Massi v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Mut. of Ohio, No. C87-3099.

• Decision Date: 22 May 1991
• Docket Number: No. C87-3099.
• Parties: Luciano MASSI, Plaintiff, v. BLUE CROSS & BLUE SHIELD MUTUAL OF OHIO, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio

765 F. Supp. 904

Luciano MASSI, Plaintiff, v. BLUE CROSS & BLUE SHIELD MUTUAL OF OHIO, et al., Defendants.

No. C87-3099.

United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, E.D.

May 22, 1991.

David A. Forrest, Jeffries & Monteleone, Cleveland, Ohio, for plaintiff.

Michael J. Frantz, Carl H. Gluek, Thompson, Hine & Flory, Cleveland, Ohio, for defendants.

ORDER

BATTISTI, District Judge.

Before the court is Defendant Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ohio's ("Blue Cross") motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff Luciano Massi's complaint alleges violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., and asserts state law claims for breach of employment contract, promissory estoppel, and negligent and/or intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief and an award of back pay, compensatory damages and punitive damages.

Jurisdiction in the federal district court is predicated upon the alleged violations of the federal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was initially hired by Blue Cross in 1967. Deposition of Luciano Massi (hereinafter referred to as the Massi Deposition), taken October 8, 1988, at 9. Massi held several positions with Blue Cross, the last being Financial Research Coordinator. Id. at 12.

The parties have provided somewhat varying descriptions of the Plaintiff's duties as a Financial Research Coordinator. Massi claims that his job was to gather statistical and financial reports and data from hospitals, analyze the data submitted, and then generate reports which were used internally by Blue Cross. In addition, he claims to have provided services to hospitals and nursing homes such as preparing special reports and interpreting data.

The Defendant claims that "Plaintiff was responsible for collecting historical cost data from hospitals and nursing homes and from this data he would generate the quarterly cost report which provided historical cost data of medical providers in Northern Ohio." Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, at 3; see Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit A (Affidavit of Thomas Campanella) (hereinafter referred to as the Campanella Affidavit), at ¶ 4.

The Defendant claims that the importance of quarterly cost reports diminished greatly when Blue Cross changed from a retrospective reimbursement plan to a prospective reimbursement plan shortly before February, 1986. See Campanella Affidavit, at ¶¶ 2-4. Allegedly as a result of this change, Campanella, the Director of Provider Finance Contracting¹ at Blue Cross, determined that Plaintiff's position could be eliminated with any essential duties being transferred to the Plaintiff's immediate supervisor, Jonathan Swift.² Id. at ¶ 4.

On March 26, 1986, an Open Positions Form was posted on bulletin boards in the Defendant's building. Massi Deposition, Defendant's Exhibit 10 (copy of Open Positions Form). The form announced an opening for a Financial Analyst who would report to Campanella. The duties involved in the position were described as follows:

1) Analyze financial information used to negotiate on a provider-by-provider basis;

2) help in the planning and monitoring of the DRG system;

3) help negotiate financial reimbursements with providers; and

4) assist Manager and Director on special projects.

Id. The form also listed the following six qualifications:

1. Graduate business degree (MBA) or CPA or extensive work experience as a financial analyst.

2. Experience interfacing with senior management.

3. Four (4) years working experience in a business environment.

4. Excellent written and oral communications skills.

5. Familiarity with personal computers and general software applications.

6. Exposure to insurance or health care industry.

Id.

On April 15, 1986, Campanella and John Surgala, the Manager of Employee Relations, informed the Plaintiff that his position was being eliminated. At the time, the Plaintiff was forty-four years old.

Surgala then asked the Plaintiff to review a voluntary resignation agreement, and subsequently went through its various terms and conditions with the Plaintiff. Massi Deposition, at 173. Plaintiff stated that "Surgala told me ... `This is your agreement. And make sure you read it, you understand it, you feel comfortable with it.' He was honest about it." Id. at 173-74.

When Plaintiff questioned Surgala about the consequences of not signing the agreement he was allegedly told that if he didn't sign, he would not receive any benefits. Id. at 175. Asked if he could have a copy to take with him to review, the Plaintiff was allegedly told that he could have all the copies he wanted after he signed the agreement. Id. at 176.

After requesting that some incorrect dates be changed, the Plaintiff signed the agreement. The agreement essentially provided the Plaintiff with salary and health insurance for three months from the date of discharge, and for an additional three months if he was unable to find work.³ In return, the Plaintiff agreed to voluntarily resign, and accepted the following waiver:

In consideration of the premises herein contained, Employee hereby releases and discharges Blue Cross, its subsidiaries and affiliates, and officers, directors, employees and agents of any of the foregoing, from and against any and all claims, liabilities, causes of action, or otherwise whether or not known, accrued, or matured, arising out of the relationship between Employee and Blue Cross, as it may have existed prior to the date hereof. Employee understands and agrees that the foregoing includes, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, all claims for compensation, fringe or other benefits, or any claims asserted as a consequence of any form of discrimination under any applicable laws, doctrines, regulations or otherwise....

See Plaintiff's Complaint, Exhibit A (copy of agreement) (emphasis added).

Plaintiff admits that he has received all of the benefits promised in the agreement, including the additional three months of salary and benefits.

Plaintiff has submitted the affidavits of two other former Blue Cross employees which indicate that the treatment afforded the Plaintiff was not unusual. See Affidavits of Robert Flowers and Robert Wright, affixed to Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.

Shortly after Mr. Massi left Blue Cross, Campanella requested that Mary Burkhart be transferred into the Provider Finance Contracting Unit. Campanella Affidavit, at ¶ 5. Campanella claims that Burkhart was a Financial Analyst in another unit and an "expert" in the area of the newly adopted prospective reimbursement plan. Id. Campanella further asserts that Burkhart possesses an MBA degree, remained a Financial Analyst in the Provider Finance Contracting Unit, and that the position of Financial Analyst involved a "completely different job responsibility" than the position formerly held by the Plaintiff.⁴ Id. at ¶¶ 5-6.

Plaintiff alleges that he was in fact replaced by Ms. Burkhart because she was younger and because his salary requirements were higher due to his many years of service with defendant employer. In the alternative, Plaintiff claims that he met the minimum requirements for the job filled by Ms. Burkhart.

On November 24, 1987, Plaintiff filed his complaint in the instant action. In it, he alleged violation of the ADEA, breach of employment contract, promissory estoppel, and negligent and/or intentional infliction of emotional distress.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The granting of summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must view all facts and inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Sims v. Memphis Processors, Inc., 926 F.2d 524, 527-28 (6th Cir.1991) (citation omitted).

"The moving party has the burden of showing the absence of genuine disputes over facts which, under the substantive law governing the issue, might affect the outcome of the action." Harris v. Adams, 873 F.2d 929, 931 (6th Cir.1989) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). By contrast, the nonmoving party "is required to present some significant probative evidence which makes it necessary to resolve the parties' differing versions of the dispute at trial." 60 Ivy Street Corp. v. Alexander, 822 F.2d 1432, 1435 (6th Cir. 1987) (citing First Nat'l Bank of Arizona v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 1592-93, 20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968)). The nonmoving party is required to go beyond the pleadings "and by his own affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate specific fact showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

III. WAIVER OF CLAIMS

The Defendant's argue that the complaint in the instant case must be dismissed because the Plaintiff signed a valid and binding waiver of claims.

A. Plaintiff's ADEA Claim

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has held that "public policy weighs in favor of allowing ... releases of private rights under the ADEA." Shaheen v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 873 F.2d 105, 107 (6th Cir.1989) (citations omitted). In keeping with this principle, the court has formulated a two step review procedure for evaluating the validity of ADEA waiver agreements. Id.

First, the court must determine whether the agreement was signed in an atmosphere in which "overreaching or exploitation was not inherent," and whether...