Mastrosimone v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., Civ. No. 14-1710 (NLH)

• Decision Date: 03 August 2015
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 14-1710 (NLH)
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey
• Parties: DAVID T. MASTROSIMONE, Petitioner, v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondents.

DAVID T. MASTROSIMONE, Petitioner, v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondents.

Civ. No. 14-1710 (NLH)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

August 3, 2015

OPINION

APPEARANCES

David Mastrosimone, # 335223C

Southern State Correctional Facility

4295 Route 47

Delmont, NJ 08314

Petitioner, prose

HILLMAN, District Judge

Petitioner David Mastrosimone is a state prisoner currently incarcerated at the Southern State Correctional Facility in Delmont, New Jersey. He is proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in which he challenges the computation of his jail time credits.¹

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner initially filed his Petition pursuant to both 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and § 2241 on March 18, 2014. (ECF No. 1). OnMarch 27, 2014, the Court administratively terminated the case for failure to pay the filing fee or submit a complete application to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 3).

On April 3, 2014, Petitioner paid the filing fee and thereafter filed an Amended Petition. (ECF No. 4). On May 27, 2014, the case was reopened for review by a judicial officer. (ECF No. 5).

Because Petitioner had initially filed his Petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the Court advised Plaintiff of the consequences of such a filing, as required by Mason v. Meyers, 208 F.3d 414 (3d Cir. 2000), in an Order dated February 25, 2015. (ECF No. 6). Pursuant to that Order, Petitioner was to notify the Court whether he wished to have his Amended Petition ruled upon as filed or whether he wished to withdraw his petition and file one all-inclusive § 2254 petition, subject to the applicable statute of limitations. Petitioner did not submit a response. Accordingly, pursuant to the terms of the February 25, 2015 Order, the Court will rule upon the Amended Petition as filed, and does so now.

In the Amended Petition, Petitioner states that he is challenging the New Jersey Department of Corrections' request to modify Petitioner's "jail time credit computation of 660 days to 301 days of jail time credit, and 358 days of gap time credit." (Am. Pet. 2, ECF No. 4).

II. DISCUSSION

A. HABEAS JURISDICTION

As an initial matter, the Court notes that the Amended Petition is submitted on form AO 242 and is labeled as a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Pursuant to the Court's Order dated March 27, 2014, the Clerk of the Court supplied to Petitioner a blank habeas petition form AO 241, which is a form for a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF No. 3). It is therefore unclear why the Amended Petition was submitted on the AO 242 form and filed pursuant to § 2241.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has determined, based on canons of statutory construction, that because § 2254 is more specific and § 2241 more general, a state prisoner must generally seek relief via a § 2254 petition and not via a § 2241 petition. See Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480 (3d Cir. 2001); accord BRIAN R. MEANS, FEDERAL HABEAS MANUAL § 1:34 (May 2013) ("The vast majority of courts have concluded that, although the texts of § 2241 and § 2254 appear similar in their grant of jurisdiction, § 2254 is the exclusive avenue for a state prisoner challenging the constitutionality of his detention. Section 2254 is properly understood as in effect implementing the general grant of habeas corpus authority found in § 2241, even if the petitioner is not challenging theunderlying state court conviction (such as challenges to parole determinations), so long as the person is in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court.") (original emphasis removed); see also Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 662, 116 S.Ct. 2333, 135 L.Ed.2d 827 (1996) ("Our authority to grant habeas relief to state prisoners is limited by § 2254.").

In this case, Petitioner is in custody pursuant to a state court conviction. Therefore, his challenge to the execution of his state court sentence is properly brought under § 2254 rather than § 2241. See Washington v. Sobina, 509 F.3d 613, 618 n. 5 (3d Cir. 2007) ("We have held that a state prisoner challenging the validity or execution of his state court sentence must rely on the more specific provisions of § 2254 rather than § 2241.") (citing Coady, 251 F.3d at 485); DeVaughn v. Dodrill, 145 F. App'x 392, 394 (3d Cir. 2005) (per curiam) ("A prisoner challenging either the validity or execution of his state court sentence must rely on the more specific provisions of § 2254 and may not proceed under § 2241."); Wiggins v. Wolf, Civ. No. 15-656, 2015 WL 1115769 (D.N.J. Mar. 10, 2015).

Accordingly, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the Petition pursuant to § 2241.

Moreover, as set forth above, Petitioner was provided with an AO 241 form for use in habeas petitions filed pursuant to § 2254. Petitioner was also advised of his rights pursuant toMason and he did not object to the Court construing his claim as one filed under § 2254. For the foregoing reasons, his Petition will be assessed under § 2254.

B. STANDARD FOR SUA SPONTE DISMISSAL

"Habeas corpus petitions must meet heightened pleading requirements." McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856 (1994). Habeas Rule 2(c) requires a petition to "specify all the grounds for relief available to the petitioner," "state the facts supporting each ground," "state the relief requested," be printed, typewritten, or legibly handwritten, and be signed under penalty of perjury. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 2(c).

Habeas Rule 4 requires a judge to sua sponte dismiss a petition without ordering a responsive pleading "[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court." 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 4. Thus, "Federal courts are authorized to dismiss summarily any habeas petition that appears legally insufficient on its face." McFarland, 512 U.S. at 856.

Finally, the Court notes that a pro se pleading is held to less stringent standards than more formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). A pro se habeas petition and any supporting submissions must be construed liberally and with a measure of tolerance. See Royce v. Hahn, 151 F.3d 116, 118 (3dCir. 1998); Lewis v. Attorney General, 878 F.2d 714, 721-22 (3d Cir. 1989). Nevertheless, a federal court can dismiss a habeas corpus petition without the filing of an answer if "it appears on the face of the petition that petitioner is not entitled to [habeas] relief." Siers v. Ryan, 773 F.2d 37, 45 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1025 (1989); see also McFarland, 512 U.S. at 856; United States v. Thomas, 221 F.3d 430, 437 (3d Cir. 2000) (habeas petition may be dismissed where "none of the grounds alleged in the petition would entitle [petitioner] to [habeas] relief"); see also Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 655 (2005).

C. THE EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENT

The Supreme Court has held that a court of appeals may raise the issue of exhaustion sua sponte on appeal. See Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129 (1987). "This Court and other circuit courts have extended that holding to conclude that district courts also have authority to raise sua sponte the issue of exhaustion[.]" Nicoloudakis v. Bocchini, No. 13-2009, 2015 WL 4392638, at *4 (D.N.J. July 15, 2015) (citations omitted) (collecting cases). The exhaustion requirement is intended to allow state courts the first opportunity to pass upon federal constitutional claims, in furtherance of the policies of comity and federalism. Granberry, 481 U.S. 129; Rose, 455 U.S. at 516-18. Exhaustion also has the practicaleffect of permitting development of a complete factual record in state court, to aid the federal courts in their review. Rose, 455 U.S. at 519. Therefore, it is appropriate for this Court to raise, sua sponte, the question of whether the exhaustion requirement has been met. See Nicoloudakis, No. 13-2009, 2015 WL 4392638; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(3).

It has long been established that a state prisoner is required to exhaust all available state remedies before filing his federal habeas petition, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), and he bears the burden of demonstrating proper exhaustion. See Rose, 455 U.S. at 515; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) Lines v. Larkins, 208 F.3d 153, 159 (3d Cir. 2000).

"Under Section 2254, a writ of habeas corpus may not be granted unless the applicant has exhausted remedies available in state court or 'unless there is an absence of available corrective state process or state remedies are ineffective.'" Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 488 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Morris v. Horn, 187 F.3d 333, 337 (3d Cir. 1999); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)). Section 2254(c) further provides that "[a]n applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c).

Notably, New Jersey law provides an absolute right to appeal any action or decision of a state administrative agency to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, under: (a) the State Constitution, N.J. Const. Art. VI, Sec. 5, ¶ 4, see Trantino v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 166 N.J. 113, 172, 764 A.2d 940, modified on other grounds, 167 N.J. 619, 772 A.2d 926 (2001); and also under (b) the New Jersey Court Rules. See N.J. Ct. Rule 2:2-3(a)(2). This procedure allows for appeals from "inaction as well as action of a State administrative agency." Trantino v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 296 N.J. Super. 437, 459-460, 687 A.2d 274 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997), modified on other grounds and affirmed, 154 N.J. 1, 710 A.2d 1008 (1998); see also Johnson v. State Parole Board, 131 N.J. Super. 513, 517-18, 330 A.2d 616 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974), cert. denied, 67 N.J. 94, 335 A.2d 47 (1975); accord Petrucelli v. Dep't of Civ. Service, 28 N.J. Super. 572, 575...