervision as to counts two and three. (Return, D.E., 17, ¶¶ 3, 10.)

On February 1, 2018, Petitioner filed this pro se Petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 2254. (Pet., D.E. 1.) Petitioner claims in his Petition that (1) his guilty plea was not entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently, and (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel. For the following reasons, his Petition is DENIED in its entirety.

BACKGROUND

The Court will begin with a general overview, adding greater detail in the ensuing analysis. As is the usual practice, the facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. See Garbutt v. Conway, 668 F.3d 79, 80 (2d Cir. 2012).

I. Guilty Plea

On October 16, 2013, Petitioner entered a guilty plea in the County Court of the State of New York, County of Suffolk, as to all three counts of the indictment. (See Plea Tr., D.E. 18, ECF pp. 44-107, 53:7-60:25.)¹ Section 265.03(3) of the New York State Penal Law, charged in count one, states in pertinent part that "[a] person is guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree when . . . such person possesses any loaded firearm. Such possession . . . shall not constitute a violation . . . if such possession takes place in such person's home or place of business." Section 265.11 of the New York State Penal Law, charged in counts two and three, provides that "[a] person is guilty of criminal sale of a firearm in the third degree when such person is not authorized pursuant to law to possess a firearm and such person unlawfully either: (1) sells, exchanges, gives or disposes of a firearm or large capacity ammunition feeding device to another person; or (2) possesses a firearm with the intent to sell it."

At Petitioner's guilty plea, the Honorable James Hudson, County Court Judge, asked Petitioner a series of standard plea allocution questions. Before Petitioner entered his guilty plea, Judge Hudson confirmed that he was competent to plead guilty and that he understood the rights he forfeited by choosing to plead guilty. (See Plea Tr. 47:25-53:13.) The Court stated:

[A]s part of our plea agreement, in exchange for my promise regarding the proposed more merciful sentence for you, you are being asked to give up and to waive any and all basis that you may have for an appeal and any and all of your appellate rights; do you understand this?

(Plea Tr. 44:23-45:5.) Petitioner confirmed that he understood that he was waiving his right of appeal. (Plea Tr. 45:8-46:25.)

Petitioner also confirmed that he had enough time to discuss the plea with his attorney and that he was satisfied with his counsel's representation. (Plea Tr. 42:4-14.) Further, Petitioner confirmed that he was not under the influence of any drugs, medicine, alcohol, or substance which could affect his ability to understand the consequences of his guilty plea, (Plea Tr. 47:25-48:5), that his guilty plea was voluntary and of his own free will, (Plea Tr. 47:18-24), and that he was guilty of the charge, (Plea Tr. 53:10-13). Lastly, Petitioner acknowledged that he was aware of the constitutional rights that he was waiving, (Plea Tr. 43:16- 46:25), that he understood the charges he was pleading guilty to, (Plea Tr. 61:12- 62:10), and that he was aware of the maximum and minimum sentence he would face if convicted at trial (Plea Tr. 9:14-18, 11:7-12:5).

Petitioner then admitted that he possessed a 45-caliber firearm on February 28, 2012, he did not possess the firearm in his home or place of business, and that he was acting in concert with another person, namely Jason C. Bullock, whom Petitioner identified as his cousin, satisfying count one of the charges. (Plea Tr. 58:20-59:15.) Petitioner also admitted to having unlawfully sold that firearm to another person, acting in concert with his cousin, satisfying count three of the charges. (Plea Tr. 59:16-60:6.) Lastly, Petitioner admitted to knowingly and unlawfully selling a 22-caliber firearm to another person on February 16, 2012, satisfying count two of the charges. (Plea Tr. 60:7-22.) Judge Hudson acknowledged the guilty pleas as fully satisfying the charges before the court. (Plea Tr. 62:11-13.)

II. Sentence

Petitioner was sentenced on November 25, 2013. Prior to imposing sentence, the court informed Petitioner it considered the plea agreement and the recommendations made by the Government. (Sentencing Tr., D.E. 18, ECF pp. 108-26, 8:25-9:10.) The People recommended seven years² incarceration with five years post-release supervision as to count one. (Sentencing Tr. 8:25-9:3.) The court imposed the sentence it had promised during the plea colloquy (Plea Tr. 9:6-12, 48:23-49:15): four years of incarceration, followed by five years of post-release supervision as to count one. (Sentencing Tr. 9:4-10.) As to counts two and three, the court imposed the negotiated-for sentence of three years of incarceration and three years of post-release supervision, with all sentences to run concurrently. (Sentencing Tr. 16:25-17:20.)

III. Appeal

Petitioner, by counsel, appealed his conviction and sentence to the New York State Appellate Division, Second Department. Petitioner's sole argument was that his sentence should be modified in the interest of justice, pursuant to Section 470.15(2)(c) of the Criminal Procedure Law, on the ground that the sentence imposed was unduly harsh and severe. (Pet'r App. Div. Br., D.E. 18, ECF pp. 38-42, at 3-5.)

On April 24, 2015, the Appellate Division affirmed the sentence and held that it was not excessive. People v. Massey, 131 A.D.3d 548, 14 N.Y.S. 3d 699 (2d Dep't 2015). Petitioner sought leave to appeal to the New York State Court of Appeals. On December 1, 2015, the Court of Appeals denied Petitioner's application for leave to appeal. People v. Massey, 26 N.Y.3d 1090, 44 N.E.3d 945, 23 N.Y.S.3d 647 (2015).

IV. The Petition

On February 1, 2018, Petitioner filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that (1) his guilty plea was not entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently, and (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel due to his trial attorney's failure to show him certain video and audio recordings prior to his plea sentence. (See Pet. at 6-7.)

DISCUSSION

The Court will first address the applicable legal standard before turning to the merits of the Petition.

I. The Legal Standard

A habeas corpus petition is not a vehicle to relitigate every issue previously determined in state court. Herrara v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 401, 113 S. Ct. 853, 961, 122 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1993). Rather, a state prisoner seeking habeas relief under Section 2254 must show that he is "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treatises of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). "[T]he petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that his constitutional rights have been violated." Jones v. Vacco, 126 F.3d 408, 415 (2d Cir. 1997).

Section 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), provides, in part, that:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was not adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim-(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established [f]ederal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

As the Second Circuit noted in Jones v. Stinson, 229 F.3d 112, 119 (2d Cir. 2000), the Supreme Court has

construed the amended statute so as to give independent meaning to 'contrary [to]' and 'unreasonable.' Under the 'contrary [to]' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.

229 F. 3d 112, 119 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1523, 146 L. Ed. 2d 389 (2000). "Under the 'unreasonable application' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts." Williams, 529 U.S. at 413, 120 S. Ct. at 1523. This standard does not require that reasonable jurists all agree that the state court was wrong. See id. at 409-10. Rather, the standard "falls somewhere between 'merely erroneous and unreasonable to all reasonable jurists.'" Stinson, 229 F.3d at 119 (quoting Francis S. v. Stone, 221 F.3d 100, 109 (2d Cir. 2000)).

The Section 2254(d) standard is "difficult to meet" for two reasons. White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 419, 134 S. Ct. 1697,...