Material Service Corp., Division of General Dynamics v. Industrial Commission

Decision Date26 January 1973
Docket NumberNo. 44919,44919
Citation53 Ill.2d 429,292 N.E.2d 367
PartiesMATERIAL SERVICE CORPORATION, DIVISION OF GENERAL DYNAMICS, Appellant, v. The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Albert E. Hedrick et al., Appellees.)
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

Robson, Masters, Ryan, Brumund & Bellom, Joliet (Frank H. Masters, Jr., Joliet, and Sidney Z. Karasik, Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.

Horwitz, Anesi, Ozmon & Associates, Ltd., Chicago (Charles E. Anesi, Chicago, and Dario A. Garibaldi, Flossmoor, of counsel), for appellees.

UNDERWOOD, Chief Justice:

On November 29, 1967, the decedent, Judith Ann Hedrick, drowned when her car fell into the Illinois Deep Waterway adjacent to the parking lot of respondent Material Service Corporation, where she was employed. Claimants, who are her surviving husband and minor children, filed an application for benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act. At the conclusion of a hearing, an arbitrator entered a decision denying compensation on the grounds that the evidence did not establish that the decedent's death arose out of and in the course of her employment. The arbitrator's decision was affirmed by the Industrial Commission. On Certiorari, the circuit court of Cook County held the decision of the Industrial Commission to be contrary to law and reversed and remanded the cause to the Commission with directions to award benefits. Pursuant to the order of remandment, the Commission fixed the amount of benefits, and on review, the award was affirmed by the circuit court of Cook County. This is an appeal from that judgment.

The facts are not in dispute. On November 29, 1967, Judith Ann Hedrick reported for work as usual on the 4:30 P.M. to 1:00 A.M. shift as a computer operator at Material Service Corporation's plant in Lockport. She worked steadily at her job until about ten minutes before the start of the regular half-hour meal break at 7:30 P.M. when she put on her coat and went out into the employees' parking lot, apparently to warm up her car. The night in question was very cold, and there was testimony by her supervisor that all employees were authorized to leave their work areas five or ten minutes prior to the meal break to start their cars on cold nights or on other occasions when they were likely to have trouble getting their cars started after work. Mrs. Hedrick never returned.

When her supervisor noticed her absence at the end of the meal break at 8:00 P.M., he also noticed that her office machine had been left running and that her purse and cigarettes were on her desk. There was also evidence that she had left her lunch in the area where employees eat during their meal break. Later that night, members of her family were told of her disappearance, and her husband notified police authorities. A search of the employer's grounds and the surrounding areas that night failed to disclose her whereabouts.

The building in which decedent worked was located directly west of and parallel to the Illinois Deep Waterway. The parking lot, which also paralleled the canal, was situated just north of the building. The lot sloped slightly downgrade to the canal's west retaining wall, the top of which was level with the surface of the lot. There were no barricades, guardrails or other barriers separating the parking lot from the edge of the canal in the area near the building. On the day following Mrs. Hedrick's disappearance, a deputy sheriff of Will County inspected the parking lot and noticed scratch marks and rust on the concrete retaining wall of the canal indicating that something had gone over the wall into the water. Scuba divers were called to the scene, and they located Mrs. Hedrick's 1960 Thunderbird automobile submerged in the canal at a point near the north end of the building. When the car was raised from the water her body was found part way out of a broken rear window of the car. The coroner testified that upon examination of the car he found the key in the ignition switch in the 'on' position. No determination was made as to the position of the gearshift.

The decedent's husband testified that on the date of her death the decedent was in good health, was not taking any medication and was not under a doctor's care. He and her supervisor at work testified further that she was in good spirits and was looking forward with enthusiasm to Christmas, which was less than a month away.

The principal issue before us is whether the circuit court erred in concluding that the evidence established as a matter of law that the decedent's death 'arose out of' her employment with Material Service Corporation. An injury which 'arises out of' a person's employment may be defined as one which has its origin in some risk connected with or incidental to the employment so that there is a causal connection between the employment and the accidental injury. (Chmelik v. Vana (1964), 31 Ill.2d 272, 201 N.E.2d 434.) Conversely, if the injury is caused by something unrelated to the nature of the employment or is not fairly traceable to the employment environment as a contributing proximate cause, but results instead from a hazard to which the employee would have been equally exposed apart from the employment, then it does not arise out of it. State House Inn v. Industrial Com. (1965), 32 Ill.2d 160, 204 N.E.2d 17.

In a number of cases it has been held that accidental injuries suffered by an employee as a consequence of hazardous conditions in parking lots maintained by an employer for the use of employees are compensable under our Workmen's Compensation Act. (Hiram Walker & Sons v. Industrial Com. (1968), 41 Ill.2d 429, 244 N.E.2d 179; Chmelik v. Vana (1964), 31 Ill.2d 272, 201 N.E.2d 434; Carr v. Industrial Com. (1962), 26 Ill.2d 347, 186 N.E.2d 280; De Hoyos v. Industrial Com. (1962), 26 Ill.2d 110, 185 N.E.2d 885.) In each of those cases the accidental injury was clearly traceable to a condition of the lot--an icy surface which caused a fall or hazardous traffic congestion which resulted in an employee being struck by a car driven by another employee. In this regard, respondent contends that those cases are distinguishable from the case now under consideration. It argues that...

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