Mata v. United States
| Decision Date | 03 September 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 09-796C,09-796C |
| Parties | FLORENTINO L. MATA, Plaintiff, v. THE UNITED STATES, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. Claims Court |
Motion to Dismiss, RCFC 12(b)(1); Subject Matter Jurisdiction; Settlement Agreement Pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e; Cunningham v. United States, 748 F.3d 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Holmes v. United States, 657 F.3d 1303 (2011); Law-of-the-Case Doctrine; 28 U.S.C. § 1631
Lorenzo W. Tijerina, San Antonio, TX, for plaintiff.
Michael P. Goodman, Trial Attorney, with whom were Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney General, Robert E. Kirschman, Jr., Director, and Reginald T. Blades, Jr., Assistant Director, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for defendant. Rebecca Ausprung, Chief, Civilian Personnel Branch, United States Army Litigation Division, Fort Belvoir, VA, of counsel.
Florentino L. Mata (plaintiff or Mr. Mata), a former engineer with the United States Army, brings a breach of contract action against the United States (the government or defendant). Plaintiff alleges that the Army breached three provisions of a settlement agreement entered into by the parties to resolve an employment discrimination claim. See Complaint (Compl.), ECF No. 7, ¶¶ 1, 10-11.1
On February 26, 2014, the court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant with respect to two of plaintiff's breach of contract claims (February 2014 decision). Mata v. United States, 114 Fed. Cl. 736, 746-47, 750-51 (2014). The court stayed the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment as to plaintiff's third breach of contract claim, finding that summary resolution of this issue was premature. Id. at 750. During a telephonic status conference with the parties, defendant sought leave to file a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the third provision of the settlement agreement is not money-mandating. See Order 1, Mar. 18, 2014, ECF No. 67. The court subsequently ordered the parties to brief whether the court possesses jurisdiction over plaintiff's surviving breach of contract claim. Id. at 1-2.
Currently before the court are defendant's motion to dismiss (Def.'s Mot.), ECF No. 68, filed May 9, 2014; plaintiff's response2 (Pl.'s Resp.), ECF No. 73, filed June 6, 2014; and defendant's reply (Def.'s Reply), ECF No. 74, filed June 16, 2014.
For the reasons set forth below, the court concludes that it lacks jurisdiction over plaintiff's sole surviving breach of contract claim. The court does not dismiss plaintiff's complaint as defendant has urged. Rather, the court TRANSFERS this case back to the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas.
The facts and procedural history of this case are set forth in detail in the court's February 2014 decision. See Mata, 114 Fed. Cl. at 740-43. For ease of reference, the court provides an abbreviated version of the relevant background here.
On June 20, 2007, plaintiff and the Army entered into a negotiated settlement agreement (NSA) to resolve Mr. Mata's employment discrimination complaint made pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. See Compl. ¶ 10; Pl.'s Resp. 5-6. Paragraph 3b of the NSA, which is the subject of the dispute currently before the court, provides in relevant part:
As soon as possible during the 120 calendar day period from the effective date of this agreement with the right of Complainant to request an extension of time from the Chief of Staff, based on good cause due to no openings available during the 120 calendar day period, [U.S. Army South (USARSO)] shall make a good faith attempt to laterally transfer/reassign[C]omplainant to an equivalent position for which he is qualified, in a directorate outside of [Deputy Chief of Staff, Engineer (DCSENG)] but within USARSO. USARSO HR shall forward to the Complainant and [the Civilian Personnel Advisory Center (CPAC)] notice of any valid vacancy for which the Complainant could be deemed to be qualified by CPAC. CPAC will determine if Complainant is qualified for the vacancy and will notify the Chief of Staff of any positions for which he qualifies. The Chief of Staff will make the final determination as to the acceptability of the recommendation . . . .
Compl. at 26 (NSA ¶ 3b). Plaintiff contends that the Army breached paragraph 3b of the NSA by failing to make a good faith attempt to transfer plaintiff to an equivalent position for which he could be deemed qualified. See id. ¶¶ 15, 28-29.
On August 25, 2008, plaintiff filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, claiming, inter alia, that the Army breached the NSA. See Compl., Mata v. Green, No. SA-08-CA-709-OG (W.D. Tex. Aug. 25, 2008), ECF No. 1. The district court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to hear plaintiff's claims and transferred the action to this court. See Transfer Order, Mata v. Green, No. SA-08-CA-079-OG (W.D. Tex. Aug. 20, 2009), ECF No. 26. On March 5, 2010, plaintiff filed his transfer Complaint in this court. See Compl. at 1.
On October 27, 2010, defendant filed its first motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that the NSA was not money-mandating, as is required for this court to possess jurisdiction under the Tucker Act. Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss 5, ECF No. 21; cf. infra Part II (). The court stayed the proceedings pending a decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in an unrelated but potentially instructive case, Holmes v. United States, 92 Fed. Cl. 311 (2010), appeal docketed, No. 2010-5119 (Fed. Cir. May 14, 2010). Order, ECF No. 28. On December 3, 2012, following the guidance provided in the Federal Circuit's decision in Holmes, 657 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2011), the court denied defendant's motion to dismiss (December 2012 decision). See Mata v. United States, 107 Fed. Cl. 618, 623-24 (2012). The court concluded that the NSA could fairly be interpreted as contemplating money damages and that the court therefore had jurisdiction to consider plaintiff's claims. Id.
On July 27, 2013, plaintiff moved for summary judgment on his claims that the Army breached paragraphs 3a, 3b, and 3c of the NSA, see Pl.'s Summ. J. Mot. 1, 33, ECF No. 50-1, and defendant subsequently filed its response and cross-motion for summary judgment and, in the alternative, a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, see Def.'s Summ. J. Mot. 1, ECF No. 53. On February 26, 2014, the court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant as to paragraphs 3a and 3c, and stayed the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment as to the Army's breach of paragraph3b. Mata, 114 Fed. Cl. at 746-51. Following a telephonic status conference with the parties, the court granted defendant leave to file a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that paragraph 3b of the NSA is not money-mandating. See Order 1, Mar. 18, 2014, ECF No. 67. The court limited the scope of the issue to be briefed to whether the Federal Circuit's decision in Holmes precludes this court from exercising jurisdiction over plaintiff's sole surviving claim. See id. The court also ordered defendant to address "whether a finding that this court lacks jurisdiction to hear plaintiff's claim . . . would run afoul of the law-of-the case doctrine discussed in Banks v. United States, 741 F.3d 1268 (2014)." Id. at 1.
Pursuant to the court's Order of March 18, 2014, defendant filed a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss on May 9, 2014. Def.'s Mot. 1; cf. Rule 12(b)(1) of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims (RCFC). Plaintiff's response, filed June 6, 2014, neither addresses the matters set forth in court's March 18, 2014 order, nor directly responds to the arguments made in defendant's motion.3
The Tucker Act establishes and limits the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2012). The Tucker Act affords this court jurisdiction over "any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort." Id. § 1491(a)(1). Although the Tucker Act waives the sovereign immunity necessary for a plaintiff to sue the United States for money damages, United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983), it does not confer any substantive rights upon a plaintiff, United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976). Therefore, a plaintiff must identify an independent source of substantive law that creates a right to money damages in order for the case to proceed. Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc); see Jan's Helicopter Serv., Inc. v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 525 F.3d 1299, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
"Subject-matter jurisdiction may be challenged at any time by the parties or by the court sua sponte." Folden v. United States, 379 F.3d 1344, 1354 (2004). Whenconsidering a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), the court accepts as true the undisputed allegations in the complaint and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Trusted Integration, Inc. v. United States, 659 F.3d 1159, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2011). The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the court's jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Reynolds v. Army & Air Force Exch. Serv., 846 F.2d 746, 748 (Fed. Cir. 1988). A dismissal under RCFC 12(b)(1) "is warranted when, assuming the truth of all allegations, jurisdiction over the subject matter is lacking." Arakaki v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 244, 247 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). If the court determines that it does not have...
To continue reading
Request your trial