Mathews ex rel. Mathews v. Lcca
Decision Date | 21 February 2008 |
Docket Number | No. 1 CA-CV 07-0228.,1 CA-CV 07-0228. |
Citation | 177 P.3d 867,217 Ariz. 606 |
Parties | Herman MATHEWS, by and through his Guardian and Conservator, Vyntrice MATHEWS, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. LIFE CARE CENTERS OF AMERICA, INC., a Tennessee corporation dba Life Care Center of Paradise Valley; Mary Anne Stanford, Administrator, Defendants/Appellants. |
Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
Wilkes & McHugh, PA By Melanie Bossie, Brad H. Astrowsky, Phoenix, Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee.
Gordon & Rees, LLP By Linda Hunt Mullany, Matthew G. Kleiner, Phoenix, Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants.
¶ 1 Life Care Centers of America dba Life Care Center of Paradise Valley and Mary Anne Stanford, Administrator, (collectively "LCCA") appeal from the trial court's order denying its motion to compel arbitration with Herman Mathews, by and through his Guardian and Conservator, Vyntrice Mathews (collectively "Mathews"). LCCA argues that Mathews signed a Voluntary Agreement for Arbitration ("Agreement"), which required Mathews to participate in binding arbitration of all disputes with LCCA. LCCA argues that the trial court erred in denying its motion to compel arbitration because the Agreement does not take away rights and remedies available under the Arizona Adult Protective Services Act ("APSA"), Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") sections 46-451 to -459 (2005 & Supp.2007),1 § 46-455(O). The issues properly before us are whether (1) APSA prevents the enforcement of a voluntary arbitration agreement entered into by an elderly person or an elderly person's authorized representative and (2) the trial court properly ruled that the term in the Agreement requiring a panel of arbitrators selected from the American Arbitration Association ("AAA") was not a compelling reason to void the Agreement because substitute arbitrators could be found. We do not read the plain language of A.R.S. § 46-455(O) so broadly as to prevent enforcement of a voluntary arbitration agreement entered into by an elderly adult or his authorized representative. We agree, however, with the trial court's ruling that the unavailability of an AAA panel of arbitrators does not void the Agreement. Therefore, we reverse the trial court's order denying LCCA's motion to compel arbitration and remand to the trial court for rulings consistent with this decision.
¶ 2 On August 13, 2004, LCCA admitted Herman Mathews ("Herman") to its long term healthcare facility, Life Care Center of Paradise Valley. Herman suffered from diabetes and dementia, which made him a vulnerable or incapacitated adult as defined by A.R.S. § 46-451(A)(5) and (10).2 Vyntrice Mathews ("Vyntrice"), the granddaughter of Herman, had a general power of attorney to make decisions and enter agreements on Herman's behalf. On the day LCCA admitted Herman to its facility, Vyntrice signed the Agreement on her own behalf and on behalf of Herman. The Agreement clearly states: "The execution of this Arbitration Agreement is voluntary and is not a precondition to receiving medical treatment at or for admission to the Facility." Herman remained a resident at the Life Care Center of Paradise Valley until October 6, 2004.
¶ 3 In June 2006, Vyntrice filed a complaint and amended complaint against LCCA alleging negligence and vulnerable adult abuse/neglect/exploitation of Herman pursuant to APSA, A.R.S. § 46-455. Based on the Agreement, LCCA filed a motion to compel arbitration. The trial court rejected Mathews' argument that the Agreement was void because an AAA arbitration panel could not perform the arbitration, concluding that substitute arbitrators could be found. Nevertheless, it denied LCCA's motion to compel arbitration, finding that "the agreement [to arbitrate] is contrary [to] or takes away remedies permitted in the Arizona elder abuse statute."
¶ 4 We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-2101.01(A)(1) (2003). See U.S. Insulation, Inc. v. Hilro Constr. Co., Inc., 146 Ariz. 250, 253, 705 P.2d 490, 493 (App.1985) ().
¶ 5 The main issue in this case is whether A.R.S. § 46-455(O) prevents the enforcement of a voluntary arbitration agreement between an elderly individual and a healthcare facility because such agreement would deprive an elderly person of rights and remedies available under APSA. We also address the trial court's ruling that the term in the Agreement requiring an AAA arbitration panel does not void the Agreement simply because AAA no longer arbitrates disputes between patients and healthcare facilities.
¶ 6 We review a trial court's denial of a motion to compel arbitration de novo when such denial relies on statutory interpretation, an issue of law. See In re Estate of Jung, 210 Ariz. 202, 204, ¶ 11, 109 P.3d 97, 99 (App.2005). We also review issues of law involving statutory interpretation de novo. State v. Ross, 214 Ariz. 280, 283, ¶ 21, 151 P.3d 1261, 1264 (App.2007). Our primary goal of statutory interpretation is to find and give effect to legislative intent. Id. at ¶ 22, 151 P.3d 1261. We first look to the plain language of the statute as the best indicator of that intent. Fragoso v. Fell, 210 Ariz. 427, 430, ¶ 7, 111 P.3d 1027, 1030 (App.2005). When statutory language is clear and, unambiguous, we give effect to it and do not use other methods of statutory interpretation. Id. "When a statute is ambiguous or unclear, however, we attempt to determine legislative intent by interpreting the statutory scheme as a whole and consider the statute's context, subject matter, historical background, effects and consequences, and spirit and purpose." Ross, 214 Ariz. at 283, ¶ 22, 151 P.3d at 1264.
¶ 7 LCCA's main argument is that § 46-455(O) does not preclude arbitration in this case. Specifically, LCCA argues that the plain language of § 46-455(O) does not make the Agreement unenforceable. The disputed language is contained in § 46-455(O), which states: LCCA contends that the language of § 46-455(O) does not preclude contracting parties from arbitrating their disputes. LCCA stresses that the legislature did not use language expressly precluding arbitration as a potential legal remedy in an elder abuse case.
¶ 8 Mathews, however, argues that the language of § 46-455(O) preserves an elder abuse victim's right to a jury trial if the victim so chooses. Mathews further interprets § 46-455(O) as preventing enforcement of any arbitration agreement involving claims subject to APSA or any laws used to enforce such an agreement because such an agreement necessarily limits claims for elder abuse or neglect brought pursuant to § 46-455.
¶ 9 We disagree with Mathews' broad interpretation of § 46-455(O). The plain language of § 46-455(O) does not address or allude to alternative dispute resolutions such as arbitration. The disputed language contained in § 46-455(O) states in part, "[a] civil action authorized by this section ... does not limit and is not limited by any other civil remedy or criminal action or any other provisions of law." We do not read this language as being applicable to legally valid voluntary arbitration agreements. An arbitration agreement is not a civil remedy as defined by APSA, nor is it a criminal action or a provision of law. Instead, arbitration is a means to resolve a civil action in an alternative forum.
¶ 10 The legislature enacted APSA in 1988 because it determined that elder abuse was a serious problem requiring legislative intervention. In re Guardianship/Conservatorship of Denton, 190 Ariz. 152, 155, 945 P.2d 1283, 1286 (1997). The legislature first enacted § 46-455 as a criminal statute, making abuse of an incapacitated or vulnerable adult a class five felony. Id. In 1989, the legislature expanded the scope of the statute to include a civil cause of action, which it set forth in § 46-455 subsections (B) to (P).3 Id. (citing 1989 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 118, § 1). The main purpose of, enacting APSA was to protect incapacitated of vulnerable adults. Consistent with that purpose, subsection (O) plainly tries to ensure that other statutes do not limit an incapacitated or vulnerable adult from bringing his or her civil action.
¶ 11 Although the Arizona Supreme Court has interpreted APSA broadly to increase the remedies available to and for elderly people who have been harmed by their care-givers, it has not specifically addressed whether APSA precludes the enforcement of voluntary arbitration agreements. We find each of the three supreme court cases interpreting APSA broadly to be distinguishable from the case at hand. Each case discusses an inherent conflict between APSA and another statute enacted by the legislature, and in each case the supreme court found APSA's legislative intent to outweigh the conflicting statute.
¶ 12 The supreme court first addressed APSA in Denton. In that case, the supreme court held that "representatives of elder abuse victims may recover damages for pain and suffering endured by the victims, notwithstanding the death of the victim." Id. at 157, 945 P.2d at 1288. In Denton, a husband filed suit against his wife's nursing home alleging negligence, breach of contract and a statutory cause of action under APSA, § 46-455(B). Id. at 153, 945 P.2d at 1284. The wife died prior to the resolution of the action and the nursing home moved for partial summary judgment on the claim for damages for pain and suffering. Id. The nursing home relied on the survival statute, A.R.S. § 14-3110, which precludes victims of elder abuse and their representatives from recovering damages for pain and suffering after the death of the victim. Id....
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