Mathews v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, Civil Action No. 14-00024

• Decision Date: 14 January 2015
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 14-00024
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania
• Parties: DANIEL KEITH MATHEWS, Plaintiff, v. FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, CENTRAL MEDICAL REVIEW DIRECTOR, FPC MCKEAN HEALTH SERVICES ADMIN., MR. VAN HORN (HSA), MS. BLEEM (HSA), DR. WALT, FCI MCKEAN WARDEN BOBBY L. MEEKS, MRS. DEANNA TRONETTI, Unit Manager, MRS. BUNTZ, FCI Elkton MRS. JANE BARNES, AHSA FCI Elkton, DR. MD R. LEPIANE, FCI Elkton, and PA ANDREW SCHUMACHER, FCI Elkton Defendants.

DANIEL KEITH MATHEWS, Plaintiff, v. FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, CENTRAL MEDICAL REVIEWDIRECTOR, FPC MCKEAN HEALTH SERVICES ADMIN., MR. VAN HORN(HSA), MS. BLEEM (HSA), DR. WALT, FCI MCKEAN WARDEN BOBBYL. MEEKS, MRS. DEANNA TRONETTI, Unit Manager, MRS. BUNTZ, FCI ElktonMRS. JANE BARNES, AHSA FCI Elkton, DR. MD R. LEPIANE, FCI Elkton, and PAANDREW SCHUMACHER, FCI Elkton Defendants.

Civil Action No. 14-00024

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

January 14, 2015

Judge Nora Barry Fischer¹

Magistrate Judge Susan Baxter

MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

I. RECOMMENDATION

It is respectfully recommended that the Court grant Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or, in the alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 15).

II. REPORT

A. Relevant Procedural and Factual History

On January 27, 2014, Plaintiff filed this pro se civil rights action pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971). At the time of the filing of the complaint, Plaintiff was a federal inmateincarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution at McKean in Bradford, Pennsylvania ("FCI McKean"). Named as Defendants are: the Federal Bureau of Prisons; the Central Medical Review Director; FPC McKean Health Services Administration; Mr. Van Horn (HSA); Ms. Bleem (HSA); Dr. Walt; FCI McKean Warden Bobby L. Meeks; Mrs. Deanna Tronetti, Unit Manager; Mrs. Buntz, FCI Elkton; Mrs. Jane Barnes, AHSA FCI Elkton; Dr. MD R. Lepiane, FCI Elkton; and PA Andrew Schumacher, FCI Elkton. (ECF No. 1; ECF No. 11).

Plaintiff complains that since he was diagnosed with Hepatitis-C Virus ("HCV") in 2011, staff members at the Federal Correctional Institution in Lisbon, Ohio ("FCI Elkton") and FCI McKean failed to provide him with appropriate and necessary medical treatment in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. (ECF No. 1 at pp. 1-2; ECF No. 4 at pp. 1-2; ECF No. 11 at pp. 1-2). Plaintiff further alleges that staff members at FCI McKean violated his Constitutional rights by refusing to grant him 12 months at a Residential Re-Entry Center ("RRC") as allowed by 18 U.S.C. § 3624. (ECF No. 1 at p. 2; ECF No. 4 at p. 2; ECF No. 11 at pp. 1-2). Plaintiff states that had he been granted 12 months early release, he would have been able to secure health insurance and treatment for his HCV. (ECF No. 1 at p. 2; ECF No. 4 at p. 2). Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants' actions have caused irreversible liver damage, and he seeks "unspecified compensatory damages" for medical treatment after his release on May 6, 2014, and "compensation for living expenses while undergoing treatment" because the "side effects of the treatment will render [him] incapable to hold down a normal job." (ECF No. 11 at p. 2).

On July 24, 2014, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 15), arguing that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to his Eighth Amendment claim, and has otherwise failed to state a causeof action upon which relief may be granted. Plaintiff filed a response on August 11, 2014 (ECF No. 19). This matter is now ripe for disposition.

B. Standards of Review

1. Motion to Dismiss

A motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) must be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and all the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint must be accepted as true. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007). A complaint must be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) if it does not allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (rejecting the traditional 12(b)(6) standard set forth in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (specifically applying Twombly analysis beyond the context of the Sherman Act).

The Court need not accept inferences drawn by plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts as set forth in the complaint. See California Pub. Employee Ret. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) citing Morse v. Lower Merion School Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Nor must the court accept legal conclusions set forth as factual allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Although the United States Supreme Court does "not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, [the Court does require] enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570.

In other words, at the motion to dismiss stage, a plaintiff is "required to make a 'showing' rather than a blanket assertion of an entitlement to relief." Smith v. Sullivan, 2008 WL 482469, at *1 (D.Del. 2008) quoting Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008). "This 'does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage,' but instead 'simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence off the necessary element." Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234, quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.

Recently, the Third Circuit Court prescribed the following three-step approach to determine the sufficiency of a complaint under Twombly and Iqbal:

First, the court must 'tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.' Second, the court should identify allegations that, 'because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.' Finally, 'where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.'

Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011), citing Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1947, 1950); see also Great Western Mining & Min. Co. v. Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 177 (3d Cir. 2010).

2. Summary Judgment

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(2) provides that summary judgment shall be granted if the "pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(e)(2) further provides that when a motion for summary judgment is made and supported, "an opposing party may not rely merely on allegations or denials in its own pleading; rather, its response must-by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule-set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. If the opposing party does not so respond, summary judgment should, if appropriate, be entered against that party."

A district court may grant summary judgment for the defendant when the plaintiff has failed to present any genuine issues of material fact. FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c). The moving party has the initial burden of proving to the district court the absence of evidence supporting the non-moving party's claims. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 330, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Andreoli v. Gates, 482 F.3d 641, 647 (3d Cir. 2007); UPMC Health System v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 391 F.3d 497, 502 (3d Cir. 2004).

The burden then shifts to the non-movant to come forward with specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. FED.R.CIV.P. 56(e); Williams v. Borough of West Chester, Pa., 891 F.2d 458, 460-461 (3d Cir. 1989) (the non-movant must present affirmative evidence-more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance-which supports each element of his claim to defeat a properly presented motion for summary judgment). The non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings and show specific facts by affidavit or by information contained in the filed documents (i.e., depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions) to meet his burden of proving elements essential to his claim. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. See also Saldana v. Kmart Corp., 260 F.3d 228, 232 (3d Cir. 2001). The non-moving party "must present more than just bare assertions, conclusory allegations or suspicions to show the existence of a genuine issue." Garcia v. Kimmell, 381 F. App'x 211, 213 (3d Cir. 2010) quoting Podobnik v. U.S. Postal Serv., 409 F.3d 584, 594 (3d Cir. 2005).

When considering a motion for summary judgment, the court is not permitted to weigh the evidence or to make credibility determinations, but is limited to deciding whether there are any disputed issues and, if there are, whether they are both genuine and material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The court must consider the evidence, and all reasonable inferences which may be drawn from it, in the lightmost favorable to the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). See also El v. SEPTA, 479 F.3d 232, 238 (3d Cir.2007).

A material fact is a fact whose resolution will affect the outcome of the case under applicable law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Summary judgment is only precluded if the dispute about a material fact is "genuine," i.e., if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Id. at 247-249.

3. Pro Se Pleadings

Pro se pleadings, "however inartfully pleaded," must be held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972). If the court can reasonably read pleadings to state a valid claim on which the litigant could prevail, it should do so despite failure to cite proper legal...