Matarese v. Mun. Ass'n Property Liability
| Decision Date | 11 January 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 99-480.,99-480. |
| Citation | 791 A.2d 175 |
| Parties | Maureen MATARESE v. NEW HAMPSHIRE MUNICIPAL ASSOCIATION PROPERTY-LIABILITY INSURANCE TRUST, INC. |
| Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
Gallagher, Callahan & Gartrell, P.A., of Concord (David A. Garfunkel on the brief and orally), for the defendant.
The plaintiff, Maureen Matarese, suffered injuries during an automobile collision with an uninsured motorist while on duty as a police officer. She sought uninsured motorist coverage from the defendant, the New Hampshire Municipal Association Property-Liability Insurance Trust, Inc. (Trust), the Town of Londonderry's insurer. The Superior Court (Abramson, J.) ruled that the fireman's rule barred her right of recovery against the Trust. We affirm.
The underlying facts in this case are described in detail in Matarese v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 141 N.H. 311, 311-12, 682 A.2d 258 (1996) (Matarese I), in which we held that the fireman's rule barred the plaintiff from recovering uninsured motorist benefits from Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company (Nationwide), her personal automobile insurer.
The plaintiff was injured while on duty when her car collided with an uninsured vehicle. She sought uninsured motorist coverage from both Nationwide and the Trust. The Trust moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Workers' Compensation Law barred the claim. The court granted the Trust's motion, stating, "On the state of the record presented, the plaintiff Matarese was injured while acting within the scope of her duties as a police officer...." Following a trial, the superior court held that the fireman's rule, which bars some public safety officers from bringing negligence suits in certain circumstances, see RSA 507:8-1 (1999), also barred the claim for benefits against Nationwide. The plaintiff appealed both decisions.
Regarding the case against Nationwide, we held that the fireman's rule barred the plaintiff from pursuing an action against the tortfeasor. See Matarese I, 141 N.H at 315-16, 682 A.2d 258. Although the plaintiff had also argued that even if the fireman's rule barred an action against the tortfeasor, she was entitled to uninsured motorist coverage because the language in her Nationwide insurance policy was ambiguous, we concluded that the ambiguity issue had not been preserved and declined to address it. Id. at 313, 682 A.2d 258. Regarding the case against the Trust, we found the trial court's order granting the Trust's motion for summary judgment to be ambiguous, declined to rule on the question of the workers' compensation bar, and remanded the case with instructions to consider the applicability of the fireman's rule and the workers' compensation bar, and any other issue raised by the parties' pleadings.
After the case was remanded, we decided Hull v. Town of Plymouth, 143 N.H. 381, 383, 724 A.2d 1291 (1999), in which we concluded that an automobile insurer is not an "insurance carrier" within the meaning of the Workers' Compensation Law. Therefore, the Workers' Compensation Law did not bar an action for underinsured motorist benefits against an employer's automobile insurer if the underinsured motorist was neither the insured's employer nor a co-employee. Id. at 385, 724 A.2d 1291. In light of Hull, the only issue on remand in the plaintiff's case against the Trust was whether the plaintiff is entitled to uninsured motorist coverage even though the fireman's rule barred an action against the tortfeasor. The plaintiff argued that even if the fireman's rule barred an action against the tortfeasor, she was entitled to uninsured motorist coverage because the language in the Trust policy was ambiguous. Following a hearing, the superior court ruled that the fireman's rule barred the plaintiff's action against the Trust, and this appeal followed. Thus, the issue we declined to decide on preservation grounds in Matarese I is now squarely before us in this appeal involving the case against the Trust.
Although the parties have not filed a copy of the applicable insurance policy with this court, they agree that the language at issue is standard language taken from New Hampshire's uninsured motorist statute that mandates uninsured motorist coverage in all motor vehicle policies, so that benefits are available "for the protection of persons ... who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or drivers of uninsured motor vehicles." RSA 264:15 (1993).
The question on appeal is whether the plaintiff was "legally entitled to recover" from the driver of the uninsured motor vehicle, given the applicability of the fireman's rule. The fireman's rule provides:
I. Firefighters, emergency medical technicians (E.M.T.'s), police officers and other public safety officers shall have no cause of action for injuries arising from negligent conduct which created the particular occasion for the officer's official engagement. However, this section does not affect such officer's causes of action for other negligent conduct or for reckless, wanton or willful acts of misconduct.
II. In this section, "public safety officer" means a person who is exposed to injury while acting in an official capacity in law enforcement or protection of life or property.
RSA 507:8-h (1997) (emphasis added). In Matarese I, we concluded that "[b]ecause the plaintiff suffered her injuries while performing the very service which [she] is paid to undertake for the citizen's benefit," her right of recovery against the tortfeasor was barred by the fireman's rule. Matarese I, 141 N.H. at 315-16, 682 A.2d 258 (quotation and citation omitted). Thus, her right of recovery against her personal automobile insurer, Nationwide, was barred. Id.
In this appeal, the plaintiff contends that despite the application of the fireman's rule, our decisions in Green Mountain Insurance Co. v. George, 138 N.H. 10, 634 A.2d 1011 (1993), and Gorman v. National Grange Mutual Insurance Co., 144 N.H. 157, 738 A.2d 1276 (1999), "unequivocally establish the Petitioner's contractual right to receive uninsured motorist benefits." The plaintiff notes that in Green Mountain, we held that the phrase "legally entitled to recover" contained in the applicable insurance policy was ambiguous, and construed the ambiguity against the insurer. Green Mountain, 138 N.H. at 14-15, 634 A.2d 1011. The plaintiff also points out that we reaffirmed this holding in Gorman, where we held that because we had determined in Green Mountain that the phrase "legally entitled to recover" referred to whether the owner or operator of the uninsured vehicle was at fault, "the insured's right to recover will depend on her ability to establish fault on the part of the alleged tortfeasor." Gorman, 144 N.H. at 159, 738 A.2d 1276 (quotations and brackets omitted). We agree with the plaintiff that application of the rule set forth in Green Mountain and Gorman would entitle her to uninsured motorist benefits. Upon reconsideration of both cases, however, we conclude that the analysis supporting the rule we adopted in Green Mountain and reapplied in Gorman is legally unsound. Therefore, for the reasons that follow, we overrule our reasoning, but not our holding, in Green Mountain. Furthermore, because our decision in Gorman rested on the faulty reasoning we advanced in Green Mountain, we overrule Gorman and affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the Trust.
While we recognize the value of stability in legal rules, we have also acknowledged that Weeks Restaurant Corp. v. City of Dover, 119 N.H. 541, 544, 404 A.2d 294 (1979) (citations, brackets and quotations omitted). "Where a decision has proven unworkable or badly reasoned ... we will not hesitate to revisit it." Providence Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Scanlon, 138 N.H. 301, 304, 638 A.2d 1246 (1994).
At issue in Green Mountain was whether the plaintiffs, New Hampshire residents who had been injured in a collision in Massachusetts by a Massachusetts resident and were barred from recovering damages from the tortfeasor under the Massachusetts no-fault statute, were also barred from collecting uninsured motorist benefits from their own automobile insurer. Green Mountain, 138 N.H. at 13, 634 A.2d 1011. In concluding that the plaintiffs could recover, we stated:
The [plaintiffs] submit that the alternative forms of dispute resolution agreed to by the parties under this insurance policy are designed to determine matters of fact, such as who is at fault in a collision and how much the wronged party is entitled to recover from the party at fault. Under such an interpretation, they argue, the "legally entitled to recover" phrase refers to whether the owner or operator of the uninsured automobile was at fault. On the other hand, Green Mountain argues that the phrase refers only to the [plaintiffs'] entitlement as a matter of law to pursue damages against the alleged tortfeasor. We find the phrase "legally entitled to recover" susceptible of both interpretations propounded by the parties and, therefore, hold that it is ambiguous. Because the [plaintiffs'] interpretation would favor coverage, we must construe the phrase in favor of [the plaintiffs] and against Green Mountain.... Accordingly, we hold that the [plaintiffs'] right to recover will depend on their ability to establish fault on the part of the alleged tortfeasor at a subsequent uninsured motorist arbitration hearing.
Id. at 14-15, 634 A.2d 1011 (citations omitted). Thus, our decision in Green Mountain rested upon our conclusion that, given the existence of the alternative forms of dispute resolution set forth in the contract, the phrase "legally entitled to recover" in...
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