Mastandrea v. Snow

• Decision Date: 02 February 2022
• Docket Number: 1D20-3713
• Parties: Roland MASTANDREA, Appellant, v. Sherri SNOW, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

333 So.3d 326

Roland MASTANDREA, Appellant,

v.Sherri SNOW, Appellee.

No. 1D20-3713

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

February 2, 2022

Jack Andreas Krumbein of Krumbein Law PLLC, Jacksonville, for Appellant.

Robert Aguilar of Aguilar & Sieron, P.A., Green Cove Springs, for Appellee.

Per Curiam.

The appellant, a city councilman, challenges the trial court's dismissal of his defamation lawsuit against the appellee, a resident of the city he represented. On appeal, the councilman argues that the trial court erred because it granted the resident's motion for summary judgment and applied section 768.295, Florida Statutes (2020), which is also known as the anti-SLAPP statute. We find the trial court correctly granted the resident's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the councilman's petition.

The resident filed her motion for summary judgment shortly after the complaint was filed. Her motion for summary judgment was based on two theories. First, she was entitled to summary judgment because the anti-SLAPP statute applied. Second, even if the anti-SLAPP statute did not apply, she was entitled to summary judgment because there was no proof that she made her statements with actual malice.

In order for the anti-SLAPP statute to apply, the resident was required to prove, in addition to other things, that the councilman filed a meritless lawsuit. § 768.295(3), Fla. Stat. (2020). The resident was also required to prove the lawsuit was meritless if the anti-SLAPP statute did not apply. To determine whether the councilman's lawsuit had merit, the trial court first had to determine whether the councilman was a public figure because a different standard applies to public figures. If the plaintiff is a public figure, he must show that the defendant made the statements with actual malice, which has been defined as knowing the statements were false at the time they were made or making the statements with a reckless disregard of the truth. Mile Marker, Inc. v. Petersen Publ'g, L.L.C. , 811 So. 2d 841, 845 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). If the plaintiff is not a public figure, he must show the defendant made the statements negligently. Id.

The actual malice standard became the national standard for public figures suing for defamation in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan , 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964). Until that time, some states had held that an actual malice standard applied, and others had not. Id. at 280, 84 S.Ct. 710. After examining the reasons for and against applying the actual malice standard, the United States Supreme Court decided that the First Amendment demanded the application of the higher actual malice standard. Id. at 268-84, 84 S.Ct. 710. The court reasoned that without this standard, people were more likely to curtail their criticism of the government. Id. at 283-84, 84 S.Ct. 710.

During oral argument, the councilman conceded he was a public figure. As a result, the actual malice standard applies. In addition to the presence of actual malice, the trial court had to review the summary judgment evidence to determine if the following additional elements were present: (1) publication of the statement; (2) falsity of the statement; (3) actual damages; and (4) the statement was defamatory. Jews For Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp , 997 So. 2d 1098, 1105-06 (Fla. 2008). After hearing argument of counsel and reviewing the evidence filed in support of and opposing the resident's motion for summary judgment, the trial court determined that there was no evidence that the resident knew her statements were false or that the statements were made with a reckless disregard for the truth. On appeal, the councilman has argued that the trial court erred when it made that determination. Since that element is necessary for this Court to determine whether summary judgment was proper under either of the resident's theories, we begin our review there.

After reviewing the entire record on appeal, we find the trial court correctly determined there was no evidence of actual malice. As such, the trial court correctly determined that the resident was entitled to summary judgment and dismissal of the councilman's complaint. Having found the trial court correctly granted the resident's motion for summary judgment, we do not need to examine the other elements necessary to sustain the trial court's determination that the anti-SLAPP statute applied.

AFFIRMED .

Roberts and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur; B.L. Thomas, J., concurs with opinion.

B.L. Thomas, J., concurring with opinion.

I concur because I am bound by the decision of New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964).

But I agree with Justice Clarence Thomas, Justice Neil Gorsuch, Judge Lawrence Silberman, and others, that New York Times was wrongfully decided and was not grounded in the history or text of the First Amendment. Appellant and other public-figure defamation plaintiffs should not have to prove that the alleged defamation was made with the knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of the truth, as this is an "almost impossible" burden:

... Under this Court's First Amendment precedents, public figures are barred from recovering damages for defamation unless they can show that the statement at issue was made with " ‘actual malice’—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." New York Times , supra , at 280, 84 S. Ct. 710. Like many plaintiffs subject to this "almost impossible" standard , McKee was unable to make that showing. SeeDun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. , 472 U.S. 749, 771, 105 S. Ct. 2939, 86 L.Ed. 2d 593 (1985) (White, J., concurring in judgment).

....

... New York Times and the Court's decisions extending it were policy-driven decisions masquerading as constitutional law. Instead of simply applying the First Amendment as it was understood by the people who ratified it, the Court fashioned its own " ‘federal rule[s]’ " by balancing the "competing values at stake in defamation suits." Gertz , supra , at 334, 348, 94 S. Ct. 2997 (quoting New York Times , supra , at 279, 84 S. Ct. 710 ).

We should not continue to reflexively apply this policy-driven approach to the Constitution. Instead, we should carefully examine the original meaning of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. If the Constitution does not require public figures to satisfy an actual-malice standard in state-law defamation suits, then neither should we.

McKee v. Cosby , ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 675, 675–76, 203 L.Ed. 2d 247 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring) (mem.) (emphasis added).

New York Times has inflicted real injury on society:

The lack of historical support for this Court's actual-malice requirement is reason enough to take a second look at the Court's doctrine. Our reconsideration is all the more needed because of the doctrine's real-world effects. Public figure or private, lies impose real harm. Take, for instance, the shooting at a pizza shop rumored to be "the home of a Satanic child sex abuse ring involving top Democrats such as Hillary Clinton," Kennedy, ‘Pizzagate’ Gunman Sentenced to 4 Years in Prison, NPR (June 22, 2017), www.npr.org/section/thetwo-way/2017/06/22/533941689/pizzagate-gunman-sentenced-to-4-years-in-prison. Or consider how online posts falsely labeling someone as "a thief, a fraudster, and a pedophile" can spark the need to set up a home-security system. Hill, A Vast Web of Vengeance, N. Y. Times (Jan. 30, 2021), www.nytimes.com/2021/01/30/technology/change-my-google-results.html. Or think of those who have had job opportunities withdrawn over false accusations of racism or anti-Semitism. See , e.g., Wemple, Bloomberg Law Tried To Suppress Its Erroneous Labor Dept. Story, Washington Post (Sept. 6, 2019), www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/09/06/bloomberg-law-tried-suppress-its-erroneous-labor-dept-story. Or read about Kathrine McKee—surely this Court should not remove a woman's right to defend her reputation in court simply because she accuses a powerful man of rape. SeeMcKee , 586 U. S., at –––– - ––––, 139 S. Ct. at 675–676 (opinion of THOMAS, J.).

The proliferation of falsehoods is, and always has been, a serious matter . Instead of continuing to insulate those who perpetrate lies from traditional remedies like libel suits, we should give them only the protection the First Amendment requires.

Berisha v. Lawson , ––– U.S. ––––, 141 S. Ct. 2424, 2425, 210 L.Ed. 2d 991 (2021) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (mem.) (emphasis added).

As Justice Gorsuch recognized, public-figure plaintiffs essentially have no legal recourse under New York Times . And many people injured by "grievous defamation" are not office holders or other famous people, but innocent victims caught by this definition, leaving no judicial remedy for the harm inflicted on them by the media and other defendants. Very few can hope to prevail under the immunity granted defamation defendants by New York Times, as reflected in the extremely low number of defamation suits:

... But over time the actual malice standard has evolved from a high bar to recovery into an effective immunity from liability . Statistics show that the number of trials involving defamation, privacy, and related claims based on media publications has declined dramatically over the past few decades: In the 1980s there were on average 27 per year; in 2017 there were 3. Logan 808–810 (surveying data from the Media Law Resource Center). For those rare plaintiffs able to secure a favorable jury verdict, nearly one out of five today will have their awards eliminated in post-trial motions practice. Id., at 809. And any verdict that manages to make it past all that is still likely to be reversed on appeal. Perhaps in part because this Court's jurisprudence has been understood to invite appellate courts to engage in the unusual practice of revisiting a jury's factual determinations de novo , it appears just 1 of every 3 jury awards now survives

...