Mathis v. Bzdula

Decision Date06 November 1936
Citation188 A. 264,122 Conn. 202
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court
PartiesMATHIS v. BZDULA et al.

Appeal from Superior Court, Fairfield County; Carl Foster, Judge.

Action by Olive Mathis against Sylvester Bzdula and another to recover damages for injuries to person and property, alleged to have been caused by negligence of the defendants. From a verdict and judgment for the defendants, the plaintiff appeals.

James A. Dougherty, of Greenwich (William C. Strong, of Greenwich on the brief), for appellant.

Martin E. Gormley, of New Haven, and Adrian W. Maher, of Bridgeport for appellees.

Argued before MALTBIE, C.J., and HINMAN, BANKS, AVERY, and BROWN JJ.

MALTBIE, Chief Justice.

This action arises out of a collision between an automobile being operated by the plaintiff and a truck driven by the defendant Bzdula as the agent and employee of the defendant. The Lee Construction Company. The collision occurred at the junction of Glenville Road and Riversville Road in Greenwich. As the cars approached the intersection the defendants' truck was upon the right of the plaintiff. The defendants claimed that the truck had the right of way under the statute which provides that where two cars approach an intersection at approximately the same time, the car approaching from the right shall have the right of way. General Statutes, Cum. Supp. 1935, § 636c. The plaintiff, on the other hand, claimed that she had passed more than half way through the intersection when the truck entered it and that she therefore had the right of way under the rule set forth in Jackson v. Brown, 106 Conn. 143, 137 A. 725; Camarotta v. Kling, 108 Conn. 602, 604, 143 A. 881; Brangi v. Marshall, 117 Conn. 675, 168 A. 21, and Fitzhugh v. Bushnell, 118 Conn. 677, 679, 174 A. 80. It thus became material in the case to determine what constituted the intersection of the highways within the statutory provision.

The nature of the intersection is shown in the accompanying diagram:

TA TABLE

The circular area in the center of the space where the two roads join is raised above their level and is not open to traffic. Traffic going in both directions passes between this circular area and the highway bound opposite. The trial court correctly charged the jury that the presence of this circular area in effect created separate highways. The plaintiff had come in a northerly direction along Glenville Road and was proceeding through the intersection to continue westerly on that road. The defendants' truck had come in a southerly direction along Riversville Road and was proceeding to the east of the circular area to go southerly on Glenville Road. For the purposes of this case, therefore, the intersection in question was made by Riversville road regarded as passing to the east of the circular area and Glenville road passing to the west of it, the two highways intersecting southerly of that area.

We have defined the intersection of two highways as meaning the space common to both. Neumann v. Apter, 95 Conn 695, 702, 112 A. 350, 21 A.L.R. 970. In cases where the highways ran substantially at right angles to each other and their bounds were straight lines, we have said that the intersection was the space included within the lines of both extended to cross each other. Bettilyon v. C. E. Smith & Son, Inc., 96 Conn. 16, 20, 112 A. 649; Rohde v. Nock, 101 Conn. 439, 443, 126 A. 335. This result does not come merely from the application of a mathematical formula. The underlying purpose of the statutes concerning the right of way at intersections is to prevent automobiles coming into collision; they are essentially regulations of traffic; and, if their meaning is not definitely settled by the language used, they are to be interpreted in the light of their application to traffic moving over the highways. The basis of the inclusion, in an intersection of the space formed by the extension, of the lines of two streets which meet virtually at right angles, is the fact that it may naturally be expected that all that space may be used by traffic proceeding through the intersection, whether upon one or the other of...

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17 cases
  • Turbert v. Mather Motors, Inc.
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • November 14, 1973
    ...is not always applicable to a complicated traffic pattern. Baird v. Gaer Bros., Inc., 152 Conn. 219, 223, 205 A.2d 490; Mathis v. Bzdula, 122 Conn. 202, 206, 188 A. 264. Statutory rules of the road are to be interpreted in light of their purpose to prevent collisions, 'and, if their meaning......
  • Hill v. Employers' Liability Assur. Corp.
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • November 6, 1936
  • Vecchiarelli v. Weiss
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • May 8, 1951
    ...1 Its underlying purpose is to prevent collisions at intersections. McNaught v. Smith, 127 Conn. 450, 453, 17 A.2d 771; Mathis v. Bzdula, 122 Conn. 202, 205, 188 A. 264. The statute establishes a mandatory rule of conduct for operators of all vehicles. Andrew v. White Line Bus Corporation, ......
  • People v. Silver
    • United States
    • Michigan Supreme Court
    • July 1, 1942
    ...forms two separate intersections, is to be found in a line of cases decided by the supreme court of errors of Connecticut. Mathis v. Bzdula, 122 Conn. 202, 188 A. 264;Beck v. Sosnowitz, 125 Conn. 553, 7 A.2d 389;Wilson v. M. & M. Transportation Co., 125 Conn. 36, 3 A.2d 309. In Mathis v. Bz......
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