Matadi v. Wash. Metro. Area Transp. Auth.

• Decision Date: 08 July 2022
• Docket Number: 20-cv-03449 (APM)
• Parties: JENNY MATADI, Plaintiff, v. WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

JENNY MATADI, Plaintiff,
v.
WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, Defendant.

No. 20-cv-03449 (APM)

United States District Court, District of Columbia

July 8, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION

AMIT P. MEHTA UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

I.

Plaintiff Jenny Matadi brings this action against Defendant Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (“WMATA”) for negligent maintenance of the L'Enfant Plaza Metrorail Station. Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1 [hereinafter Notice of Removal], Compl., ECF No. 1-2 [hereinafter Compl.], ¶ 4. Plaintiff claims that, at approximately 6:30 p.m. on January 16, 2019, she was struck on the head by a piece or block of ice that fell from the architectural canopy above the street-level escalator leading to the Maryland Avenue entrance of the L'Enfant Plaza Metrorail Station. Def. 's Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 13 [hereinafter Def.'s Mot.], Def.'s Statement of Material Facts, ECF No. 13-2 [hereinafter Def.'s Facts], ¶ 6; Pl.'s Reply to Def.'s Mot., ECF No. 14 [hereinafter Pl.'s Opp'n], at 1. Plaintiff asserts that WMATA was negligent in failing to clear snow and ice from the architectural canopy. Compl. ¶¶ 5-6.

Plaintiff filed the instant Complaint in D.C. Superior Court on November 16, 2020. See Notice of Removal. The case was removed to this court on November 25, 2020. Id. WMATA filed its Motion for Summary Judgment on January 28, 2022. See Def.'s Mot. WMATA

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argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because it enjoys sovereign immunity from Plaintiff's claims. See Def's Mot., Def's Mem. of L. in Supp. of Its Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 13-1 [hereinafter Def's Mem.], at 3-7. Alternatively, WMATA maintains that summary judgment must be granted because Plaintiff has failed to establish-as required to make a prima facie case of negligence-both a national standard of care and WMATA's awareness of a defective condition on its property. See Def's Mem. at 7-10.

For the reasons that follow, WMATA's motion is granted.

II.

Summary judgment is warranted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A dispute is “genuine” only if a reasonable factfinder could find for the nonmoving party and a fact is “material” only if it is capable of affecting the outcome of litigation. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Although the court must both view the evidence and draw reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, see Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007), the non-moving party must present affirmative evidence showing a genuine issue for trial, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257. Further, the entry of summary judgment is required against a party who “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

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III.

A.

WMATA asserts that it has sovereign immunity from Plaintiff's claims. See Def.'s Mem. at 3. This defense implicates the court's subject matter jurisdiction. See Burkhart v. WMATA, 112 F.3d 1207, 1216 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“[S]overeign immunity claims are jurisdictional ”).

WMATA's claim of sovereign immunity stems from the terms of its founding. WMATA was created by an interstate compact (“the Compact”) signed by Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia and enacted with congressional consent. Def.'s Mem. at 3; see D.C. Code § 9-1107.01 (2022). In forming the Compact, the signatories conferred upon WMATA their respective sovereign immunities. See Morris v. WMATA, 781 F.2d 218, 219-20 (D.C. Cir. 1986). When sovereign immunity applies, federal courts may not adjudicate private actions against the immune entity absent an express waiver of that immunity. Workagegnehu v. WMATA, 373 F.Supp.3d 110, 116 (D.D.C. 2019) (citing Va. Off. for Prot. & Advoc. v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 253-54 (2011)). Section 80 of the Compact outlines the scope of this waiver: “[WMATA] shall be liable for its . . . torts and those of its . . . employees and agent[s] committed in the conduct of any proprietary function . . . but shall not be liable for any torts occurring in the performance of a governmental function.” D.C. Code § 9-1107.01(80) (2022). Under this provision, the key issue is whether the function in question is “governmental” rather than “proprietary.” Sanders v. WMATA, 819 F.2d 1151, 1154 (D.C. Cir. 1987). If the former, then sovereign immunity applies. See id.

There are two alternative tests for identifying “governmental” functions under Section 80. See Burkhart, 112 F.3d at 1216. If an activity is a “quintessential government function, such as police activity, it is within the scope of WMATA's sovereign immunity,” id. (cleaned up), and the

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inquiry ends there. WMATA does not contend that snow and ice removal is a “quintessential government function.” Alternatively, if an activity is not a quintessential governmental function, “immunity will depend on whether the activity is ‘discretionary' or ‘ministerial,'”^[1] with “[o]nly those activities considered ‘discretionary' . . . shielded by sovereign immunity.” Id.

To determine whether an activity is in fact discretionary, courts employ another set of alternative tests. Cope v. Scott, 45 F.3d 445, 448 (D.C. Cir. 1995). If a “federal statute, regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a course of action for an employee to follow,” United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted), the prescribed course of action is deemed non-discretionary and sovereign immunity does not bar suit against an employee's failure to comply. Cope, 45 F.3d at 448. If, however, the governing statutes do not prescribe a course of action but rather leave room for “choice,” an exercise of that choice is immune from private action if it is “susceptible to policy judgment and involve[d] an exercise of political, social, or economic judgment.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 325).

Applying this test for discretionary activity, WMATA argues that it has sovereign immunity because “WMATA's snow and ice removal efforts are discretionary.” Def.'s Mem. at 6. WMATA points to its internal policy for snow and ice removal at its Metrorail stations, see Def.'s Mot., Ex. 9, ECF No. 13-11 [hereinafter Lloyd Decl.], Ex. A [hereinafter Severe Weather Plan], which, among many employee duties set forth in order of priority, does not include the removal of snow and ice from architectural canopies above its stations. See generally id.; Def.'s Mem. at 6-7. WMATA contends that, because the Severe Weather Plan does not set forth specific

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procedures that WMATA employees must follow, employees “must use their discretion in determining how to remove snow and ice.” See Def.'s Mem. at 6; see also Def.'s Facts ¶¶ 15-16;^[2]Lloyd Decl. ¶¶ 6-7. WMATA also states that “WMATA's snow and ice removal efforts do not include clearing snow or ice from architectural canopies.” See Def.'s Facts ¶ 19; see also Lloyd Decl. ¶ 11. Because WMATA's decision not to clear snow or ice from the L'Enfant Plaza architectural canopy is rooted in “economic, political, and strategic factors, including safety, equipment and personnel limitations, and maintaining unencumbered access to its rail stations,” WMATA argues that the decision is necessarily discretionary and thus shielded by sovereign immunity. See Def.'s Mem. at 6.

Although the court agrees with WMATA that it enjoys sovereign immunity in this case, the court's reasoning differs from WMATA's. Cf. Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490, 496 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“[F]ederal courts, being courts of limited jurisdiction, must assure themselves of jurisdiction over any controversy they hear, regardless of the parties' failure to assert any jurisdictional question.”). WMATA is right to construe its internal policy as the relevant “federal statute, regulation, or policy” for purposes of finding discretionary activity. See Workagegnehu, 373 F.Supp.3d at 117-18 (finding that, although the D.C. Circuit has not spoken on the matter, the D.C. Court of Appeals and many courts in this District have held that an internal WMATA policy may qualify as a “statute, regulation, or policy” as required under the first step of the sovereign immunity test). But WMATA's characterization of its Severe Weather Plan is inconsistent. WMATA's sovereign immunity argument depends on construing the Severe

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Weather Plan to give WMATA's employees choice-discretion-in how they remove snow and ice from its stations, including from their overhanging architectural canopies. See Lloyd Decl. ¶¶ 6-7 (“WMATA's severe weather plan does not set forth specific procedures on how WMATA employees are expected to remove snow or ice. WMATA employees exercise their discretion in removing snow and ice.”); Def.'s Mem. at 6 (“WMATA's plan does not set forth specific procedures that WMATA employees must follow. Rather, they must use their discretion in determining how to remove snow and ice.” (citations omitted)). Simultaneously, however, WMATA asserts numerous times that its policy for snow and ice removal expressly excludes architectural canopies altogether. See Lloyd Decl. ¶ 11 (“WMATA's snow and ice removal efforts do not include clearing snow or ice from architectural canopies over its escalators ”); Def.'s Mem. at 6 (“WMATA does not clear snow or ice from architectural canopies outside its stations ....”). It cannot be that the Severe Weather Plan both gives employees discretion whether to clear snow and ice from architectural canopies and categorically excludes architectural canopies from WMATA's snow-and-ice-removal efforts.

The court finds the latter proposition more convincing: removal of snow or ice from architectural canopies is simply...