Mathewson v. Mathewson

• Decision Date: 04 December 1986
• Docket Number: No. 85-1592,85-1592
• Citation: 400 N.W.2d 485,135 Wis.2d 411
• Parties: In re the Marriage of Joyce N. MATHEWSON, Petitioner-Respondent, v. Leroy D. MATHEWSON, Appellant.
• Court: Wisconsin Court of Appeals

Page 485

400 N.W.2d 485

135 Wis.2d 411

In re the Marriage of Joyce N. MATHEWSON, Petitioner-Respondent, v. Leroy D. MATHEWSON, Appellant.

No. 85-1592.

Court of Appeals of Wisconsin.

Submitted on Briefs Oct. 17, 1986.

Opinion Released Dec. 4, 1986.

Opinion Filed Dec. 4, 1986.

[135 Wis.2d 413] Frank X. Kinast, Beloit, for appellant.

William T. Henderson and Collins & Henderson, Beloit, for petitioner-respondent.

Before GARTZKE, P.J., and EICH and SUNDBY, JJ.

SUNDBY, Judge.

Leroy Mathewson appeals from an order entered July 26, 1985, construing, amending and enforcing the property division provisions of a judgment of August 5, 1982, by which he and Joyce Mathewson were divorced. We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in amending the judgment pursuant to sec. 806.07(1)(h), Stats; that the court erred in failing to divide between the parties the expenses of sale of a part of the parties' real property; and that the court erred in failing to determine whether Leroy was entitled to an interest credit. We therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings.

A stipulation dividing the parties' property, incorporated in the judgment, provided:

The real property of the parties shall be sold. From the proceeds of the sale, the Respondent is owed the sum of $18,390.33 before the net proceeds are divided. After the subtraction of the costs of the sale and the above-described sum, the net proceeds of the sale shall be divided equally between the parties. The interest and interest rate, if any, owed on the sum due to the Respondent shall be determined by the court. The parties shall cooperate in the listing and sale of the real estate owned by them. In the event that an offer to purchase is made which is accepted by one of the parties and rejected by the other, the party rejecting the offer shall be obliged to purchase the share of the party who wishes to accept the offer. The purchase price shall be one-half of the amount of the said offer to purchase. ...

Sale of part of the real estate (woodland) netted $1,628.72. Joyce accepted but Leroy refused an offer to purchase other real estate of the parties known as the Shopiere Road property. He offered to purchase the property on the same terms as the offer to purchase. They could not agree as to who was to pay certain expenses of sale and what effect these two sales would have on their financial obligations to each other. Joyce was also dissatisfied with that part of the judgment which requires her to pay The court denied Joyce's motion to delete the interest provision; amended the judgment to require Joyce to pay Leroy 12% interest on $9,195.17 (one-half of the $18,390.33 owed Leroy under the judgment) commencing August 1, 1982; required Leroy to purchase the Shopiere Road property on the same terms as contained in the offer to purchase; directed that the proceeds of the woodland sale be credited against the $18,390.33 owed Leroy; and determined that Leroy owed Joyce $14,869.19 after applying the proceeds from the sale of the woodland and the Shopiere Road properties.

interest to Leroy. Accordingly, she moved the court to resolve these differences and dissatisfactions.

AMENDMENT OF THE JUDGMENT

The divorce judgment was amended under unusual circumstances. The court amended the judgment to correct what it saw as an "obvious error" of the court in determining in the judgment the amount on which Joyce was to pay Leroy interest. Joyce's motion did not seek relief from the judgment under sec. 806.07, Stats. She was unaware of the "error" which the court subsequently found. Joyce acknowledged she owed Leroy the interest as provided in the judgment. Her counsel agreed that she owed Leroy the interest and that: "The Court can't change the judgment. We are stuck with whatever is there." During the first day's hearing the court stated: "And to me that's [the provisions of the judgment] as clear as it can be and I am going to order that the Petitioner [Joyce] pay interest on the sum of $18,390.33 from and after August 1, 1982, simple interest, not compounded, until that sum is paid. ..."

It was not until the hearing the following day that the court discovered the "error" in the divorce judgment. The "error" was that Joyce should not have been ordered to pay interest on the difference in value of the personal property awarded her and that awarded to Leroy--$18,390.33--but only on one-half that amount. At that hearing the court stated: "That was an obvious error by the Court, and I am going to modify that judgment."

The court treated Joyce's motion as a motion for relief from judgment under sec. 806.07(1)(h), Stats., granted the motion, and ordered the judgment amended. Section 806.07 provides:

(1) On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party ... from a judgment, order or stipulation for the following reasons:

(a) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;

....

(h) Any other reasons justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.

(2) The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and, if based on sub. (1)(a) ..., not more than one year after the judgment was entered or the order or stipulation was made.

A trial court's order under sec. 806.07, Stats., will not be reversed on appeal unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion. State ex rel. M.L.B. v. D.G.H., 122 Wis.2d 536, 541, 363 N.W.2d 419, 422 (1985). We will not find an abuse of discretion if the record shows that the trial court exercised its discretion and that there is a reasonable basis for the court's determination. Id. at 542, 363 N.W.2d at 422. "Discretion" contemplates a process of reasoning which yields a conclusion based on logic and founded upon proper legal standards. Id.

A motion to correct a mistake in a judgment may be made under sec. 806.07(1)(a), Stats., not more than one year after judgment is entered. Joyce's motion was not made until almost three years after the divorce judgment was entered. However, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has construed sec. 806.07(1)(h) to permit the trial court to provide relief from a judgment or an order in "extraordinary circumstances" even though the motion is not brought within one year after entry of the order or judgment. M.L.B., 122 Wis.2d at 549, 363 N.W.2d at 425. In M.L.B., the court adopted the "extraordinary circumstances" test applied by some federal courts to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6), the federal counterpart of sec. 806.07(1)(h). Id. at 552, 363 N.W.2d at 426-27.

The trial court did not find that this case presented "extraordinary circumstances." However, the court attached considerable significance to the fact that the court made the mistake. On July 26, 1982, the court pronounced judgment ordering Joyce to pay interest on $18,390.33. The court's error was in interpreting the parties' stipulation as agreeing that Joyce owed Leroy $18,390.33, when in fact the stipulation provided that Leroy was owed $18,390.33 of the...