Masterson v. Wall

Decision Date03 February 1937
Docket NumberNo. 23659.,23659.
PartiesMASTERSON v. WALL.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Suit by John J. Masterson against John R. Wall. After the death of John J. Masterson, by leave of court, Helen Sweeney, the sole devisee under Masterson's will, filed her amended and supplemental complaint. From a decree dismissing the amended and supplemental complaint, Helen Sweeney appeals.

Affirmed.

HERRICK, C. J., dissenting.Appeal from Superior Court, Cook County; Charles A. Williams, judge.

John J. Kelly and Ernest A. Eklund, both of Chicago (John N. Thornburn, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.

Lloyd C. Whitman, of Chicago, for appellee.

WILSON, Justice.

John J. Masterson filed a complaint in the superior court of Cook county against John R. Wall to cancel a deed and to rescind a contract. The defendant answered the complaint and the cause was referred to a master in chancery. Masterson, who was eighty-nine years of age at the time the suit was filed, died on April 14, 1935. By leave of court Helen Sweeney, the sole devisee under Masterson's will, filed her amended and supplemental complaint. Wall interposed an answer to her complaint. The master recommended that a decree be entered in favor of the defendant. The chancellor overruled plaintiff's exceptions to the master's report and entered a decree approving the report and dismissing the amended and supplemental complaint for the want of equity. From that decree, the substituted plaintiff prosecutes this appeal.

The pertinent facts disclosed by the pleadings and the evidence are as follows: On and prior to November 20, 1934, Masterson owned a parcel of real estate at 5818 Winthrop avenue, Chicago. The building on the premises was a two-story brick structure consisting of two apartments. Masterson, a widower, without descendants, lived in one of these apartments with Michael Dwyer, caretaker of the building. The other apartment was leased. The tenant was in arrears in her rent. Wall is a young attorney at law who lived next door. He became acquainted with Masterson two years prior to his admission to the bar, in 1930. Thereafter he represented Masterson in certain matters. In March, 1934, Masterson retained Wall as his attorney in the administration of his wife's and son's estates. The son's estate had been closed, but the administration of the wife's estate was still pending at the time of making the deed and contract. Wall also wrote Masterson's will in 1934. By it Masterson devised all his property to Helen Sweeney, describing her as ‘my beloved daughter.’ Mrs. Sweeney was not, however, related to him. Wall was appointed executor without bond. On November 1, 1934, Wall visited Masterson at the latter's request. The weather was cold. Masterson had no fuel to heat the house, was wrapped in a coat, and could not eat, as the cold had affected his appetite. On this occasion Masterson asked for a loan of $10 with which to buy oil to heat the apartment. Wall loaned it to him. In response to a query as to whether Mrs. Sweeney would help him, Masterson replied, ‘No, she won't do a damn thing.’ On November 15 and 16 Dwyer, at Wall's home, talked with him relative to an agreement for the support of Masterson. The next day, Masterson, Dwyer, and Wall discussed this matter in the Masterson home. Wall informed Masterson he would not enter into an agreement unless Masterson was represented by another attorney, inasmuch as he had transacted legal matters for Masterson. The latter thereupon directed Wall to procure the services of an attorney. To protect Masterson's rights in the contemplated transaction, Joseph E. Newton, an attorney at law with whom Wall was acquainted, consented to represent him. Newton prepared a contract from the information furnished by Wall, adding a provision to protect Masterson in the event Wall should predecease him. On November 20, Newton, accompanied by Wall and the latter's sister, went to Masterson's apartment. Newton explained to Masterson that Wall had invited him to represent Masterson and inquired whether it was satisfactory. He stated further that there would be no charge for his services, as he understood Masterson had no money. Masterson replied it was all right for Newton to represent him. After giving a copy of the proposed agreement to Dwyer, Newton read the contract aloud, very slowly, paraphrasing the legal language so that there would be no question in the mind of any layman as to its meaning and frequently asked Masterson if he understood it thoroughly. Masterson replied in the affirmative and expressed his satisfaction with the transaction. The contract was then executed.

The agreement recited that Masterson was advanced in years and unable to provide money for his care and sustenance; that Wall had on several occasions aided him financially; that Masterson having known Wall for many years reposed special trust and confidence in him and desired to make an arrangement with him for the purpose of providing support and maintenance. The contract then provided that Masterson would execute a deed to Wall conveying the property at 5818 Winthrop avenue in fee simple; that Wall, on the other hand, would furnish Masterson $12 a week during his lifetime, permit him to occupy the apartment on the first floor rent free, supply him with sufficient oil to heat the apartment, and, further, take out an insurance policy for $2,000 in the Globe Life Insurance Company on Wall's life with Masterson as beneficiary, the premiums to be paid by Wall. In conformity with the contract the deed was executed and delivered. Wall made out his check for $18, representing board for a week and one-half, and delivered it to Masterson. The insurance policy was delivered to Masterson two days later. Wall subsequently paid Newton for his services. Wall made his payments under the contract regularly. Eight checks, for $12 each, in addition to the first one for $18, were accepted by Masterson and cashed. These payments paid the contract up to January 25, 1935. Wall also paid $72.24 for oil between November 23, 1934, and January 21, 1935, and an installment of $11.15 on the refrigerator in the building. Although not required to do so, Wall paid Masterson's past-due gas and electric bills, amounting to $21.37. For a period of approximately two months, these expenditures aggregated $218.76. A letter to Masterson dated December 12, 1934, from a real estate firm, requested information concerning the responsibility and desirability of L. Rivkin as a tenant. Masterson wrote on the original letter, ‘I have sold the house last month,’ and signed his name to this statement.

On January 11, 1935, Wall was in the Masterson apartment. Mrs. Sweeney was present and accused him of taking Masterson's property away from him without the latter knowing it. Masterson confirmed her statement. Wall thereupon asked him if he had not called him in some time prior to November 20, 1934, and asked him to support Masterson for the rest of his life in return for the property. Masterson replied that he had, adding that he understood the agreement and was satisfied with it. On this occasion Wall gave Masterson a chect for $12, which he accepted. Three days later, namely, on January 14, 1935, Masterson filed his complaint, by which he charged that the deed and contract were obtained without an adequate consideration, by means of misrepresentations of the defendant, and that the plaintiff did not, at the time he executed the instruments, understand the nature thereof. The relief sought was the rescission of the contract and the cancellation of the deed, together with a reconveyance to the plaintiff. Masterson died on April 14, 1935, after the cause had been referred to a master in chancery. By her amended and supplemental complaint Helen Sweeney charged, in substance, that on November 20, 1934, Masterson was about ninety years of age, in ill health, weakened mental condition, without income or means of sustenance and in pecuniary distress; that the defendant, as Masterson's attorney, knew these facts and because of the fiduciary relationship existing between Masterson and the defendant Masterson was under improper restraint, was unduly influenced by the defendant to make the agreement and to execute and deliver the deed for the premises to him, and that the consideration therefor was wholly inadequate. Wall's answer averred he had at all times kept the undertakings assumed by him in the contract; denied the weakened mental condition of Masterson and the undue influence over him by the defendant; denied the relationship of attorney and client with respect to the transaction or that the consideration was inadequate; admittedMasterson was in financial need; averred that Mrs. Sweeney did not come into equity with clean hands; denied she had any right to the premises, and averred that she wrongfully and forcibly seized the premises and was holding them in defiance of law and the defendant's rights.

Evidence as to the value of the property ranged from $4,230 to $10,500. The master found its value to be $6,000 and the rental value of each apartment to be $45 as of November 20, 1934. Delinquent taxes and special assessments against the premises amounted to $1,228.68.

Additional facts and circumstances appear from the record. A check dated January 18, 1935, just four days after Masterson's complaint was filed, is in evidence. Wall testified that he sent this check by mail and at the time did not know the proceeding had been instituted against him by Masterson. In this connection the check has written upon it, in typewriting, ‘For week ending January 25, 1935, on agreement for support,’ above the indorsement of Masterson, the payee of the check. A few days later, when Wall offered another check to Masterson at his home, the latter would have accepted it if Mrs. Sweeney had not intervened. She told Masterson that Wall would throw him out in three...

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