Matala v. Consolidation Coal Co., s. 80-1287

Citation647 F.2d 427
Decision Date21 July 1981
Docket NumberNos. 80-1287,80-1288,s. 80-1287
Parties, 1981 O.S.H.D. (CCH) P 25,517 John MATALA, Appellee, v. CONSOLIDATION COAL COMPANY, Appellant, and Ray Marshall, Secretary of Labor, Defendant. John MATALA, Appellee, v. Ray MARSHALL, Secretary of Labor, Appellant, and Consolidation Coal Company, Defendant.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit)

Belva D. Newsome, U. S. Dept. of Labor, Washington, D. C. (Carin Ann Clauss, Sol. of Labor, Laurie M. Streeter, Associate Sol., Judith E. Wolf, Co-Counsel, Washington, D. C., for Black Lung Benefits on brief), for appellant Secretary of Labor.

John H. Riordan, Jr., Pittsburgh, Pa. (Anthony J. Polito, Leonard Fornella, Rose, Schmidt, Dixon, Hasley, Whyte & Hardesty, Pittsburgh, Pa., on brief), for appellant Consolidation Coal Co. Steven B. Jacobson, Los Angeles, Cal. (De Castro, West & Chodorow, Los Angeles, Cal., James M. Haviland, Washington, D. C., and McIntyre, Haviland & Jordan, Charleston, W. Va., Harrison Combs, General Counsel, Mary Lu Jordan, United Mine Workers of America, Washington, D. C., on brief), for appellee.

Before BUTZNER, SPROUSE and ERVIN, Circuit Judges.

ERVIN, Circuit Judge:

Matala is an underground coal employee at Consolidation Coal Company's (Consolidation) Blacksville No. 2 mine in Monongalia County, West Virginia. Prior to March 1, 1975, Matala was employed as a continuous mine operator. On or about March 1, 1975, he was diagnosed as having symptoms of pneumoconiosis (black lung). He thus exercised his right granted by section 203(b)(2) of title II of the Federal Coal Mine Health & Safety Act of 1969 (the Act) 1 to transfer to a less dusty area of the mine. Any miner who exercises his option to transfer is guaranteed by section 203(b)(3) compensation for his new work "at not less than the regular rate of pay received by him immediately prior to his transfer." 30 U.S.C. § 843(b)(3).

After his transfer, Matala was classified as a general inside laborer, a classification having a lower daily base rate than that of his old classification as a continuous mine operator. Matala, however, was paid the same daily base rate after his transfer that he received immediately prior to his transfer. He also received periodic cost of living increases granted to all coal miners.

In a complaint filed with the Department of Labor pursuant to 30 U.S.C. § 938, 2 Matala contended that after he transferred, he was entitled under section 203(b)(3) not only to the same daily base pay that he received in his prior job classification, but also to all wage increases subsequently granted to miners classified as continuous mine operators during the term of the wage agreement that sets the pay scales for each job classification. 3 He claimed that Consolidation discriminated against him in violation of 30 U.S.C. § 938(a) when it failed to grant him such increases. 4

The Secretary of Labor (Secretary) interpreted "regular rate of pay" in section 203(b)(3) to mean the dollar amount that Matala received immediately prior to transferring. The Secretary found that Matala's employer, Consolidation, had paid Matala the same amount after his transfer that he had received immediately prior to transferring. He concluded that Consolidation had not discriminated against Matala by reason of his having been diagnosed as having pneumoconiosis. Thus, Matala's complaint was dismissed.

Matala then filed a petition in district court for review of the Secretary's order. The district court concluded that the Secretary's interpretation of section 203(b)(3) was erroneous. It, therefore, granted Matala's motion for summary judgment against the Secretary and Consolidation, reversing the decision of the Secretary. Both the Secretary and Consolidation appeal the district court's decision. We reverse.

I.

In this case we must decide whether section 203(b)(3) of the Act guarantees the transferred miner only the amount that he received immediately prior to his transfer or whether it requires the employer to continue to pay a transferred employee at his pre-transfer classification rate. If we adopt this latter construction, a transferred employee would continue to receive any pay increases granted to those in his pre-transfer classification subsequent to his transfer.

When we are faced with a question of statutory interpretation, our starting point for discerning congressional intent is the language of the statute itself. State Water Control Board v. Train, 559 F.2d 921, 924-25 n.20 (4th Cir. 1977). Congress is presumed to have used words according to their ordinary meaning unless a different use is clearly indicated. United States v. Snider, 502 F.2d 645 (4th Cir. 1974). In examining section 203(b)(3), we find the language contained therein to be unambiguous. Accord, Higgins v. Marshall, 584 F.2d 1035 (D.C.Cir.1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 931, 99 S.Ct. 2051, 60 L.Ed.2d 659 (1979). The meaning of section 203(b)(3) is clear on its face; it provides that a miner who transfers because of pneumoconiosis "shall receive compensation for such work at not less than the regular rate of pay received by him immediately prior to his transfer." (emphasis added). The ordinary meaning of "rate" is dollar amount. See Higgins v. Marshall, 584 F.2d 1035 (D.C.Cir.1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 931, 99 S.Ct. 2051, 60 L.Ed.2d 659 (1979). Furthermore, "regular rate of pay" must not be read alone but must be construed with the rest of section 203(b)(3). See United States v. Snider, 502 F.2d 645, 652 (4th Cir. 1974). In the statutory context of section 203(b) (3), the plain meaning of "rate" is confirmed by the modifying phrase "received by him immediately prior to his transfer." If "rate" were construed as referring to classification rate, then "received by him" would have no meaning, thereby violating a basic canon of statutory construction that all words in a statute are to be given effect. Id.

Matala has urged upon us a construction that is at odds with the plain meaning of section 203(b)(3). He contends that "regular rate of pay" means the classification rate. In support of his position, he cites two passages in the legislative history. He first asserts that the conferees intended that the Act be construed liberally when improved health or safety to miners will result. H.R.Rep.No.761, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 63 (1969), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1969, p. 2503. He also argues that our interpretation is contrary to Congress' intent that those who transfer should "suffer no loss in compensation." S.Rep.No.411, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1969). Matala contends that if "regular rate of pay" is interpreted to mean merely dollar amount, then, although the miner who transfers may not necessarily suffer any loss at the moment of transfer, he may suffer substantial losses shortly after transferring if those persons in his pre-transfer classification are granted subsequent increases. 5

While we sympathize with Matala's position, we do not agree with it. The plain meaning of a statute should be rejected only if there is substantial, unambiguous evidence supporting a contrary interpretation. State Water Control Board v. Train, 559 F.2d 921, 924-25 n.20 (4th Cir. 1977). We find Matala's references to the legislative history to be very general, and we are not persuaded that the broad passages he cites should be deemed to support clearly and conclusively a contrary interpretation. Our plain meaning construction does not do violence to the intent of Congress that a miner transferring because of black lung should not lose money because of his transfer. Under our interpretation a miner who exercises his statutory right of transfer would receive the same dollar amount that he received immediately prior to his transfer, thus suffering no loss of pay upon transfer.

It appears that Matala has sought to create an ambiguity in section 203(b)(3) by his citations to the legislative history. We look to the legislative history in construing a statute only if the meaning of a statute is unclear. See United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643, 648, 81 S.Ct. 1278, 1281, 6 L.Ed.2d 575 (1961). The legislative history should never be used to create doubt if the language of a statute is plain on its face. Railroad Commission of Wisconsin v. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Co., 257 U.S. 563, 589, 42 S.Ct. 232, 237, 66 L.Ed. 371 (1922). Because we find the language of section 203(b)(3) to be clear and unambiguous, we find no need to resort to the legislative history. 6

We hold that, after transferring, Matala was entitled to receive no less than the dollar amount that he received immediately prior to his transfer. Thus, because Matala received $55.00 per day plus a .07 per hour cost-of-living add-on prior to his transfer, he was entitled to receive no less than $55.00 per day plus .07 per hour after his transfer. 7 Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand this case to the district court for entry of an order consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

SPROUSE, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

I respectfully dissent.

The linchpin of the majority decision is that the language of section 203(b) (3) of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, 30 U.S.C. § 843(b) (3), is not susceptible to judicial interpretation because it is not ambiguous. In the majority's view, the phraseology "not less than the regular rate of pay received by him immediately prior to his transfer" clearly means the amount of money received by the miner prior to his transfer rather than the regular contract classification rate which fixes the amount of money a miner is to receive from time to time. I think coal miners will be startled to discover this to be the plain meaning of this hoary provision of countless collective bargaining agreements. Their expectation, I submit, would be to the contrary that the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
16 cases
  • United States v. Nesline, Civ. A. No. M-79-1768.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 4th Circuit. United States District Court (Maryland)
    • 12 Julio 1984
    ...1088, 8 L.Ed.2d 187 (1962); Avery v. Commissioner, 292 U.S. 210, 214, 54 S.Ct. 674, 676, 78 L.Ed. 1216 (1934); Matala v. Consolidation Coal Co., 647 F.2d 427, 429 (4th Cir.1981); United States v. Snider, 502 F.2d 645, 651 (4th Cir.1974). Cf. Phinpathya, 104 S.Ct. at 589 (and cases cited the......
  • Jaekel v. Equifax Marketing Decision Systems, Inc., Civ. No. 92-607-A.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 4th Circuit. United States District Court (Eastern District of Virginia)
    • 26 Junio 1992
    ...as conclusive."); In re Forfeiture Hearings as to Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir.1988) (same); Matala v. Consol. Coal Co., 647 F.2d 427 (4th Cir.1981) (same); Salomon Forex, Inc. v. Tauber, 795 F.Supp. 768, (E.D.Va.1992) (same). Analysis therefore, properly begins with ......
  • United Nuclear Corp. v. Cannon, Civ. A. No. 81-0521-S.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 1st Circuit. United States District Courts. 1st Circuit. District of Rhode Island
    • 13 Diciembre 1982
    ...2241 n. 3, 68 L.Ed.2d 744 (1981); United States Lines, Inc. v. Baldridge, 677 F.2d 940, 944 (D.C.Cir.1982); Matala v. Consolidation Coal Co., 647 F.2d 427, 429 (4th Cir. 1981). No such indication appears. Thus, the Court must construe S. 924 as an attempt at simultaneous, not seriatim, regu......
  • National City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., s. 81-2044
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)
    • 17 Agosto 1982
    ...Safety Commission v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 2056, 64 L.Ed.2d 766 (1979); Matala v. Consolidation Coal Co., 647 F.2d 427, 429 (4th Cir. 1981); Blue Cross Association v. Harris, 622 F.2d 972, 977 (8th Cir. In the present case appellants have not directed us to ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT