Mastec N. Am., Inc. v. Wilson

• Citation: 325 Ga.App. 863,755 S.E.2d 257
• Decision Date: 28 February 2014
• Docket Number: No. A13A2473.,A13A2473.
• Parties: MASTEC NORTH AMERICA, INC. et al. v. WILSON.
• Court: United States Court of Appeals (Georgia)

325 Ga.App. 863

755 S.E.2d 257

MASTEC NORTH AMERICA, INC. et al.

v.WILSON.

No. A13A2473.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Feb. 28, 2014.

Huff, Powell & Bailey, Michael Roger Boorman, Atlanta, Leslie Evan Cline, for Appellants.

Andy Joel Williams Jr., Blakely, Law & Moran, Peter Andrew Law, Amanda Lynn Evans, for Appellee.

ELLINGTON, Presiding Judge.

Pursuant to a granted application for interlocutory appeal, MasTec North America, Inc. (“MasTec”), and Gregory Piccione, defendants below, challenge an order of the State Court of Carroll County denying their joint motion for partial summary judgment on GildaWilson's claims for punitive damages and for negligent hiring, retention, supervision, and entrustment, in this suit arising from an automobile collision. Because Piccione and MasTec demonstrated that they were entitled to judgment in their favor on these claims, the trial court erred in denying the motion. Consequently, we reverse the court's order.

A grant of summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9–11–56(c). “Summary judgments enjoy no presumption of correctness on appeal, and an appellate court must satisfy itself de novo that the requirements of OCGA § 9–11–56(c) have been met.” (Citations omitted.) Cowart v. Widener, 287 Ga. 622, 624(1)(a), 697 S.E.2d 779 (2010). “Thus, to prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact, so that the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 623(1)(a), 697 S.E.2d 779. We view the evidence of record, as well as all inferences that might reasonably be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. at 624(1)(a), 697 S.E.2d 779.

So viewed, the record shows the following. In her complaint, Wilson alleges that, on May 8, 2009, Piccione, while driving a commercial pickup truck owned by MasTec, ran a red light and struck the car that she was driving, causing her serious injuries. Piccione denied that the accident was his fault and contends that Wilson ran the light. The record shows that, on the day of the collision, Piccione was on his way to pick up a work crew. MasTec admits that Piccione was in the course of his employment when the accident occurred. Piccione deposed that he was in no rush to meet the crew, he was alert and well-rested, he was not sick or impaired in any way, he had not consumed any medication or alcohol, and he was focused on the road. Although Piccione was talking to his fianceé on the phone when the collision occurred, he was using a hands-free device.

The collision occurred during morning traffic at the intersection of Highway 166 and South Park Street, a double intersection with two sets of traffic lights on either side of a median. Wilson, who was ejected from her car during the collision, was cited for failing to wear her seatbelt. Given the conflicting accounts of how the accident occurred by the drivers and the eyewitnesses, the police cited both parties for running the red light.

Piccione was not convicted of running the red light. Rather, without the advice of counsel and to avoid legal expenses, he pled guilty to a “reduced” charge of driving “too fast for conditions.” ¹ There is no evidence in the record establishing how fast Piccione was driving or whether he was exceeding the posted speed limit at the time of the accident.

Wilson sued Piccione for negligence and she sued MasTec under a theory of imputed liability. Wilson also sought punitive damages against both defendants and brought a separate claim for negligent hiring, retention, supervision, training, and entrustment against MasTec. In support of her claims against MasTec for punitive damages and negligent hiring, Wilson showed that MasTec had done a background check on Piccione on March 3, 2008, and that it knew that Piccione had been convicted three times for speeding, twice in 2002 and once in 2005, and that he also had been convicted in 2004 for failing to obey a stop sign.

The citations were issued to Piccione while he was driving his personal vehicle. There is no evidence that Piccione had been cited for a traffic violation while driving a commercial vehicle. Piccione was 46 years old at the time of the accident and had been driving for 31 years. He had obtained his “class five” driver's license (the predecessor to a commercial driver's license) around 1985. Around 1998, he obtained a commercial driver's license and he has maintained the license continuously since then.

When Piccione was hired by MasTec in March of 2008, he had never been in an automobile accident before the instant one, and it is undisputed that Piccione had no traffic citations in the three years ² preceding his employment with MasTec. There is no evidence in the record that MasTec had ever received any complaints concerning Piccione's driving. Piccione's driver's license had never been suspended or restricted (except for corrective lenses). Further, in the first six months after being hired by MasTec, Piccione completed a defensive driving class required by the company, and a follow-up review of Piccione's driving record revealed no citations during his first year of employment. The record shows that, on March 11, 2008, Piccione reviewed and signed the MasTec Employee Handbook, which contained driver safety guidelines.

Both Piccione and MasTec argue that the undisputed facts do not support an award of punitive damages against them and that the trial court erred in denying its motion as to these claims. And, since a punitive damages claim is required to support Wilson's claim against MasTec for negligent hiring, retention, supervision, and training, MasTec argues that it is entitled to summary judgment as to this claim, too. We agree.

Absent evidence supporting a valid claim for punitive damages against MasTec, Wilson's claims sounding in negligent entrustment, hiring, and retention fail. As we have explained,

when an employer admits the applicability of respondeat superior, it is entitled to summary judgment on claims for negligent entrustment, hiring, and retention. The rationale for this is that, since the employer would be liable for the employee's negligence under respondeat superior, allowing claims for negligent entrustment, hiring, and retention would not entitle the plaintiff to a greater recovery, but would merely serve to prejudice the employer. An exception exists for this general rule, however, where a plaintiff has a valid claim for punitive damages against the employer based on its independent negligence in hiring and retaining the employee or entrusting a vehicle to such employee. In such case, it cannot be said that the negligence claims against the employer are merely duplicative of the respondeat superior claim. Under these circumstances, the employer is not entitled to summary judgment on the negligent entrustment, hiring, and retention claims.

(Footnote and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Kelley v. Blue Line Carriers, 300 Ga.App. 577, 580(2), 685 S.E.2d 479 (2009). See also Durben v. American Materials, 232 Ga.App. 750, 751(1), 503 S.E.2d 618 (1998) (accord).

Thus, to support its claims against MasTec based on its alleged independent negligence, it was incumbent upon Wilson to produce evidence sufficient to support an award of punitive damages with respect to that alleged negligence. OCGA § 51–12–5.1(c) provides that “[p]unitive damages shall be awarded not as compensation to a plaintiff but solely to punish, penalize, or deter a defendant.” Given the punitive nature of such damages, OCGA § 51–12–5.1(b) provides that

[p]unitive damages may be awarded only in such tort actions in which it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant's actions showed willful misconduct, malice, fraud, wantonness, oppression, or that entire want of care which would raise the presumption of conscious indifference to consequences.

Negligence, even if gross, will not alone authorize the recovery of punitive damages; there must be circumstances of aggravation and...