Mata v. Anderson

Decision Date24 January 2009
Docket NumberNo. CIV 08–0046 JB/RLP.,CIV 08–0046 JB/RLP.
Citation760 F.Supp.2d 1068
PartiesJuan MATA, Plaintiff,v.Sgt. Ron ANDERSON, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of New Mexico

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Dennis W. Montoya, Montoya Law, Inc., Rio Rancho, NM, for Plaintiff.Alex C. Walker, Lisa Mann, Modrall, Sperling, Roehl, Harris & Sisk, P.A., Albuquerque, NM, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JAMES O. BROWNING, District Judge.

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on the Defendant's Motion and Brief to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint for Failure to Timely Serve or, In the Alternative, Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, filed July 7, 2008 (Doc. 9) (“Motion”). The Court held a hearing on October 23, 2008. The primary issues are: (i) whether the Court should dismiss the suit for failure to timely serve when the Complaint was not served within 120 days potentially had run during the 40 days after the 120 days passed; (ii) whether the Plaintiff Juan Mata has stated the essential element of lack of probable cause for a claim for First–Amendment retaliation where a magistrate court jury found him guilty and a district court judge submitted two of three counts to a jury that acquitted him; (iii) whether Defendant Ron Anderson, a police officer who signed the criminal complaint and the underlying statement of probable cause, enjoys absolute immunity; and (iv) whether Anderson enjoys qualified immunity. The Court will excuse Mata's failure to timely serve and will grant him an extension to complete service. The Court finds that, on the face of his Complaint, Mata has established a claim for First Amendment retaliation. The Court also finds that Anderson is not entitled to absolute or qualified immunity.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On a motion to dismiss, the Court must assume that the Complaint's allegations are true. Thus, the Court sets forth the relevant facts as the Complaint alleges them. This motion, however, also involves some facts that are not ascertainable from the face of the pleadings, but which are necessary to fully understand the context of this lawsuit. The Court will therefore refer at times to facts that appear in exhibits, briefing, and in the transcript of the hearing to provide context. At the same time, the Court remains mindful of the standard for deciding a motion to dismiss.

Mata was one of several Mata family members who filed a civil-rights lawsuit on November 28, 2004. See Mata v. Briseno, No. CIV 04–1334 ACT/RLP, Complaint, filed November 28, 2004 (Doc. 1) (“First Mata case”). Mata, his brother Renee Barraza, and his mother, Gregoria, sued certain agents of the Farmington Police Department. See First Amendment Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights Under Color of State Law ¶ 7, at 2, filed June 18, 2008 (Doc. 6) (“First Amended Complaint”). The First Mata case settled a year later, on November 14, 2005. See Mata v. Briseno, the Honorable Richard L. Puglisi, United States Magistrate Judge's Notice to Docket Clerk at 1, filed November 16, 2005 (Doc. 70) (“Settlement Notice”).1 The lawsuit that led to the November 2005 settlement has some relationship to this lawsuit. According to Mata, Anderson, a law enforcement officer and employee of the Farmington Police Department, became “enraged” because of the news coverage that the settlement received. First Amended Complaint ¶¶ 2 & 8, at 1–2. Motivated by a desire to retaliate against Mata for his outspoken criticism of Farmington police officers, for his protest activities outside the police station, and for the settlement he and his family members obtained in the first lawsuit, Anderson filed a criminal complaint against Juan Mata listing, among other things, criminal libel. See First Amended Complaint ¶¶ 10–13.

Although the First Amended Complaint provides little detail of the criminal proceedings that resulted from the criminal complaint, it is apparent from the briefing, exhibits, and arguments presented at the hearing, that the criminal complaint contained three counts—harassment, stalking, and criminal libel. Mata was tried in a Magistrate Court in San Juan County, and the magistrate jury convicted Mata on all three counts. See Exhibit E to Answer, Magistrate Verdict Forms, filed July 7, 2008 (Doc. 8–6).

Judges who are not usually trained in the law preside over municipal and magistrate courts in New Mexico.2 One of the safeguards against miscarriages of justice built into this structure is a defendant's entitlement to a trial de novo in the state district court. Mata availed himself of this proceeding and sought a trial de novo in the state district court. At the district court, the district judge dismissed the criminal libel charge, finding it unconstitutional, and allowed the other two charges to proceed to the jury. See Transcript of Hearing at 15:19–25 (taken October 23, 2008) (Walker) ( “Tr.”).3 It is to this second trial that Mata refers in his First Amended Complaint, stating: “A jury, after deliberating only a few minutes after trial, declared Plaintiff Juan Mata not guilty of all charges brought against him by Sgt. Anderson.” First Amended Complaint ¶ 20, at 4.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Mata filed this case on January 11, 2008, asserting a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for alleged retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. Anderson asserts that Mata's Complaint is premised on the impossible allegation that a desire to retaliate against Mata for the settlement of the First Mata case motivated Anderson's alleged act of filing the criminal charges. See First Amended Complaint ¶ 10, at 3. According to Mata, this retaliation violated his First–Amendment right of free speech. See id., Count I, at 3. Mata filed his suit in this case for civil-rights violations three years to the day after the criminal charges against him were filed. See State v. Mata, M–47–MR–200500028, Farmington Magistrate Court, Copy of Docket Sheet at 1 (dated January 31, 2005). According to Anderson, the statute of limitations would have run on Mata's claims the day that Mata filed his original complaint. Mata was required to serve Anderson by May 10, 2008. See Fed. R. Civ. 4(m) (“If a defendant is not served within 120 days after the complaint is filed, the court—on motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff—must dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant....”).

1. Service of the First Amended Complaint.

Mata filed his First Amended Complaint on June 18, 2008, which made no substantive change to his allegations and was identical to the original Complaint except that the Amended Complaint omitted an unnumbered prefatory paragraph that related to some other case. Mata filed the Amended Complaint outside of the 120–day period. Although Mata did not attach the criminal complaint to the Complaint or to the First Amended Complaint, the First Amended Complaint makes numerous references to that criminal complaint.

It is undisputed that Mata failed to serve Anderson within 120–days of filing the original Complaint. Mata did not served his Amended Complaint on Anderson until June 19, 2008, 160 days after he filed his Complaint and roughly 40 days after expiration of the 120–day deadline.

Anderson filed an Answer to Mata's First Amended Complaint. See Answer to Amended Complaint, filed July 7, 2009 (Doc. 8) (“Answer”). In his Answer, Anderson raises several equitable defenses, including the defense of unclean hands, see Answer, Affirmative Defense 4, at 4; waiver and estoppel, see Answer, Affirmative Defense 5, at 4, and laches, see Answer, Affirmative Defense 7, at 5. Anderson attached the criminal complaint, along with other exhibits, to his Answer.

Anderson moves the Court for dismissal of Mata's Complaint for failure to effect timely service under rule 12(b)(5) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Motion at 1. Anderson alternatively requests that the Court enter judgment on the pleadings. Anderson requests that the Court dismiss Mata's First Amended Complaint with prejudice. In support of his Motion, Anderson raises several arguments: (i) the Court should dismiss due to the lack of timely service; (ii) the Court should dismiss on the merits because Mata fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; (iii) the Court should dismiss because Anderson is absolutely immune from suit in this case; or (iv) the Court should dismiss the case because Anderson enjoys qualified immunity under the circumstances of this case.

2. Arguments Regarding Failure to Timely Serve and the Statute of Limitations.

Anderson points out that rule 12(b)(5) permits a party to move for the dismissal of a complaint for “insufficiency of service of process.” Motion at 2 (internal quotation marks omitted). He notes that the time limit that rule 4(m) lays out required Mata to complete service of process by May 10, 2008. Anderson quotes part of rule 4(m), and emphasizes the rule's command that, if the 120–day deadline is missed, the Court must dismiss the action without prejudice against the defendant....” Motion at 3 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).

Anderson admits that the original filing came within the applicable statute of limitations and that Mata's filing the lawsuit tolled the statute of limitations for the 120–day period that rule 4(m) provides for effectuating service of process. See Motion at 3. Anderson argues, however, that, although the statute of limitations is tolled during the 120–period, once the 120 days have passed, the clock on the statute of limitations resumes and the statute of limitations again becomes applicable. See id. Anderson insists that the clock began running on Mata's claims on the day that the 120–day period expired and that, shortly thereafter, the limitations period ran out. According to Anderson, the result of Mata's missing the deadline for service of process, and the application of the statute of limitations, is to bar Mata's lawsuit. See id.

Although this result appears harsh, Anderson asks the Court to...

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