Masters v. New York Cent. R. Co., No. 30624.

• Court: Ohio Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: HART
• Citation: 70 N.E.2d 898,147 Ohio St. 293
• Parties: MASTERS v. NEW YORK CENT. R. CO.
• Decision Date: 15 January 1947
• Docket Number: No. 30624.

147 Ohio St. 293
70 N.E.2d 898

MASTERS
v.
NEW YORK CENT. R. CO.

No. 30624.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Jan. 15, 1947.

[70 N.E.2d 899]

Syllabus by the Court.

1. Wanton misconduct is such conduct as manifests a disposition to perversity, and it must be under such surrounding circumstances and existing conditions that the party doing the act or failling to act must be conscious, from his knowledge of such surrounding circumstances and existing conditions, that his conduct will in all common probability result in injury. (Paragraph two of the syllabus in Universal Concrete Pipe Co. v. Bassett, 130 Ohio St. 567, 200 N.E. 843, 119 A.L.R. 646, approved and followed.)

2. An interrogatory requiring the jury in a personal injury action, in the event the jury finds the defendant guilty of negligence, to specify the act or acts of negligence is a proper inquiry; and the failure or inability of the jury to find the existence of a claimed act of negligence, in answer to interrogatories so submitted, is equivalent to a finding on such claim of negligence against the party having the burden to establish it.

3. The requisite of proximate or legal cause to sustain a recovery in a personal injury action is a limitation which the courts place upon a defendant's responsibility for the consequences of his conduct. In such cases, actual causation is laways essential to liability, but it does not wholly determine it. Legal responsibility is limited to those causes so closely connected with the injurious result as to justify the imposition of liability.

4. A person, who brings about a condition or situation obviously dangerous to himself by voluntarily exposing himself to a hazard created by another, assumes the risk of injury so created and thereby relieves such other of legal responsibility for an injury resulting from such exposures.

5. Where it is undisputed that a prospective passenger, who in attempting to board a moving train suffers injury, is an experienced railroad man with full knowledge equal to that of the train crew of the circumstances relating to the hazard of such boarding, and where minds cannot differ as to the assumption of risk on the part of the prospective passenger, the court may find as a matter of law that the prospective passenger's own conduct was the proximate cause of his injury.

Appeal from Court of Appeals, Lucas County.

Action by Alfred W. Masters against the New York Central Railroad Company for personal injuries. From judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals after allowance of motion to certify the record.-[Editorial Statement.]

Judgment reversed and final judgment for defendant.

TURNER, J., dissenting.

The plaintiff, Alfred W. Masters, was employed by the defendant, The New York Central Railroad Company, as a brakeman for more than 16 years before his injury which is the subject of this litigation.

On March 29, 1942, while off duty, he attempted as a prospective passenger to board a moving passenger train of the company at Adrian, Michigan, for Toledo, Ohio. As a result, he lost his grip on the handhold and was thrown down between the rails and dock. As a result his hand was severely injured requiring the amputation of four fingers.

In his petition he alleged that his injuries were caused solely and proximately by the negligence and carelessness of the defendant in the following respects:

‘1. That defendant prematurely started said train before plaintiff had an opportunity to safely board the same.

‘2. That defendant saw plaintiff on said platform, hurrying to board said train, before said train had started, but nevertheless failed and omitted to hold said train until plaintiff was safely on board.

‘3. That defendant started said train with the trap open at the coach entrance, where plaintiff was about to enter said train.

‘4. That defendant started said train before plaintiff had an opportunity to safely board the same, knowing that the handles of said coach door and the station platform were wet and slippery from rain, sleet and snow.

‘5. That defendant caused said train to be started and operated with such violence and unusual jerks that plaintiff's hand was torn loose from said slippery handhold.

‘6. That defendant started said train before said train was scheduled to depart for Toledo.

‘7. That defendant willfully and wantonly started said train before said train was scheduled to leave said station, although defendant then knew that plaintiff had ample time to safely board said train before said train was scheduled to depart, and all when defendant had definitely promised plaintiff to hold said train for plaintiff until plaintiff had safety boarded the same.

‘8. That defendant willfully and wantonly started said train, as aforesaid, before plaintiff had safely boarded the same, all when plaintiff was in the plain sight of said conductor and the fireman on said train, while approaching and attempting to board the same.

‘9. That defendant willfully and wantonly started said train, with said trap open as aforesaid, knowing that said handholds at said coach entrance were wet and slippery; all when plaintiff was wholly unaware of said slippery condition of said handholds.

‘10. That defendant willfully and wantonly started said train, all as is aforesaid, without warning whatever to plaintiff of its intention so to do.’

The defendant railroad company answered and in its first defense admitted formal matters, denied all others and alleged:

‘Defendant further admits that on or about Sunday, March 29, 1942, plaintiff attempted to board defendant's passenger train as it was leaving defendant's station in Adrian, Michigan, and says that plaintiff did so in a manner and at a time when said train was in motion and traveling at a speed greater than that which would permit a reasonably prudent person in the exercise of ordinary care to safely board said train, all of which plaintiff knew at said time.’

In its second defense defendant alleged also that plaintiff was guilty of negligence in the following particulars:

‘1. In attempting to board defendant's train when the said train was in motion and leaving the station.

‘2. In attempting to board defendant's train at a vestibule entrance of one of the cars of said train at a place which was not

[70 N.E.2d 901]

designated by defendant for use in boarding said train.

‘3. In failing to board said train before the same had started from the station and before or at the time the signal for the starting of said train had been given by defendant's employees, all of which plaintiff had full opportunity to do.

‘4. In attempting to board or get on defendant's train at a time when the speed thereof was greater than that which would permit a reasonably prudent person in the exercise of ordinary care to safely board same, all of which plaintiff knew or in the exercise of ordinary care should have known.

‘5. In failing to exercise ordinary care for his own safety.’

A reply, denying all new matter, was filed.

Upon the trial, motions for a directed verdict were made by the defendant at the conclusion of plaintiff's case and again at the conclusion of all the evidence. These motions were overruled. The defendant requested answers to certain interrogatories which the court submitted to the jury. The jury, nine members concurring, returned a general verdict for the plaintiff and answered the interrogatories. The defendant filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a motion for new trial. The court overruled both motions and entered judgment on the verdict.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court, and the case is here on review following the allowance of a motion to certify the record.

Doyle, Lewis & Warner and Harold A. James, all of Toledo, for appellant.

Brady, Whitehead, O'Connor & Simmons, of Toledo, for appellee.

HART, Judge.

Since no...