Mathis v. Caswell Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Educ.
| Docket Number | 1:20CV92 |
| Decision Date | 17 August 2022 |
| Parties | BRANDI MATHIS, Plaintiff, v. CASWELL COUNTY SCHOOLS BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of North Carolina |
Before the Court are cross motions seeking summary judgment[1], (ECF Nos. 54; 58), as well as several motions to seal and strike,[2] (ECF Nos. 63; 64; 69; 73; 82 85). For the reasons stated herein, Defendants' motion for summary judgment will be granted, Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment will be denied, and the motions to seal and strike will be granted in part and denied in part.
Plaintiff is a science teacher formerly employed by Defendant Caswell County Schools Board of Education (“Defendant Board”). (ECF Nos. 54-6 at 131:24-25; 60-1 ¶¶ 5, 7.) Defendant Sandra Carter is the Superintendent for Caswell County Schools. (ECF No. 54-2 ¶ 2.)
Defendant Wayne Owen is a Caswell County School Board member. (ECF No. 54-3 ¶ 2.) Defendant Shannon Apple, formerly Shannon Gammon,[3] served as an assistant principal of Plaintiff's school. (ECF No. 60-7 at 13.) Plaintiff began working for Defendant Board in around 2007 and was later designated as a “career status” teacher. (ECF Nos. 54-6 at 26:8; 60-1 ¶ 44.) As a career status teacher, Plaintiff was no longer hired under an annual contract, was able to keep her job indefinitely, and was protected from termination by certain procedural protections. (ECF No. 54-6 at 26:15-27:5); see also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115C-325(a)(1a), (e)-(n).
Plaintiff attended a professional development event on March 21, 2019. (ECF No. 60 1 ¶ 10.) After the event, participants complained to facilitators that Plaintiff acted unprofessionally. (See ECF No. 54-2 at 6-8.) These complaints were relayed to Superintendent Carter via email on March 25, 2019. (Id.) One email states that Plaintiff and two other teachers drank margaritas at lunch, were late from lunch, were “loud, rude, and disrespectful after lunch,” and complained about the quality of the professional development. (Id. at 6-7.) Another states that the three teachers worked on school work during professional development sessions, drank beer at lunch, were “overly chatty, giddy, and laugh-y” after lunch, and left the session early. (Id. at 8.) Plaintiff disputes these accounts and avers that she was not “loud, rude, [or] disrespectful,” did not drink margaritas at lunch, and “appropriately engaged” and actively participated in the professional development sessions. (ECF No. 60-1 ¶ 14.) She does state that she worked on schoolwork between sessions, drank one beer at lunch, was approximately ten minutes late returning from lunch, and left the event approximately ten minutes early. (ECF No. 54-6 at 34:20-35:9; id. at 227-29.) She felt the event was geared toward elementary teachers and was not helpful for high school students but did not intend for her criticism to be disrespectful. (Id. at 229.)
Carter and Plaintiff's principal met with Plaintiff on March 25, 2019 and informed her of the complaints. (ECF No. 60-1 ¶¶ 12-13.) Carter informed Defendant Board about the accusations and her intent to discipline Plaintiff at its monthly meeting that evening. (ECF No. 60-7 at 551-52.) Plaintiff testifies that one Board member present for the meeting later told her that Carter characterized Plaintiff and the other two teachers as “a bunch of drunks” who deserved to be fired. (ECF No. 54-6 at 108:11-18.) On March 27, 2019, Carter issued a letter of reprimand to Plaintiff and suspended her without pay on March 28. (ECF No. 60-1 ¶ 19.) Word of the suspension quickly spread throughout Plaintiff's school and local community. (See, e.g., ECF Nos. 60-3 ¶¶ 9-12; 60-7 at 554.) Although no direct evidence shows that Carter or any Board member disclosed the details of the allegations against Plaintiff, Plaintiff's evidence does support that Defendant Apple learned of the suspension from her mother, who is married to Defendant Owen, a Board member. (ECF Nos. 60-3 ¶¶ 12-13; 60-7 at 554.)
Plaintiff appealed the suspension and reprimand on April 11, 2019. (ECF No. 61-26 at 1.) After a full hearing on June 19, 2019, the Hearing Officer issued a decision on July 24, 2019. (ECF No. 61-29 at 17.) He found that “sufficient grounds do exist to warrant some disciplinary action and it should be up to the Board of Education to determine whether that disciplinary action should include a one (1) day suspension without pay” and a letter of reprimand, but Carter, as superintendent, cannot suspend a teacher without prior approval from the Board. (Id. at 15-17.) Thus, the Hearing Officer required Carter to “decide whether she intends to proceed further with” recommending discipline. (Id. at 17.)
On August 9, 2019, Carter notified Plaintiff that she intended to submit a written recommendation for disciplinary suspension without pay to the Board. (ECF No. 54-2 ¶ 13; id. at 45.) Plaintiff objected to Carter's notice as untimely and requested a hearing before the Board, (id. at 46), which the Board initially scheduled for September 9 and rescheduled for September 26, 2019, (ECF No. 54-4 ¶ 7-8). Plaintiff “believed the Board planned to uphold Dr. Carter's recommendation for my suspension without pay,” that the Board “did not care about my legal rights,” and that “it would be futile to participate in the hearing as the Board's decision was predetermined,” (ECF No. 60-1 ¶ 40), although she did not know for sure whether the Board would adopt Carter's recommendation, (ECF No. 54-6 at 51:22-52:4 ( that she could not “speculate” as to whether Carter's recommendation would have been approved)).
Plaintiff resigned on August 26, 2019, effective September 25, 2019. (ECF No. 60-1 ¶ 43.) She viewed resignation as “the only way to protect [her] professional career.” (ECF No. 54-6 at 49:10-15.) Plaintiff obtained employment teaching science in a neighboring county before resigning. (Id. at 129:16-22.) She receives higher pay and identical health insurance at her new job. (Compare ECF No. 54-5 at 3, with ECF No. 54-6 at 133:12-134:6, 135:24-136:12.) However, due to her resignation, she is no longer a career status teacher and cannot regain that status under North Carolina law. (ECF No. 60-1 ¶ 44.)
Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on all of Plaintiff's remaining claims. (ECF No. 54 at 1.) Plaintiff argues that she is entitled to summary judgment on Count I (Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment - Procedural Due Process). (ECF No. 58 at 1.)
Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “A dispute is genuine if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Off. of the Cts., 780 F.3d 562, 568 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal citations and quotations omitted). “[I]n deciding a motion for summary judgment, a district court is required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant” and to “draw all reasonable inferences in his favor.” Harris v. Pittman, 927 F.3d 266, 272 (4th Cir. 2019) (citing Jacobs, 780 F.3d at 568). A court “cannot weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations,” Jacobs, 780 F.3d at 569, and thus must “usually” adopt “the [nonmovant's] version of the facts,” even if it seems unlikely that the moving party would prevail at trial, Witt v. W.Va. State Police, Troop 2, 633 F.3d 272, 276 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007)).
Where the nonmovant will bear the burden of proof at trial, the party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of “pointing out to the district court . . . that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). If the moving party carries this burden, then the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to point out “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). In so doing, “the nonmoving party must rely on more than conclusory allegations, mere speculation, the building of one inference upon another, or the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence.” Dash v. Mayweather, 731 F.3d 303, 311 (4th Cir. 2013). Instead, the nonmoving party must support its assertions by “citing to particular parts of . . . the record” or “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence . . . of a genuine dispute.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1); see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324.
The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution makes it unlawful for any state to “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. Amend. XIV. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a private cause of action for damages against any person “who, under color of state law causes the violation of another's federal rights.” Owens v. Balt. City State's Att'ys Off., 767 F.3d 379, 402 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). The plaintiff bears the burden to show that defendant “deprived plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem'l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (2009). To survive summary judgment, Plaintiff must therefore show that she (1) had a protected property or liberty interest, and (2) Defendants deprived her of such interest under color of state law (3) without due process.
Here, Plaintiff argues on summary judgment that she suffered two distinct constitutional deprivations: loss of career employee status and loss of her reputation. (ECF No. 72 at 4, 9.)
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