Mathie v. Mathie

• Decision Date: 07 July 1961
• Docket Number: No. 9345,9345
• Citation: 363 P.2d 779,12 Utah 2d 116
• Parties: d 116 Edith Chloe MATHIE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. William Truman MATHIE, Defendant and Respondent.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

Page 779

363 P.2d 779

12 Utah 2d 116

Edith Chloe MATHIE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. William Truman MATHIE, Defendant and Respondent.

No. 9345.

Supreme Court of Utah.

July 7, 1961.

Gustin, Richards & Mattsson, Salt Lake City, for appellant.

Joseph C. Fratto, Salt Lake City, for respondent.

CROCKETT, Justice.

The plaintiff, who was granted a decree of divorce, appeals attacking only the disposition of property made therein.

It is apparent that the trial court, being convinced that the parties had come to a necessary parting of the ways, and that grounds for divorce were established, proceeded to consider the various factors proper to take into account ¹ and in the light thereof made such adjustment of their property rights as he thought would provide the best foundation for each to live separately. Having done so, it is our duty to give deference to his advantaged position and prerogatives, and not to disturb the decree unless it is shown clearly and persuasively to be so unfair and inequitable as to manifest an abuse of the wide discretion reposed in the trial court in such matters. ²

This was a second marriage for both, each having been previously married and divorced. They were married February 28, 1946. The plaintiff had children by her prior marriage, who are themselves now married. The matrimonial barque has seen tempestuous seas, including a prior divorce action in 1953, which was dropped when a reconciliation was effected. It is fortunate that the adjustment of the property rights of these parties does not appear to work any great hardship on either. They are about the same age; plaintiff 52, defendant 53. Although the evidence is that both have somewhat impaired health because of heart ailments, they both show industrious work records and are employed, with incomes adequate for their own support. Plaintiff has been employed variously as a waitress, cook, teacher, and is employed by the State Liquor Control Commision at $260 per month. Defendant is also a former school teacher; and has had various other jobs and is now driving a truck for a dry cleaning firm earning approximately $60 a week.

No alimony or support money was asked or awarded. Each was allowed to keep items of personal property and their own accumulated bank accounts. Our only concern here is their rights in the real property known as 643 and 657 South 7th East in Salt Lake City. Upon it are two buildings: a home and a four-unit apartment. Prior to their separation the parties lived in one of the apartments and rented the other three unfurnished for $45.00 per month each; and the home was rented for $85.00 per month. The property was purchased by them in 1947, a year after their marriage, for $13,500. The plaintiff appears to have taken the initiative in this transaction, and it was she who furnished the $4,000 down payment; the defendant has independently contributed approximately $2,300. The property has been cared for and managed by their mutual efforts; the taxes, expenses and monthly payments have been paid from the rentals. The property is entirely paid for and the parties agreed to a present market value of $25,000.

In fixing the rights of the parties in this property, the trial court followed generally the pattern set by the parties themselves in the 1953 reconciliation agreement: that the property was to belong to the plaintiff, subject to the defendant's right to share in its use and to participate in the income realized therefrom during his lifetime, and in the event of the plaintiff's prior death, to give the defendant a life estate in the whole thereof, before it passed to the plaintiff's heirs.

The controversy giving rise to this appeal is the dispute between the parties as to the provisions of the decree attempting to carry out the general purpose above stated. As defendant's counsel put it 'It is not ambiguous, it just needs a little clarification.' This we essay to do in this opinion.

Without delineating the various provisions of the decree and the contentions with respect thereto, from our analysis of it and the record we conclude that the decree should fix the property rights of the parties as follows:

1. The fee title to the property is vested in the plaintiff, subject to certain rights of defendant in said property during his lifetime; and upon his death the property shall pass to the plaintiff, or to her assigns, heirs or devisees; provided, that should the plaintiff predecease the defendant, he shall have a life estate in the entire property.

2. The plaintiff shall have the possession and the right to live in the home, rent free; and the defendant shall have the right to live in one of the apartment units, chosen by him, rent free.

3. The plaintiff may, if she desires, rent the home, and after paying the expenses and upkeep thereon, keep whatever profit is realized from such rental.

4. If the plaintiff chooses not to live in the home, but to rent the same as provided in (3) above, she may live in one of the apartment units upon paying, or being charged with, the usual monthly rental for said apartment.

5. The taxes and heating expenses shall be probated on a ratio of $85.00 for the home to $180.00 for the apartment; and each party is to pay the proportion thereof represented by the unit that party occupies, the remainder to be paid from the rentals of the respective units.

6. Water, light and all other utilities and repairs shall be borne by each property separately.

7. The net profit realized from renting the three apartments, other than the one occupied by the defendant, shall be divided between the plaintiff and defendant equally.

8. The property may be sold by mutual consent of the parties. In that event the proceeds shall be divided as follows: the plaintiff shall have one-half of the net sales price plus $2,500; and the defendant shall have one-half of the net sales price less $2,500.

Undoubtedly the trial court would better have served the desired purpose by making an adjustment of the rights and duties of the parties and a division of the property in some manner which would have permitted them to go their separate ways, rather than this attempted joint ownership arrangement. However, he not having done so, we are not disposed to substitute our judgment for his, except to make more clear and definite what the rights of the parties are as hereinabove set forth.

Considerable emphasis is placed upon the argument that the decree deprives plaintiff of rights which she obtained by contract with the defendant in the 1953 reconciliation agreement. Setting aside for the moment the question as to how inviolable a contract between spouses to fix their property rights inter se during coverture may be, and assuming that under proper circumstances they may make one which is binding upon them and which must be honored by a court in the event of a divorce, it nevertheless seems to me that our dissenting colleagues place altogether too much emphasis on certain aspects of the 1953 reconciliation agreement and fail to allow the trial court the latitude of discretion he should have in carrying out its purpose and fulfilling the court's proper function in a divorce action.

In view of the obligations inherent in the marriage relationship, the agreement is extremely spare in what it spells out as to the rights of the parties in this property. It did not expressly state who was to have its use and benefit during their further marriage; nor in the event of a future separation or divorce; nor in the event of a sale of the property. Particularly, there was no provision that the plaintiff was to have it exclusively for her use and benefit. If it was her purpose to so claim the entire property and the income from it for herself and to exclude the defendant therefrom during the future years of the marriage, as now seems to be her position, then the aggressiveness and avarice which the trial court appears to have sensed, and with which the writer is not in a position to disagree, is even more apparent than from other matters shown in the record, the most significant of which is the fact that a few days before this latest divorce action was filed, she attempted to convey this property to her daughter, in violation of her agreement to protect the defendant by seeing that he had a life estate in it.

The only fair assumption the court could indulge is that the parties intended to resume their marriage in good faith and to mutually enjoy the property during the future years of their marriage, presumably until 'death do us part'; that the purpose of putting the title in the plaintiff's name was not to exclude the defendant from any use or enjoyment thereof during his lifetime, but was only to assure that it would descend to the plaintiff's daughters; and that the plaintiff's irrevocable will was executed to protect the defendant in the property for his lifetime in the event she predeceased him.

Inasmuch as the agreement did not contemplate a future divorce and did not articulate what was to be done in that eventuality, it was the responsibility of the trial court to so interpret and apply it as to achieve a just and equitable result in the light of all the circumstances. This it has done by providing that each shall have a share in the enjoyment of the property during their lifetimes. If ownership is continued the plaintiff is given substantially more than one-half of its benefits. In view of the possibility that such joint ownership and operation may not prove desirable the court wisely created a plan by which they can sell it if they so desire. The plaintiff would then get $15,000 or 60% of the proceeds; and the defendant would get $10,000 or 40% (based on the agreed value of $25,000). Therefore what is done by the trial court's decree, and carried out in the decision of this court, is not at substantial variance from the general purpose the parties themselves appear to have had in mind, or reasonably may be...