Mathews v. New York Racing Association, Inc.

• Decision Date: 01 May 1961
• Citation: 193 F. Supp. 293
• Parties: Joseph L. MATHEWS, Plaintiff, v. NEW YORK RACING ASSOCIATION, INC. (Owners), and Thoroughbred Racing Protective Association Inc., and/or Thoroughbred Racing Protective Bureau, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

193 F. Supp. 293

Joseph L. MATHEWS, Plaintiff, v. NEW YORK RACING ASSOCIATION, INC. (Owners), and Thoroughbred Racing Protective Association Inc., and/or Thoroughbred Racing Protective Bureau, Defendants.

United States District Court S. D. New York.

May 1, 1961.

Joseph L. Mathews, plaintiff, pro se.

Hirsh, Newman & Rosenson, New York City, for defendants; Alvin S. Rosenson, New York City, of counsel.

MacMAHON, District Judge.

Defendants move for summary judgment, pursuant to Rule 56(b), Federal Rules on Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A., on the ground that a judgment in a prior action in this court is res judicata as to the claim alleged in the complaint.

New York Racing Association Inc. is a New York corporation which operates Jamaica Race Track. It employs defendant Thoroughbred Racing Protective Association Inc., a private detective agency, for security purposes.

Plaintiff brings this action against the Association and Thoroughbred alleging that on April 4, 1958, at Jamaica Race Track, he was "assaulted," "kidnaped," "falsely arrested," and "falsely imprisoned" by employees of Thoroughbred. He further alleges that the defendants charged him with disorderly conduct and maliciously caused him to be prosecuted and convicted in the Magistrate's Court of the City of New York on April 10, 1958. He prays for relief in the form of money damages and an injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with his attendance at race tracks, from publication of libelous statements, and from acting as peace officers.

The prior judgment on which defendants rely was entered in this court on June 30, 1960 following a trial before Judge Palmieri sitting without a jury. The complaint in that action alleged, among other matters, that plaintiff was assaulted by the defendant's private investigators at Jamaica Race Track on April 4, 1958. It also alleged that the employees of the defendants had made libelous statements concerning the plaintiff on several occasions, including plaintiff's trial for disorderly conduct on April 10, 1958. The relief prayed for in that action was also money damages and an injunction from further interference with plaintiff's attendance at race tracks within the United States. The earlier action named three individuals as defendants. The only two properly served were employees of the defendants named in the present suit.

The doctrine of res judicata operates as a bar to subsequent suits involving the same parties, or those in privity with them, based on a claim which has once reached a judgment on the merits. Lawlor v. National Screen Service, 1955, 349 U.S. 322, 326, 75 S.Ct. 865, 99 L.Ed. 1122. There can be no doubt that the parties in this action are in privity with those in the earlier suit. A corporation acts only through its agents, and if the agents are not at fault, there is no basis for corporate liability. See Benjamin v. United States, D.C.S.D. N.Y.1950, 92 F.Supp. 489. This, of course, is nothing more than the application of familiar principles of the law of agency.

The Association owns the race track, Thoroughbred is its agent, and the individual defendants, who removed plaintiff from Jamaica Race Track on April 4, 1958 and who testified at his trial on April 10, 1958, were employees of Thoroughbred. The present corporate defendants are, therefore, so identified in interest with their agents, the individual defendants in the earlier action, that they stand or fall with them. Mooney v. Central Motor Lines, 6 Cir., 1955, 222 F.2d 572.

The classic situation in which the doctrine of res judicata comes into play is where a second claim between the same parties is based on the same operative facts as the earlier one. The issues tried in the first claim and any other issues which could have been dealt with there are forever barred by the first judgment. Angel v. Bullington, 1947, 330 U.S. 183, 192-193, 67 S.Ct. 657, 91 L.Ed. 832.

Thus, the question is whether the claim alleged in this complaint is the same as that in the suit concluded earlier. The term "claim" refers to a group of facts limited to a single occurrence or transaction without particular reference to the resulting legal rights. It is the facts surrounding the occurrence which operate to make up the claim, not the legal theory upon which a plaintiff relies. Clark, Code Pleading 130 (2 Ed. 1947).

The facts upon which plaintiff predicates this action occurred on two days, separated by almost a week, but they are so interrelated as to constitute a single claim. The ejection from the race track on April 4, 1958 was the subject of the subsequent trial for disorderly conduct on April 10, 1958.

The facts relevant to the incident at Jamaica Race Track on April 4, 1958, along with three other separate claims based on different facts, were tried to a conclusion in the earlier suit. There, the plaintiff relied on the acts of the agents occurring on April 4, 1958 as the basis of a claim against them on the theory of assault. Now, he asserts these same acts as the basis of a claim against the agents' principals on the theory of false arrest. In the earlier action, plaintiff relied on the statements of the agents made on April 10, 1958 as the basis of a claim against them on the theory of libel. Now, he asserts those same statements as the basis of a claim against their principals on the theory of malicious prosecution. Clearly, any liability of the defendants for the acts or statements of their agents must be predicated upon the familiar...