Mathias v. Collins
| Decision Date | 05 November 2014 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 13-2002 |
| Parties | DAVID MATHIAS v. ROBERT COLLINS, et al. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
David Mathias brings this pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 against Robert Collins, the Superintendent of the State Correctional Institution in Frackville, Pennsylvania, and the Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (collectively the "Commonwealth"). In his petition Mathias alleges that his incarceration pursuant to a 2006 conviction for first-degree murder and associated charges is in violation of the Constitution of the United States. Before us are Mathias's timely objections to the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge that his petition be denied. We review the report and recommendation of a magistrate judge de novo. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).
Mathias maintains that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel pursuant to the Sixth Amendment as incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment because his counsel on direct appeal filed a deficient brief.1 He further asserts the denial of due process of law as guaranteed by the FourteenthAmendment. Mathias focuses his petition on the argument that the jury instructions on the charge of first-degree murder given at his trial in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County relieved the Commonwealth of its obligation to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he harbored the specific intent to kill.
The following facts and procedural history are taken in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth. At approximately 12:45 a.m. on May 23, 2005, Mathias and Richard Jarmon ("Jarmon") went to a boardinghouse where Eric Richardson ("Richardson") lived. Mathias was familiar with Richardson. He knocked on the door of Richardson's room, and Richardson answered, stepped out into the hallway, and closed the door behind him. In the meanwhile Jarmon had sat down in an adjacent room where Joseph Drew El ("Drew El") was watching television.
Mathias asked Richardson for change for a five-dollar bill. Richardson then returned to his room. After he came back out into the hallway and handed five one-dollar bills to Mathias, Mathias asked Jarmon, "Are you ready?" The two men drew firearms from their waistbands.
It is undisputed that Jarmon shot Drew El three times and killed him. Jarmon then turned his weapon on Richardson while Mathias had also aimed his firearm at Richardson's stomach.Richardson seized Mathias's arm, but Mathias fired multiple rounds. Despite being shot five times, Richardson managed to escape the building and flag down the police. Investigators determined that nine-millimeter and .45-caliber handguns had been discharged during the boardinghouse encounter. Mathias was apprehended several weeks later and was found with a magazine for a nine-millimeter pistol at the time of his arrest.
Mathias was tried in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (Criminal Action # CP-51-CR-0808071-2005). The jury found him guilty of the first-degree murder of Drew El, conspiracy to commit first-degree murder of Drew El, aggravated assault, possession of an instrument of crime, and carrying a firearm without a license. He is currently serving a life sentence on the murder conviction. A 15 1/2 - 31 year-sentence on the conspiracy charge was imposed to run consecutively to his imprisonment on first-degree murder, with terms of incarceration, concurrent with his conspiracy sentence, for aggravated assault, possession of an instrument of crime, and carrying a firearm without a license.2
On direct appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, Mathias raised four issues through his appellate counsel. First, heargued that the jury instruction on criminal conspiracy was erroneous and constituted a due process violation. Second, he contested the jury instructions as they pertained to his aggravated assault and weapons charges. His third argument was that the jury was not adequately instructed on the necessity of finding a specific intent to kill to sustain conviction on first-degree murder "on a conspiracy theory of liability." Finally, Mathias contested the sufficiency of the evidence on all counts.
The Superior Court denied the appeal in its entirety on the grounds of waiver. The court concluded that Mathias had waived the first two issues because his appellate counsel cited no authority in his brief. In the alternative the court denied on the merits Mathias's first issue, that is, his contention that the jury was incorrectly instructed on conspiracy. The Superior Court also deemed waived for failure to cite pertinent portions of the trial record his claim with regard to jury instructions on the specific intent requirement for conspiratorial liability. His sufficiency of the evidence issue, which was presented only in cursory fashion, was deemed to be waived as undeveloped. Thus the Superior Court addressed on the merits only the conspiracy charge.
Mathias thereafter filed a petition under the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"), 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9541 et seq. He was originally represented by counsel in this phase ofhis case. However, his counsel eventually withdrew after coming to the conclusion that his petition was without merit. Mathias himself then raised claims of ineffective assistance of counsel based on the filing by his appellate counsel of a deficient brief and appellate counsel's failure to contest the jury instructions on first-degree murder, specific intent, and accomplice liability. The Court of Common Pleas treated these new issues as an amended petition and dismissed them as undeveloped. Mathias's PCRA appeal to the Superior Court followed. We concern ourselves here with those issues which Mathias raised pro se and which the Superior Court addressed.
Mathias contended that he was denied effective assistance of counsel on direct appeal because his appellate lawyer's deficient brief caused all of the arguments contained within it to be waived. Included was his argument that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing properly to contest the manner in which the trial court charged the jury on first-degree murder, specific intent, and accomplice liability. Specifically, Mathias referenced counsel's failure to object to the jury instructions allowed the jury to find him guilty of first-degree murder without finding that he had the specific intent to kill Drew El. The Superior Court ruled in favor of the Commonwealth on each of these issues.
The Superior Court first determined that Mathias was not "entirely deprived" of his appellate rights because the court on direct appeal had "addressed the merits of several, though not all, of [Mathias's] issues" despite a formal waiver. Commonwealth v. Mathias, No. 2297 EDA 2011, slip op. at 10 (Pa. Super. Ct. Oct. 25, 2012). It then addressed in detail appellate counsel's failure to contest the jury instructions on first-degree murder. After considerable discussion this claim was denied for two reasons. The court first noted that the jury had been properly instructed on the element of specific intent to kill before the challenged instructions at issue were read.3 It also reasoned that Mathias suffered no prejudice from any error because the jury independently found that Mathias had the specific intent to kill in convicting him of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, a count which required such a finding. The court thus denied Mathias's claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in their entirety.
Having failed to obtain relief in the state courts, Mathias filed the instant pro se § 2254 petition. Mathias asserts in this petition that he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel that caused all issues to be waived. Beyond generally objecting to the quality of his appellate brief, however,Mathias does not separately contest in his § 2254 petition the matters previously litigated on direct appeal: the jury instructions on conspiracy, aggravated assault, possession of an instrument of crime, or carrying a firearm without a license, or the sufficiency of the evidence. As in the state court, his § 2254 petition also raises the issue that the jury instructions on first-degree murder failed to afford due process of law because they "permitted a first degree murder conviction based solely on [the] intent of [his] accomplice." The Magistrate Judge recommended that the petition be denied because any error by appellate counsel caused no prejudice and any error in the jury instructions was harmless.
We begin with the standard of review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The statute provides that a writ of habeas corpus may issue on the basis of a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court only if the claim:
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). We are only concerned with subsection (1) in this case. Mathias does not contend that the Superior Court madeany unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at trial.
The "contrary to" and "unreasonable application" clauses of § 2254(d)(1) have independent meaning. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000). A state court decision is "contrary to" clearly established federal law when it either arrives at a conclusion opposite to that of the Supreme Court on an issue of law or when it confronts facts materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent and arrives at an opposite result. Id. If the state court properly identifies the appropriate Supreme Court precedent, we must determine whether it unreasonably applied that precedent. Id. at 407. A federal...
To continue reading
Request your trial