Mathews v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 05 September 1956
• Citation: Mathews v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 89 So.2d 641 (Fla. 1956)
• Parties: Sally MATHEWS, a minor, by Gladys A. Fraser, her next friend, Petitioner, v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, a Corporation, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 641

89 So.2d 641

Sally MATHEWS, a minor, by Gladys A. Fraser, her next friend, Petitioner, v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, a Corporation, Respondent.

Supreme Court of Florida, En Banc.

Sept. 5, 1956.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 15, 1956.

William D. Barfield, Jacksonville, for petitioner.

Howell & Kirby, Jacksonville, for respondent.

ROBERTS, Justice.

We here review, on certiorari, an order of a circuit court affirming a directed verdict and judgment in favor of the defendant insurance company entered in a suit on a life insurance policy filed by the plaintiff, the beneficiary thereunder, in a civil court of record.

There is no dispute as to the facts, and the sole point for determination here is whether the trial and appellate courts applied the wrong rule of law in determining liability of the insurance company on the policy under the admitted facts. It is suggested by the insurance company that, since the scope of our review on common-law certiorari is limited to a determination of whether the 'essential requirements of law have been followed in the judicial process' culminating in the judgment or order here reviewed, Wilson v. McCoy Mfg. Co., Fla.1954, 69 So.2d 659, 665, this question cannot be reached by this court in the instant proceeding. But we have the view that the duty of a trial judge to apply to admitted facts a correct principle of law is such a fundamental and essential element of the judicial process that a litigant cannot be said to have had the 'remedy, by due course of law,' guaranteed by Section 4 of the Declaration of Rights of our Constitution, F.S.A., if the trial judge fails or refuses to perform that duty. It was so held in Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n v. Bunting, 1938, 133 Fla. 646, 183 So. 321, 330, wherein the court said: 'On certiorari, we do not weigh the effect of the evidence; but we can reach it when a wrong rule of law is enforced as to its application.' And, indeed, it is unthinkable that this court, in the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction over other courts, could not compel adherence to a principle of law heretofore established by this court in the unlikely event that a trial judge should deliberately and consciously refuse to follow our decision, even though the trial judge's arbitrarily erroneous action in this respect had been approved and affirmed by a circuit court on appeal. While the principle of law here contended for by the plaintiff has not heretofore been established by this court, the distinction is simply one of degree and not in kind.

As to the merits of the controversy, the admitted facts are as follows: The plaintiff's decedent ('the insured' hereafter) applied for life insurance on January 19, 1953, and was on that date given a medical examination by the insurance company's physician. The policy was issued about two months later. The insured died on July 17, 1953, of cancer of the lung; and all the medical testimony was to the effect that he was suffering from that disease at the time of his application and medical examination and, of course, at the time the policy was issued. The insurance company contends that, in these circumstances, the policy never became effective under a clause contained in the application reading as follows: 'The Company shall incur no liability under this application until a policy has been delivered and the full first premium specified in the policy has actually been paid to and accepted by the Company during the lifetime and continued insurability of the applicant * * *' (emphasis added), and relies on the decisions of this court in Independent Life & Accident Ins. Co. of Florida v. Roddam, Fla.1955, 81 So.2d 221, and Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Green, Fla.1955, 80 So.2d 321, in support of its contention.

But in both the Roddam and Green cases the insurance was issued upon the application of one other than the insured and without a medical examination of the insured. Here, as has been noted, there was a medical examination; and a growing majority of the courts of other jurisdictions have taken the position that if there has been no fraud or misrepresentation on the part of the applicant, and he was ben subjected to a medical examination by the company's physician and has been accepted as a satisfactory...