Masters v. Daniel Intern. Corp., 88-1345

Citation917 F.2d 455
Decision Date23 October 1990
Docket NumberNo. 88-1345,88-1345
Parties118 Lab.Cas. P 56,549, 5 Indiv.Empl.Rts.Cas. 1454 Ronald MASTERS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. DANIEL INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, Respondent-Appellee.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (10th Circuit)

Dan L. Wulz of Bryan, Lykins, Hejtmanek & Wulz, Topeka, Kan., for petitioner-appellant.

Leonard J. Spooner of Thompson, Mann and Hutson, Greenville, S.C., Lizabeth Lee Walther of Thompson, Mann and Hutson, Washington, D.C., and Arthur E. Palmer of Goodell, Stratton, Edmonds & Palmer, Topeka, Kan., for respondent-appellee.

Before McKAY and TACHA, Circuit Judges, and RUSSELL, District Judge. *

PER CURIAM.

In our original panel opinion, 895 F.2d 1295, we affirmed the district court's dismissal of Petitioner-Appellant Ronald Masters' Complaint alleging a state-law claim for retaliatory discharge against his employer, Respondent-Appellee Daniel International Corporation ("Daniel"). We held that Section 210 of the Energy Reorganization Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 5851 (the "Act"), pre-empts a state-law claim for retaliatory discharge for reporting nuclear safety violations.

Subsequently, the Supreme Court granted Masters' certiorari petition, vacated our judgment and remanded for further consideration in light of English v. General Electric Co., --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 2270, 110 L.Ed.2d 65 (1990). In English, the Supreme Court held that a state-law tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is not pre-empted by the Act. The Supreme Court concluded that a tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress does not fall within the boundaries of the pre-empted field of nuclear safety, primarily because such a claim does not have enough direct and substantial effect on decisions made by those who build or operate nuclear facilities concerning radiological safety levels. Moreover, the Court found that such a tort claim does not conflict with any particular aspect or congressional goal of the Act.

In light of English, we find that Masters' state-law claim for retaliatory discharge is not pre-empted by the Act. However, our finding is not dispositive of this matter. The district court also dismissed Masters' state-law claim for retaliatory discharge on the basis that the Kansas Supreme Court would not recognize a cause of action for retaliatory discharge under circumstances where an employee has an alternative remedy available to him. The district court found that Masters had an alternative remedy available to him under the Act. In view of this Court's decision on remand that Masters' retaliatory discharge claim is not pre-empted by the Act, we must now determine whether the Kansas Supreme Court would recognize a state-law claim for retaliatory discharge where an alternative remedy is available. 1

We have previously addressed this issue in Polson v. Davis, 895 F.2d 705 (10th Cir.1990). In that case, this Court concluded that the Kansas Supreme Court would not recognize a state-law claim for retaliatory discharge where an adequate alternative remedy is available. We stated, "[t]here is no evidence that the remedies provided for in KAAD (Kansas Acts Against Discrimination) are constitutionally inadequate to compensate plaintiff, or so inadequate to enforce the stated public policy as to require bolstering by a common law cause of action." We thus concluded that Kansas Supreme Court would have adopted the view that KAAD, the statutory remedy at issue, was adequate and would be the exclusive remedy available to an employee.

In our opinion, we did acknowledge that recent Kansas Supreme Court cases; particularly, Coleman v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 242 Kan. 804, 752 P.2d 645 (1988), did cloud this issue. 2 However, we found that in Coleman, the Kansas Supreme Court focused on the inadequacy of the alternative remedy available to the employee in finding that a cause of action for retaliatory discharge would be available. In Polson, we determined that the Kansas Supreme Court would have found that the statutory remedy at issue was adequate and would be the exclusive remedy available to the employee. Therefore, a state-law tort claim for retaliatory discharge would be prohibited.

Relying upon our decision in Polson, we find that the Act at issue also precludes recovery under a state-law claim for retaliatory discharge. In this Court's view, the remedies under the Act like the remedies under KAAD in Polson...

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20 cases
  • Palladino ex rel. U.S. v. Vna of Southern N.J.
    • United States
    • New Jersey Supreme Court
    • June 30, 1999
    ...action exists, preemption is not found. (Def.'s Br. at 15.) The defendants propose three cases to support this claim. The first, Masters v. Daniel Int'l Corp., is not applicable because, upon remand, the Tenth Circuit did not provide an adequate explanation for its reasoning; it simply stat......
  • Flenker v. Willamette Industries, Inc., 80408
    • United States
    • Kansas Supreme Court
    • November 6, 1998
    ...statute provides an adequate alternative remedy. Bair v. Peck, 248 Kan. 824, 838, 811 P.2d 1176 (1991). Masters v. Daniel, Intern. Corp., 917 F.2d 455, 457 (10th Cir.1990), relied on Polson. The question to ask in resolving recognition of a state tort claim for retaliatory discharge is whet......
  • Korslund v. Dyncorp Tri-Cities Services
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • December 22, 2005
    ...the adequacy of redress for the employee rather than whether the public policy is adequately protected. Compare Masters v. Daniel Int'l Corp., 917 F.2d 455, 457 (10th Cir.1990) (remedies under 42 U.S.C. § 5851(b)(2)(B) adequate), with Norris, 881 F.2d at 1151 (remedies under 42 U.S.C. § 585......
  • Horizon Holdings v. Genmar Holdings
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Kansas
    • October 2, 2002
    ...have a federal statutory right. See Conner v. Schnuck Markets, Inc., 121 F.3d 1390, 1399 (10th Cir.1997) (citing Masters v. Daniel Int'l Corp., 917 F.2d 455, 457 (10th Cir.1990)). In fact, the Kansas Supreme Court has acknowledged the Tenth Circuit's Poison decision and concluded that the C......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
3 books & journal articles
  • Begging the Federal Question: Removal Jurisdiction in Wrongful Discharge Cases
    • United States
    • Seattle University School of Law Seattle University Law Review No. 20-01, September 1996
    • Invalid date
    ...state law wrongful discharge action premised upon violations of the [Energy Reorganization Act]."); but cf. Masters v. Daniel Int'l Corp., 917 F.2d 455, 457 (10th Cir. 1990) (Energy Reorganization Act does not support a wrongful discharge claim under Kansas law because the remedies under th......
  • Fire at Will the Status of Judicially Created Exceptions to Employment-at-will in Kansas
    • United States
    • Kansas Bar Association KBA Bar Journal No. 64-02, February 1995
    • Invalid date
    ...F.2d 705 (10th Cir. [Kan.] 1990). [FN220]. K.S.A. 44-1001, et seq. [FN221]. Id. at 709. See also Masters v. Daniel International Corp., 917 F.2d 455 (10th Cir.1990) ("Masters II"), where the court agreed that pursuant to the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in English v. General Electric, 110 S......
  • Admissibility of Settlement Discussions Involving Different Disputes
    • United States
    • Colorado Bar Association Colorado Lawyer No. 22-8, August 1993
    • Invalid date
    ...as to the fate of the absent person." Id. at 715. See also Haynes v. Manning, 717 F.Supp. 730, 733 (D.Kan. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 917 F.2d 455 (10th Cir. 1990) (evidence of plaintiff's settlement with three other persons admitted to assist the trier of fact in understanding the fact......

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