Matcha v. Bersoff-Matcha

• Decision Date: 08 October 2019
• Docket Number: No. 1617,1617
• Parties: DAVID MATCHA v. SUSAN J. BERSOFF-MATCHA
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

DAVID MATCHA v. SUSAN J. BERSOFF-MATCHA

No. 1617

COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND

September Term, 2017

October 8, 2019

Circuit Court for Montgomery County

Case No.: 131134-FL

UNREPORTED

Meredith, Graeff, Battaglia, Lynne, A. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.

Opinion by Battaglia, J.

*This is an unreported opinion, and it may not be cited in any paper, brief, motion, or other document filed in this Court or any other Maryland Court as either precedent within the rule of stare decisis or as persuasive authority. Md. Rule 1-104.

Appellant, David Matcha (Husband), divorced Susan Bersoff-Matcha (Wife), Appellee, but appeals from an order of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County which denied his request for alimony as well as his request to receive outright payment of a monetary award, as opposed to a roll over of funds contained in an IRA titled solely in Wife's name to an IRA of his choosing, and from the trial judge's finding that he had dissipated marital assets. In asking this Court to reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court, Husband presents the following questions for our review:

1. Whether the Circuit Court erred in denying Appellant alimony despite a significant income disparity among the parties?

2. Whether the Circuit Court erred in vacating its prior monetary award to Appellant?

3. Whether the Circuit Court erred in concluding that Appellant had dissipated marital funds?

Concluding that the trial court did not err, we shall affirm the judgment below.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We "accord great deference to the findings and judgments of trial judges, sitting in their equitable capacity, when conducting divorce proceedings." Karmand v. Karmand, 145 Md. App. 317, 326 (2002) (quoting Tracey v. Tracey, 328 Md. 380, 385 (1992)). As such, we evaluate the factual findings of a trial judge with respect to questions involving alimony and marital property under a clearly erroneous standard, "and will give due regard to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." St. Cyr v. St. Cyr, 228 Md. App. 163, 180 (2016) (citing Maryland Rule 8-131(c)); see also Omayaka v. Omayaka, 417 Md. 643, 652, 659 (2011); Gordon v. Gordon, 174 Md. App. 583, 625-26(2007). Accordingly, if "there is any competent evidence to support the factual findings [of the trial court], those findings cannot be held to be clearly erroneous." St. Cyr, 228 Md. App. at 180 (alteration in original) (quoting Solomon v. Solomon, 383 Md. 176, 202 (2004)). A legal conclusion, such as the denial of alimony or the distribution of marital property, will not be reversed unless the trial judge's "discretion was arbitrarily used or the judgment below was clearly wrong." Karmand, 145 Md. App. at 326 (quoting Tracey, 328 Md. at 385); see also Gordon, 174 Md. App. at 626. "'This means that we may not substitute our judgment for that of the fact finder, even if we might have reached a different result' absent an abuse of discretion." Gordon, 174 Md. App. at 626 (quoting Innerbichler, 132 Md. App. 207, 230, cert. denied, 361 Md. 232 (2000)). A trial court, however, "must exercise its discretion with correct legal standards." Id. (quoting Alston v. Alston, 331 Md. 496, 504 (1993)).

ALIMONY

Husband first argues that the decision of Judge Debra Dwyer of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County to deny his request for indefinite alimony was "clearly erroneous in light of the gross income disparity among the parties," urging that he should have received alimony based upon the fact that, at the time of trial, Wife "earned in excess of $180,000 working at the FDA, as well as a history of earning in excess of $200,000" as a medical doctor, whereas he earned "a mere $30,000 at the time of trial." He contends that the trial judge further erred in her alimony determination by failing to properly consider his age and lack of education, beyond that of an associate degree, as well as the fact that, at the time of trial, his expenses exceeded his annual income by $20,000.00. Accordingly,Husband posits that Judge Dwyer abused her discretion by denying his request for alimony. Before us, Husband asserts that he "does not, at this time, take a position as to whether the [alimony] award should be rehabilitative or indefinite." Under either standard, Husband is not entitled to an award of alimony, as Judge Dwyer found.

As a point of departure, we reiterate that "the principal function of alimony is 'rehabilitation of the economically dependent spouse.'" St. Cyr, 228 Md. App. at 184 (quoting Whittington v. Whittington, 172 Md. App. 317, 335-36 (2007) (internal citation omitted)). The statutory framework governing awards for alimony gives preference to "fixed-term or so-called rehabilitative alimony" under certain circumstances, as opposed to indefinite alimony, "to ease the transition from the joint married state to their new status as single people living apart and independently." Id. at 184-85 (quoting Solomon, 383 Md. at 195 (internal citation omitted)). The purpose of an alimony award "is to provide an opportunity for the recipient spouse to become self-supporting," even if "that might result in a reduced standard of living." Tracey, 328 Md. at 391. An award of rehabilitative alimony "must be grounded in a finding that the recipient spouse is not self-supporting and needs training, education, or other steps to help that spouse achieve financial self-reliance." Karmand, 145 Md. App. at 328 (citing Reuter v. Reuter, 102 Md. App. 212, 229 (1994)); see also Lemley v. Lemley, 102 Md. App. 266, 300 (1994) (providing that rehabilitative alimony may not be awarded unless the recipient spouse is unable to self-support).

In evaluating a party's request for alimony, Section 11-106(b) of the Family Law Article delineates the factors a trial judge must consider upon making such a determination:

(1) the ability of the party seeking alimony to be wholly or partly self-supporting;

(2) the time necessary for the party seeking alimony to gain sufficient education or training to enable that party to find suitable employment;

(3) the standard of living that the parties established during their marriage;

(4) the duration of the marriage;

(5) the contributions, monetary and nonmonetary, of each party to the well-being of the family;

(6) the circumstances that contributed to the estrangement of the parties;

(7) the age of each party;

(8) the physical and mental condition of each party;

(9) the ability of the party from whom alimony is sought to meet that party's needs while meeting the needs of the party seeking alimony;

(10) any agreement between the parties;

(11) the financial needs and financial resources of each party, including:

(i) all income and assets, including property that does not produce income;

(ii) any award made under §§ 8-205 and 8-208 of this article;

(iii) the nature and amount of the financial obligations of each party; and

(iv) the right of each party to receive retirement benefits; and

(12) whether the award would cause a spouse who is a resident of a related institution as defined in § 19-301 of the Health-General Article and from whom alimony is sought to become eligible for medical assistance earlier than would otherwise occur.

Maryland Code (1984, 2012 Repl. Vol.).

In the instant case, after presiding over a two-day trial at which both parties testified, and during which a multitude of financial statements and other documents were received and reviewed, Judge Dwyer made specific factual findings as to each of the statutorily enumerated factors contained in Section 11-106(b), each of which was supported by evidence adduced during the trial. Husband argues, however, that Judge Dwyer erred with respect to the finding that he could be self-supporting:

[Husband] has an Associate of Arts degree and additional three years of college from Cal State Northridge. He does not hold a Bachelor's Degree. Throughout the majority of his working life, [he] has been employed. At the time of the marriage in August 1997, [Husband] had been employed for 13 years as a sales manager with ADP, making on average $60,000-$70,000/year. Sometime in 2010, [he] left his job with ADP and began an at-home business called Scanhelpers where he testified he earned about $50,000/year. [Husband] voluntarily shuttered Scanhelpers in 2016 after the parties' separation. Since then, [Husband] testified he has routinely sought new employment, saying he spent the majority of his days at the computer searching for employment. At trial, [Husband] produced no evidence at all of job searches such as emails, cover letters, responses, resumes, etc. In October 2016, despite having no experience in insurance sales, [Husband] began semi-regular employment with Aflac Insurance Company where he remains employed. He is paid by commission only. Since October 2016, [Husband] testified he has received "two or three" commission checks totaling "less than $5,000," but there was no proof of this presented by [Husband]. [He] testified he considered software sales, recruiting, financial advising and "a lot of different things" but curiously chose irregular employment at Aflac because he thought he "would be good at it based on what I know about the business." In addition, evidence revealed that in October 2016 [Husband] received $3,950 in income from a company named Straight Source.

[Husband] testified that he is simply unable to find other employment and cites his age and lack of a Bachelor's Degree as the primary reasons. [He] produced no other evidence to corroborate this. Contrary to [Husband's] trial testimony, evidence showed that at a pre-trial deposition, [he] testified he could easily become re-employed. As previously noted, [Husband's] monthly expenses are $7,399/month. Based on [his] education, experience, and work history, which includes years of management-level employment and the ability to create and operate his own at-home business successfully, the Court is satisfied that [Husband] has the ability to gain full-time

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