Mathews v. Wal-Mart Assocs., Case No. 2:20-CV-04033-NKL
| Decision Date | 11 May 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:20-CV-04033-NKL |
| Parties | DEANNA MATHEWS Plaintiff, v. WAL-MART ASSOCIATES, INC. Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri |
Pending before the Court is Defendant Wal-Mart Associates, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Doc. 12. For the reasons stated below, Defendant's Motion is granted. Plaintiff's request for leave to amend her complaint is also granted.
Plaintiff Deanna Mathews has been an employee at Defendant Wal-Mart for twenty-eight years and has been a store manager for the last eight years. According to her Complaint, Mathews' immediate supervisor, Market Manager Marsha Heissler, and the store's Regional Vice President, Terry Nannie, discriminated against Mathews on the basis of her sex and her age. Doc. 1-2 (Complaint). Mathews claims that all discriminatory acts were directed by Nannie. Id. at ¶ 8.
Mathews alleges that examples of the discriminatory conduct include a February 2016 statement by Nannie to Mathews that she "needed to be knocking it out of the park like those young guys in Columbia." Id. at ¶ 10(a). Mathews claims that "only 20 of the 130 stores in Nannie's market are managed by females." Id. at 10(b). Mathews also alleges that Nannie "will have multiple interactions with young male store managers while ignoring Plaintiff and other female managers" which Mathews and other employees believe to be "discriminatory as to female and older managers." Id. at ¶¶ 15-17.
Mathews was also subject to "baseless coaching decisions and poor evaluations based on not meeting the metrics for Wal-Mart stores," id. at ¶ 11, and she was the only manager to be subject to these decisions despite the fact that "many other stores also received the same or worse metrics," id. at ¶ 13. After a poor evaluation in November 2018, Plaintiff "voiced opposition to the results because the same issues that led to Plaintiff's 'coaching' and 'discipline' were present and occurring in other stores, even to a greater extent, and the evaluation was reversed." Id. at ¶ 12. She "continued to receive illegitimate coaching and evaluations through January and April of 2019." Id. at ¶ 14. She claims that "age and sex are motivating factors to the discriminatory actions of Wal-Mart as alleged herein." Id. at ¶ 18.
On May 31, 2019, Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Missouri Commission on Human Rights and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Doc. 1-2, pp. 10-11. On December 3, 2019, the MCHR issued Mathews her Right to Sue letter informing her of her right to pursue independent legal action within ninety days.1 Id. at pp. 12-13.
Mathews filed her Complaint on January 14, 2020 in the Circuit Court of Cole County,Missouri, and Defendant removed the case to federal court on February 28, 2020. Mathews' Complaint alleges two counts of discrimination. Count I for "Discrimination/Sex" alleges that Wal-Mart engaged in unlawful employment practices in violation of the MHRA "in that Plaintiff was subject to a hostile environment of sex discrimination which Defendant was aware of and failed to stop or prevent." Id. at ¶ 25. Count II for "Discrimination/Age" alleges that Wal-Mart engaged in unlawful employment practices in violation of the MHRA "in that Plaintiff was subject to age discrimination." Id. at ¶ 34.
On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a court accepts the factual allegations contained in the Complaint as true, and liberally construes the allegations in favor of the plaintiff. Eckert v. Titan Tire Corp., 514 F.3d 801, 806 (8th Cir. 2008). To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must contain "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A complaint is plausible if its "factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 594 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Although "it is not necessary to plead facts sufficient to establish a prima facie case at the pleading stage," "the elements of a prima facie case may be used as a prism to shed light upon the plausibility of the claim." Blomker v. Jewell, 831 F.3d 1051, 1056 (8th Cir. 2016).
As an initial matter, from the face of her Complaint and in light of her Suggestions in Opposition to Defendant's motion to dismiss, it is unclear whether Mathews is alleging sex and/or age discrimination claims based on a specific adverse employment action, sex and/or agehostile work environment claims, or a combination of both. See Fuchs v. Dep't of Revenue, 447 S.W.3d 727, 731 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014) .
Count I of Plaintiff's Complaint for "Discrimination/Sex" states that "Defendants engaged in unlawful employment practices, as set forth herein, against Plaintiff in violation of Chapter 213 RSMo., et seq in that Plaintiff was subject to a hostile environment of sex discrimination which Defendant was aware of and failed to stop or prevent." Doc. 1-2, ¶ 25. Count II of Plaintiff's Complaint for "Discrimination/Age" does not allege that she was subject to a hostile environment as a result of age discrimination, but rather alleges that "Defendants engaged in unlawful employment practices as set forth herein, against Plaintiff in violation of Chapter 213 RSMo., et seq in that Plaintiff was subject to age discrimination." Id. at ¶ 34. In its motion to dismiss, Defendant appears to have assumed that Mathews intended to allege both claims under both protected bases and moves to dismiss both types of claims. In her response, although Mathews cites to the standard for age and/or sex discrimination, requiring an adverse employment action, she then asserts that an adverse employment action is unnecessary if she can show that she was subject to a hostile work environment. In an effort to "liberally construe[] the allegations in favor of the plaintiff," the Court will assume that she has intended to plead both claims with respect to age and sex.2 Eckert, 514 F.3d at 806.
Under Missouri law, an individual pursuing a claim of discrimination must file an administrative charge with the MCHR within 180 days of the discriminatory act. Pollock v. Wetterau Food Distribution Grp., 11 S.W.3d 754, 763 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999). Failure to do so bars that discriminatory act from forming the basis of a discrimination claim, unless the claim falls within an exception such as the continuing violation theory. Id. "Under the continuing violation theory, a victim of discrimination may pursue a claim for an act occurring prior to the statutory period, if she can demonstrate the act is part of an ongoing practice or pattern of discrimination by her employer." Plengemeier v. Thermadyne Indus., Inc., 409 S.W.3d 395, 401 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013). To survive a motion to dismiss, a Plaintiff (1) "must allege that at least one act occurred within the filing period" and (2) "establish that the disparate treatment is comprised of a series of interrelated events, rather than isolated or sporadic acts of intentional discrimination." Id.
Defendant claims that all of Plaintiff's claims arising before December 2, 2018 must be dismissed as untimely, because she filed her Charge of Discrimination with the MCHR on May 31, 2019, and therefore any events that occurred in excess of 180 days prior to that date have failed to meet this prerequisite. Mathews responds that the continuing violation theory applies here, and therefore she still has a valid claim based on the events prior to December 2, 2018.
As to the first element, Mathews alleges a discriminatory "coaching" occurred in April 2019, which is within 180 days of the May 31, 2019 Charge. As to the second element, liberally construing all allegations in Mathews' favor, she has claimed that Nannie directed the allegedlydiscriminatory conduct at Wal-Mart, including on his own through his comments that Mathews "needed to be knocking it out of the park like those young guys in Columbia" and his ignoring of female store managers while engaging in interactions with young male store managers, as well as through his direction of Mathews' supervisor Heissler, who subjected Plaintiff to "baseless coaching decisions and poor evaluations" in 2017, 2018, and 2019. Liberally construing all allegations and drawing all inferences in favor of Mathews, she has made allegations to support the inference that these were a series of interrelated events and therefore the continuing violation theory plausibly could apply here. At this juncture, it would be premature to conclude that any acts before December 2, 2018 should be dismissed as time-barred. Therefore, Defendant's motion to dismiss all claims prior to December 2, 2018 as untimely is denied.
First, Defendant claims that Mathews' claims of age and sex discrimination must fail because she has failed to allege that she suffered an adverse employment action. To establish a claim of discrimination under the MHRA, a plaintiff is required to show that "(1) [s]he was a member of a protected class; (2) [s]he was qualified to perform [her] job; (3) [s]he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) [s]he was treated differently than similarly situated [male] employees." Carter v. CSL Plasma, Inc., 63 F.Supp.3d 1034 (W.D. Mo. 2014) (citing Ressler v. Clay County, 375 S.W.3d 132, 141 (Mo.App. W.D. 2012)). "An...
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