Matei v. Cessna Aircraft Co.

• Decision Date: 15 September 1994
• Docket Number: 93-3373,Nos. 93-3172,s. 93-3172
• Citation: 35 F.3d 1142
• Parties: Debra MATEI, as Special Administrator of the Estate of Dennis Matei, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross-Appellee, v. CESSNA AIRCRAFT COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee, Cross-Appellant, and Robert Hansel, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 1142

35 F.3d 1142

30 Fed.R.Serv.3d 355

Debra MATEI, as Special Administrator of the Estate of Dennis Matei, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross-Appellee, v. CESSNA AIRCRAFT COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee, Cross-Appellant and Robert Hansel, Defendant-Appellee.

Nos. 93-3172, 93-3373.

United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.

Argued April 22, 1994.

Decided Sept. 15, 1994.

Kenneth C. Miller (argued), Chicago, IL, Salvatore Salibello, Morristown, NJ, for Debra A. Matei.

Michael M. Lane, Ann P. Goodman (argued), Patrick M. Graber, McCullough, Campbell & Lane, Chicago, IL, for Cessna Aircraft Co.

William G. Stone, James R. Branit (argued), Bullaro, Carton & Stone, Chicago, IL, for Robert W. Hansel.

Before BAUER and FLAUM, Circuit Judges, and GRANT, District Judge. ^*

GRANT, District Judge.

Dennis Matei, a commercial pilot, died in a plane crash on January 29, 1987. The alleged proximate cause of the crash and his death was a failure of the instrument control lighting system. Mrs. Matei, as special administrator of her husband's estate, brought suit against the manufacturer of the aircraft, Cessna Aircraft Company, and its owner, Robert Hansel. The district court granted summary judgment for Hansel finding that he was not liable under Illinois' common law of bailment and 49 U.S.C. App. Sec. 1404 because he had leased the aircraft to Prompt Air, Inc., the decedent's employer, did not have possession or control of the aircraft at the time of the crash, and had no knowledge of the alleged defects at the time he transferred possession.

A first trial against Cessna ended in a mistrial after two of plaintiff's expert witnesses offered testimony which varied from that provided during their depositions. Although reluctant, the district court found that a mistrial was necessary to afford Cessna's counsel an adequate opportunity to rebut the new evidence. Cessna thereafter filed a motion for sanctions under Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(d) and 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1927 based on plaintiff's failure to supplement her answers to Cessna's interrogatories regarding the substance of the experts' testimony in violation of Fed.R.Civ.P. 26. That motion was denied.

At the conclusion of the second trial, the district court submitted special interrogatories which asked the jury to determine the following issues of fact:

1. Was the Cessna 210N 4968C ("the aircraft") reasonably safe for the purposes for which it was sold including reasonably foreseeable uses such as instrument flying in October 1979 when it left the control of THE CESSNA AIRCRAFT COMPANY?

2. Was a condition or defect which made the aircraft not reasonably safe a proximate cause of the crash?

3. Did Dennis Matei assume any risk of his injury?

4. What percentage of the total proximate cause of Dennis Matei's injury was Dennis Matei's assumption of risk?

The jury answered the first question in the affirmative and, pursuant to its instructions, proceeded no further. ¹ The district court thereafter entered judgment for the defendant, Cessna Aircraft Company, but directed on the record and without explanation that the judgment be without costs. Due to a clerical error, however, the final judgment entered by the Clerk's office on April 15, 1993 omitted the district court's ruling with respect to costs. Although Cessna was aware of the mistake, it nevertheless saw what it perceived to be a golden opportunity, and filed its bill of costs. On plaintiff's motion, the district court corrected the judgment to reflect its earlier directive, explained its rationale, and struck Cessna's bill of costs. This appeal and cross-appeal followed.

I. DISCUSSION

A. HANSEL'S LIABILITY AS OWNER/LESSOR

The district court found that Hansel was not liable under the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. App. Sec. 1404, or Illinois' common law of bailment because the undisputed evidence showed that he leased the aircraft to Prompt Air on March 16, 1986; that Prompt Air had exclusive possession and control of the aircraft from that time to the date of the crash; and that Hansel had no knowledge of the alleged defects in the lighting system at the time he transferred possession. Mrs. Matei disagrees. She contends that Hansel's answers to her interrogatories, his deposition testimony, the maintenance history of the aircraft and the terms of the insurance policy which covered the aircraft all demonstrate the existence of material issues of fact which should have been tried by a jury. Her arguments, unfortunately, come too late and are supported by too little.

The Federal Aviation Act provides in pertinent part that:

... [N]o lessor of any [civil] aircraft ... under a bona fide lease of thirty days or more, shall be liable by reason of ... his interest as lessor or owner of the aircraft ... so leased, for any injury to or death of persons ... caused by such aircraft unless such aircraft ... is in the actual possession or control of such person at the time of such injury, death, damage or loss.

(Emphasis added). 49 U.S.C. App. Sec. 1404. So too, under the common law of bailment in Illinois, a bailor is liable for a third party's injuries only if:

(1) he supplied the chattel in question[;] (2) the chattel was defective at the time it was supplied[;] (3) the defect could have been discovered by a reasonable inspection, when inspection is required (i.e., where the danger of substantial harm because of the defect is great ...)[;] and (4) the defect was the proximate cause of the injury.

Brooks v. Essex Crane Rental Corp., 233 Ill.App.3d 736, 174 Ill.Dec. 565, 567, 599 N.E.2d 111, 113 (4 Dist.1992) (quoting Huckabee v. Bell & Howell, Inc., 47 Ill.2d 153, 265 N.E.2d 134, 137 (1970)). See also, Witt v. John Hennes Trucking Co., 49 Ill.App.2d 391, 199 N.E.2d 231, 234 (1964); Chambliss

v. Walker Construction Co., 46 Ill.App.2d 287, 197 N.E.2d 83, 86 (1964).

Hansel contends that as the lessor and/or bailor of the Cessna aircraft he was entitled to judgment under both federal and state law. In support of his motion for summary judgment, Hansel submitted his own affidavit and that of Prompt Air's president, Scott Filine, and his successor, Alan Kaufman. All attest that an oral lease agreement had existed between Hansel and Prompt Air since March 16, 1986 which gave Prompt Air exclusive possession and control of the aircraft. Under the terms of that lease, Prompt Air undertook the obligation to maintain and repair the aircraft, using properly certified, qualified and trained personnel, and agreed to indemnify Hansel for any liability which might arise from the ownership of the aircraft. According to Hansel's sworn testimony, the aircraft maintenance records indicated that Fairfield Aviation, the prior lessee, had conducted a 100-hour inspection of the aircraft on February 18, 1986, and had performed any maintenance or repair work which was required to make the aircraft airworthy. Hansel and Filine both attest that the aircraft "was in safe and airworthy condition, and the instrument and control lighting circuits were in good working order" when Prompt Air assumed possession on March 16, 1986.

Mrs. Matei produced no evidence in rebuttal, but merely reasserted the allegations of her complaint. The district court thus adopted the undisputed affidavits of Hansel, Filine and Kaufman as fact, and directed judgment for Hansel.

On appeal, Mrs. Matei attempts to correct the oversight by producing evidence which she contends clearly establishes the existence of material issues of fact as to the existence of the lease, Hansel's control of the aircraft, and his knowledge of the alleged defects, i.e., Hansel's answers to interrogatories, his deposition, the maintenance history of the aircraft and the insurance policy which covered the aircraft. We find nothing in any of these documents, however, which would have precluded summary judgment.

The insurance policy to which Mrs. Matei refers contained the following endorsement: "It is agreed that the following aircraft is (are) under a current and valid written lease agreement to the named insured by the owner of said aircraft ..." Mrs. Matei contends that coverage under the policy thus applied only while the aircraft was operated under a written lease agreement, that benefits were paid out under the policy as a result of the crash, and that a written lease must therefore have existed. She boldly asserts that Hansel, Filine and Kaufman conspired with the insurance company to commit perjury and defraud the court when they stated under oath that the lease was oral. The inference which Mrs. Matei would have the court draw from a single line of an endorsement on an insurance policy is unreasonable and unjustifiable. There is absolutely no evidence to support Mrs. Matei's claim that a written lease actually existed. Contrary to Mrs. Matei's suggestion, neither the Federal Aviation Act, nor Illinois law, required that the terms of the lease or bailment be set out in a formal written contract. See Kirby v. Chicago City Bank & Trust Co., 82 Ill.App.3d 1113, 38 Ill.Dec. 489, 492, 403 N.E.2d 720, 723 (1 Dist.1980); Berglund v. Roosevelt University, 18 Ill.App.3d 842, 310 N.E.2d 773, 775-76 (1 Dist.1974). The fact that the insurance company may have paid out under the policy despite the absence of a written lease neither proves nor disproves the existence of a written lease. In all likelihood, it did not question Hansel's right to recovery.

So too, we find no support for Mrs. Matei's claims in Hansel's answers to her interrogatories or in his deposition. Mrs. Matei contends that these documents clearly establish that the aircraft lighting system was defective when Hansel transferred possession of the aircraft to Prompt Air in March 1986, and that Hansel retained continuous and substantial control over the aircraft. To the contrary, while they show that Fairfield Aviation, the prior lessee, reported on January 24, 1986 that the instrument post light "dimming" was inoperative due to a...