Masterton v. Lenox Realty Co.

• Decision Date: 16 July 1940
• Docket Number: 1873
• Citation: 127 Conn. 35,15 A.2d 15
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: MASTERTON et al. v. LENOX REALTY CO.

15 A.2d 15

127 Conn. 35

MASTERTON et al. v. LENOX REALTY CO.

No. 1873

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

July 16, 1940

Appeal from Superior Court, New Haven County; Carl Foster, Judge.

Action by James A. Masterton, executor, and others against the Lenox Realty Company (1873) for the appointment of a receiver wherein a receiver was appointed and a claim in receivership for attorney's fees was filed. From an order for the payment of the claim, plaintiffs and the receiver appeal

No error.

Thomas R. Robinson, James E. Connor, Jr., and Vincent P. Dooley, all of New Haven, for appellants.

Frederick H. Wiggin, Frank E. Callahan and Harrison F Turnbull, all of New Haven, for appellees.

Argued before MALTBLE, C.J., and AVERY, BROWN, JENNINGS, and ELLS JJ.

JENNINGS, Judge.

The question on this appeal is whether the receiver of the defendant is liable for a bill for legal services rendered in advising the defendant in voluntary dissolution and in resisting an attempt to place it in receivership. An appeal from the appointment of the receiver, in the case to which this claim is incident, has been decided at this term. 15 A.2d 11.

On December 23, 1938, the directors of the defendant had voted to terminate its corporate existence under § 3470 of the General Statutes and this action had been confirmed by the stockholders. On the same day the Superior Court in New Haven County took jurisdiction under § 3472 of the General Statutes and various orders were entered in those proceedings. On the first Tuesday of April, 1939, the above captioned suit was returned to the Superior Court in New Haven County. The Lenox Realty Company was the sole defendant and the prayer for relief was that a receiver of the defendant be appointed. This suit is hereafter referred to as the principal suit. The principal suit was tried at length before Judge Daly in the spring of 1939 and on June 2, 1939, judgment was entered appointing a receiver. The firm of Wiggin and Dana, engaged in the practice of law in New Haven, rendered services to the defendant during the proceedings for dissolution and, on its behalf, opposed the appointment of a receiver. It rendered a bill to the receiver on October 31, 1939, within the time limited, for $7500 for services and $58.20 for disbursements. The services were reasonably worth this amount and the disbursements were made. The claim was disallowed by the receiver. On November 1, 1939, Wiggin and Dana made a motion to the court that the claim be allowed and ordered paid. The motion was thereafter heard by the court, Foster J., and was granted on December 6, 1939. At this hearing the amount of the bill was not questioned and the receiver offered no evidence. He claimed that he was not legally liable. An appeal was also taken from the judgment in the principal suit and the finding by the court, Daly, J., was filed December 20, 1939.

Certain of the facts found upon the present appeal were matters of record. The court further found that the defense to the suit for the appointment of a receiver was made in good faith by the defendant and by Wiggin and Dana as its attorneys. The receiver attacks this finding. He concedes the correctness of the rule that where corporate existence is attacked,...