Mateos-Sandoval v. Cnty. of Sonoma
| Decision Date | 31 January 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. C11–5817 TEH.,C11–5817 TEH. |
| Citation | 942 F.Supp.2d 890 |
| Parties | Rafael MATEOS–SANDOVAL and Simeon Avendando Ruiz, Plaintiffs, v. COUNTY OF SONOMA, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Alicia Roman, Alicia Roman Law Office, Santa Rosa, CA, Cynthia Morrison Anderson–Barker, Law Office of Cynthia Anderson–Barker, Donald Webster Cook, Robert Frederick Mann, Attorneys at Law, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiffs.
Anne L. Keck, County Counsel's Office, Matthew James Leblanc, Robert Lear Jackson, Office of the City Attorney, Santa Rosa, CA, for Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTIONS TO DISMISS
Presently under consideration are two motions, filed by the County of Sonoma and the City of Santa Rosa, their law enforcement agencies and officials (“County Defendants” and “City Defendants,” respectively), which, taken together, request dismissal of all claims presented in this suit. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants in part and denies in part each motion.
This is a suit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and California Civil Code § 52.1 raising challenges to various aspects of Defendants' enforcement of California Vehicle Code § 14602.6, which authorizes the impoundment of a vehicle for thirty days under limited circumstances.1 The present motions address claims raised by the two named plaintiffs in this action—Rafael Mateos–Sandoval, whose vehicle was impounded by County Defendants, and Simeon Avendando Ruiz—whose vehicle was impounded by City Defendants. 2 Each Plaintiff raises five claims relating to Defendants' enforcement of § 14602.6.
Section 14602.6(a)(1) provides:
Whenever a peace officer determines that a person was driving a vehicle while his or her driving privilege was suspended or revoked, driving a vehicle while his or her driving privilege is restricted pursuant to Section 13352 or 23575 and the vehicle is not equipped with a functioning, certified interlock device, or driving a vehicle without ever having been issued a driver's license, the peace officer may either immediately arrest that person and cause the removal and seizure of that vehicle or, if the vehicle is involved in a traffic collision, cause the removal and seizure of the vehicle without the necessity of arresting the person.... A vehicle so impounded shall be impounded for 30 days.
Within two working days of an impoundment pursuant to § 14602.6(a)(1), the impounding agency must notify the vehicle's owner of the impoundment. Cal. Veh. Code § 14602.6(a)(2). The vehicle's owner “shall be provided the opportunity for a storage hearing to determine the validity of, or consider any mitigating circumstances attendant to, the storage, in accordance with Section 22852.” Cal. Veh. Code § 14602.6(b). Section 22852 sets out the procedure for hearings to “determine the validity of the storage” and provides, among other things, that a “public agency may authorize its own officer or employee to conduct the hearing if the hearing officer is not the same person who directed the storage of the vehicle.” Cal. Veh. Code § 22852(c).
Plaintiffs allege that, on January 27, 2011, Mateos–Sandoval was driving his GMC Sierra pickup truck on Santa Rosa avenue when a Sonoma County Sheriff's Department (SCSD) deputy pulled him over. He stopped his truck at a safe and legal location by the street curb in front of a credit union parking lot. The truck was not blocking traffic.
The deputy informed Mateos–Sandoval that his truck's trailer hitch was blocking its license plate and asked to see his driver's license. When Mateos–Sandoval responded that he had a driver's license from Mexico, the deputy ordered the impoundment of Mateos–Sandoval's truck under § 14602.6, and called for a tow truck.
While the deputy and Mateos–Sandoval were still at the scene of the traffic stop, his friend Sonja Oralia Ortiz arrived. Ortiz told the deputy that she had a California driver's license, and Mateos–Sandoval and Ortiz asked the deputy to permit Ortiz to drive the truck away. The deputy denied their request. The tow truck arrived and removed Mateos–Sandoval's truck.
Mateos–Sandoval alleges that he was not arrested, but he was charged with violating § 12500 of the California Vehicle Code, driving without a valid California driver's license, and § 5201, relating to the proper mounting of license plates. On March 28, 2011, Mateos–Sandoval appeared in the Superior Court of the County of Sonoma, where he pled guilty to, and was convicted of, the § 12500 charge. The § 5201 charge was dismissed.3
On January 28, 2011—the day after his truck was impounded—and again on January 31, 2011, Mateos Sandoval went to the SCSD office, where he requested a hearing in order to get his truck back. On both occasions, SCSD personnel informed him that he was not eligible for a tow hearing and refused to schedule one.
Later, Mateos–Sandoval received by mail a California Highway Patrol (“CHP”) form 180, “Notice of Stored Vehicle.” The form stated, “[u]nder the provisions of Section 22852 VC, you have the right to a hearing to determine the validity of this storage.” (Docket No. 21, Exhibit A.) The form did not specify why Mateos–Sandoval's truck was being impounded for thirty days; it informed him only that it “was stored pursuant to the provisions of the California Vehicle Code.” (Docket No. 21, Exhibit A.)
On February 1, 2011 and February 3, 2011, SCSD personnel informed Mateos–Sandoval that the thirty-day impoundment of his truck was required under § 14602.6, even though he had a Mexican driver's license. Mateos–Sandoval was denied the use of his truck for over thirty days. He seeks recovery for the resulting expenses, and for expenses incurred in his attempts to recover his truck.
Plaintiff Simeon Avendando Ruiz alleges that on or about September 1, 2011, he was driving his Chevy Silverado pickup truck when he was stopped at a checkpoint by Santa Rosa Police Department (“SRPD”) officers.4 Without asking Avendando Ruiz whether he had ever been licensed to drive in any jurisdiction, the officers ordered the impoundment of his truck under § 14602.6. Avendando Ruiz had, in fact, been issued a Mexican driver's license and alleges that he would have produced that license had the SRPD officers asked him to do so. Avendando Ruiz's truck was impounded for thirty days. Avendando Ruiz was not arrested but he was charged with violating § 12500 of the California Vehicle Code, driving without a valid California driver's license. On October 4, 2011, he appeared in the Superior Court of the County of Sonoma, where he pled nolo contendere to, and was convicted of, the § 12500 charge.5
Avendando Ruiz received a CHP form 180 in the mail. On or about September 6, 2011, he informed SRPD through his attorney that he had a valid Mexican driver's license and requested that SRPD release his truck. SRPD refused on the ground that § 14602.6, as interpreted by SRPD, mandated that his truck be impounded for thirty days.
Avendando Ruiz alleges that at all times while his truck was impounded, he was ready and able to pay the storage fee and have a person with a California driver's license drive his truck away from the storage yard. However, Defendants prevented him from doing so based on their policy of treating individuals with Mexican drivers licenses as individuals who have never been issued a driver's license for purposes of § 14602.6.
Avendando Ruiz took possession of his truck after the expiration of the impoundment period by paying the accrued storage fees and an administrative fee charged by SRPD. As a result of the loss of the use of his truck for more than thirty days and his efforts to retrieve it, Avendando Ruiz incurred expenses, which he now seeks to recover.
On December 2, 2011, Plaintiffs filed a complaint in this Court presenting claims for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and California Civil Code § 52.1. They seek declaratory and injunctive relief, restitution, and damages on behalf of themselves and a statewide class of individuals who “have had cars seized/impounded for thirty days pursuant to § 14602.6, or may in the future have them so seized/impounded.” (Docket No. 1, at p. 12.). The complaint encompasses five claims, each alleged against all defendants, and a facial challenge to § 14602.6.
Defendants move to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), for lack of standing and 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim. A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement” showing “the grounds for the court's jurisdiction” and “that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). A complaint may be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) if Plaintiffs do not carry their burden to sufficiently allege subject matter jurisdiction. Dismissal is appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) when a complaint fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” In ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court must “accept all material allegations of fact as true and construe the complaint in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Vasquez v. Los Angeles County, 487 F.3d 1246, 1249 (9th Cir.2007). A complaint will survive a 12(b)(6) motion if its “non-conclusory factual content, and reasonable inferences from that content” plausibly suggest a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief. Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir.2009) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
DISCUSSIONA. Global arguments for dismissal
Defendants make several arguments for dismissal that apply to more than one of Plaintiffs' claims. The Court will address these arguments first, and then turn to Defendants' arguments for dismissal of each of the five counts set out in the complaint.6
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