Mathenia v. Delo

• Decision Date: 13 November 1996
• Docket Number: No. 95-3195,95-3195
• Parties: Chuck Lee MATHENIA, Appellant, v. Paul DELO, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 1476

99 F.3d 1476

Chuck Lee MATHENIA, Appellant, v. Paul DELO, Appellee.

No. 95-3195.

United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.

Submitted June 12, 1996.

Decided Nov. 13, 1996.

Lawrence Fleming, St. Louis, MO, for appellant.

Stephen Hawke, Jefferson City, MO, for appellee.

Before BEAM, BRIGHT and HANSEN, Circuit Judges.

BEAM, Circuit Judge.

Chuck Mathenia, under sentence of death, appeals the district court's ¹ denial of his request for relief under Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

This case is before us for a second time. Mathenia v. Delo, 975 F.2d 444 (8th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 995, 113 S.Ct. 1609, 123 L.Ed.2d 170 (1993). The relevant facts are largely set out in our prior opinion and will be repeated here only to the extent necessary. Mathenia was convicted of two counts of capital murder for the brutal stabbing deaths of Daisy Nash and her mentally impaired sister Louanna Bailey. Mathenia knew both of the sisters and, in fact, had been living with Daisy for some time. Several months before the murders, Mathenia had been arrested for allegedly twice raping Louanna. Although the charges were later dropped, Mathenia had vowed revenge on the two sisters, including telling his step-sister that he should kill Louanna for having him arrested.

On the day of the murders, Mathenia had been drinking heavily. After returning to Daisy's home, he and Daisy had a heated argument. Mathenia violently beat Daisy and stabbed her to death. He then proceeded to Louanna's home, several blocks away. After telling Louanna that he had just killed Daisy, Mathenia stabbed Louanna to death. Mathenia was later arrested for and confessed to the murders. Mathenia was convicted of both murders and was sentenced to death. As an aggravating factor, the jury found that the murders were "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that [they] involved torture or depravity of mind." ²

Mathenia's convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal and his state post-conviction relief was denied. State v. Mathenia, 702 S.W.2d 840 (Mo.), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 909, 106 S.Ct. 3286, 91 L.Ed.2d 574 (1986); Mathenia v. State, 752 S.W.2d 873 (Mo.Ct.App.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1019, 109 S.Ct. 819, 102 L.Ed.2d 809 (1989). Mathenia then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court denied the petition. This court affirmed, holding that: (1) Mathenia's trial counsel was not constitutionally ineffective; (2) although the statutory aggravating circumstance was facially vague, it was properly limited by the finding of torture; and (3) Mathenia's mental retardation did not prevent him from having the degree of culpability necessary to justify capital punishment. Mathenia, 975 F.2d at 453.

Following our denial of habeas relief, Mathenia filed a motion for relief from the district court's judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 60(b) allows for relief from a judgment for several enumerated reasons, including mistake and fraud. Subsection (b)(6) provides for relief from a judgment for "any other reason justifying relief." ³ Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6). In the motion, Mathenia alleged that new, but previously unavailable, evidence established both prejudice resulting from his counsel's ineffective assistance and his innocence of capital murder.

The district court construed the Rule 60 motion as a second petition for habeas corpus relief. Because the arguments raised in the motion had been presented in the prior habeas action, the district court determined the claims were successive. Thus, the district court found it could only reach the merits of petitioner's claims on a showing of either cause and prejudice or a miscarriage of justice. Finding neither, the district court denied Mathenia's Rule 60 motion. Mathenia v. Delo, No. 89-0088-C at 8 (E.D.Mo. June 2, 1993) (June Order).

The district court applied the standard announced in Sawyer v. Whitley to determine whether the miscarriage of justice exception had been satisfied. Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 350, 112 S.Ct. 2514, 2524-25, 120 L.Ed.2d 269 (1992) (habeas petitioner must show, by clear and convincing evidence, that but for a constitutional error, no reasonable juror would have found him guilty). The district court reviewed the mental examination evidence and found that Mathenia had not shown actual innocence. June Order at 7.

Mathenia originally appealed the denial of Rule 60(b)(6) relief, but later moved to dismiss that appeal. He then filed a timely motion under Rule 59(e) to alter or amend the June 2, 1993 judgment. In his Rule 59(e) motion, Mathenia objected to many of the legal conclusions made by the district court in its June order, including the use of the Sawyer v. Whitley actual innocence standard, and the correctness of the district court's denial of mental examinations prior to his habeas corpus hearing.

Mathenia's actual innocence argument relied on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Schlup v. Delo, which was decided after the district court's denial of Rule 60 relief. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, ----, 115 S.Ct. 851, 865, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995). Schlup held that the less stringent Murray v. Carrier standard, instead of the Sawyer standard, was to be applied to claims that a constitutional error has resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent of the crime. Id. (citing Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2649-50, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (habeas petitioner must show that a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent to avoid a procedural bar to consideration of the merits of constitutional claims)).

With regard to the mental examination argument, Mathenia alleged that the district court's denial of mental examinations in conjunction with the first habeas corpus action, was cause to excuse his failure to fully develop the evidence in that proceeding. Mathenia's counsel had requested such examinations to help in the presentation of the ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim. Two pre-trial mental examinations had shown that although Mathenia was mildly mentally retarded, he was not suffering from a mental disease or defect. At the habeas level, the district court reviewed the record containing those evaluations and denied further mental evaluations, stating that Mathenia's present mental state was not relevant to the claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Mathenia alleges that such denial was erroneous and excuses his previous failure to more fully develop this argument.

The district court found that these arguments "could have been, and in fact were, presented to and rejected by the Court in the June Order." Mathenia v. Delo, No. 4:89-CV-88 at 3 (E.D.Mo. August 10, 1995) (August Order). The district court then re-analyzed the mental examination evidence under the Schlup/Carrier standard and again found that Mathenia had not shown actual innocence. The court also determined that its prior denial of mental examinations was not cause to excuse Mathenia's procedural default. Consequently, the district court denied Rule 59(e) relief. August Order at 5. Mathenia now appeals that order.

II. DISCUSSION

In this procedurally intricate appeal, Mathenia attempts to introduce evidence that was not presented in his first habeas proceeding through a Rule 59(e) motion to amend a judgment from an earlier Rule 60 proceeding. The evidence includes proof of his brain damage and mental retardation. This psychological evidence largely comes from the reports of three physicians. Using this evidence, Mathenia attempts to show that his trial counsel was ineffective. He also asserts that the evidence shows that he was not capable of achieving the requisite mental state for capital murder. Our prior decision disposes of both of these issues. See Mathenia, 975 F.2d at 447, 453.

Mathenia argues that allowing him to present the now-available mental examination evidence at his first habeas proceeding would have established the prejudice that resulted from his trial counsel's allegedly deficient performance. In concluding that Mathenia's trial counsel was not constitutionally ineffective, however, we found no instances of deficient performance in this regard. Mathenia, 975 F.2d at 448, 452. Had our opinion found the prejudice prong of Strickland v. Washington's ineffective assistance of counsel test to be determinative, Mathenia's current argument might be more compelling. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (to establish constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel, petitioner must show both deficient performance and prejudice resulting from such deficiency). However, because of our finding that counsel's performance was not deficient, Mathenia's present argument does not affect our earlier decision.

Mathenia also asserts that he is innocent of the crime of capital murder because of his diminished mental capacity at the time of the murders. Such capacity allegedly prevented him from deliberating as to those murders. See, e.g., State v. Eggers, 675 S.W.2d 923, 925-26 (Mo.Ct.App.1984) (capital murder requires both premeditation (thinking about the act, for however short a period of time) and deliberation (cool reflection)). See also State v. Gilmore, 650 S.W.2d 627, 629 (Mo.1983). We expressly rejected this argument as to premeditation in our earlier opinion. See Mathenia, 975 F.2d at 453. Furthermore, we agree with the district court's determination that there was ample evidence of deliberation, including the lapse of time between the murders, to allow for reflection before the second murder.

Turning to the matter now before the court, we review a district court's denial of Rule 59(e) relief under an abuse of discretion standard. See,...