Mathis v. Cmty. Transp. Inc.

• Decision Date: 28 October 2011
• Docket Number: Re: ECF No. 24,Civil Action No. 10-1399
• Parties: DAVID L. MATHIS Plaintiff, v. COMMUNITY TRANSPORTATION, INC., and BILL BRUNTY Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania

DAVID L. MATHIS Plaintiff,

v. COMMUNITYTRANSPORTATION, INC., andBILL BRUNTY Defendants.

Civil Action No. 10-1399

Re: ECF No. 24

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Dated: October 28, 2011

Chief Magistrate Judge Lenihan

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Presently before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 24) Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (ECF No. 21). For the reasons discussed below, Defendants' Motion will be granted, except that Plaintiff's state law claims will be dismissed without prejudice.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff David L. Mathis ("Mathis" or "Plaintiff") is an individual, proceeding pro se, who filed an eleven-count complaint against Defendants Community Transportation, Inc. ("Comm Trans") and Bill Brunty ("Brunty") (collectively "Defendants"). (ECF Nos. 7 & 21.)¹ Beginning in August of 2009, Plaintiff was hired as a driver by Comm Trans. (ECF No. 7 at ¶ 2.) At this time, Plaintiff was informed by management that Defendant Brunty was in charge of matters relating to payroll. (ECF No. 7 at ¶ 2.) In January of 2010, Plaintiff was arrested for charges unrelated to his employment. (ECF No. 7 at ¶ 3.)

In March of 2010, Plaintiff's brother called Comm Trans about Plaintiff's missingpaycheck and tax forms and was informed by Brunty that Comm Trans had sent Plaintiff's final paycheck to Plaintiff's last known address. (ECF No. 7 at ¶ 4.)

Plaintiff waited for more than a month for the check to arrive at his brother's home because he had his mail forwarded from his old address to his brother's address in Oregon. (ECF No. 7 at ¶ 5.) Thereafter, on April 26, 2010, Plaintiff sent Brunty a letter at Comm Trans' headquarters stating that he had not received his check, and that if his check had been sent to his previous address, it had not been received. (ECF No. 7 at ¶ 5.) Also, Plaintiff requested that Comm Trans issue a stop payment against the previous check and that it issue a new check; Plaintiff also requested that Comm Trans send the check to his brother's address. (ECF No. 7 at ¶ 5.) Plaintiff avers he received no reply. (ECF No. 7 at ¶ 5.) In early June of 2010, Plaintiff sent another letter to Brunty at Comm Trans similar to the previous letter. (ECF No. 7 at ¶ 6.) Plaintiff avers he did not receive a reply to this letter as well. (ECF No. 7 at ¶ 6.)²

Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages from Comm Trans and Brunty in his personal and official capacity, for the sum of $200,000 and $2,000,000 respectively. (ECF No. 21 at ¶¶ 14-16.)

Liberally construing the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, Plaintiff's claims against Comm Trans and Brunty are found in Paragraphs 3- 3 of the Amended Complaint and aver as follows:

Count I: Comm Trans and Brunty knowingly and willfully conspired together to withhold the Plaintiff's income tax statements in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 6501 and 26 U.S.C. § 7204. (ECF No. 21 at ¶ 3.)

Count II: Comm Trans knowingly and willfully withheld Plaintiff's income taxstatements in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 6501 and 26 U.S.C. § 7204. (ECF No. 21 at ¶ 4.)

Count III: Bill Brunty knowingly and willfully withheld Plaintiff's income tax statements in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 6501 and 26 U.S.C. § 7204. (ECF No. 21 at ¶ 5.)

Count IV: Comm Trans and Brunty willfully and knowingly conspired together to unlawfully seize and withhold Plaintiff's payroll check. This seizure was a violation of the United States Constitution and the Fair Labor Standards Act, generally. (ECF No. 21 at ¶ 6.)

Count V: Comm Trans willfully and knowingly unlawfully seized and withheld Plaintiff's payroll check. This seizure was a violation of the United States Constitution and the Fair Labor Standards Act, generally. (ECF No. 21 at ¶ 7.)

Count VI: Brunty willfully and knowingly unlawfully seized and withheld Plaintiff's payroll check. This seizure was a violation of the United States Constitution and the Fair Labor Standards Act, generally. (ECF No. 21 at ¶ 8.)

Count VII: Comm Trans and Brunty willfully and knowingly conspired to breach the company's contractual agreement to provide Plaintiff with income tax statements, other tax and employment related documentation and compensation for services rendered to and for the benefit of Comm Trans. (ECF No. 21 at ¶ 9.)

Count VIII: Comm Trans breached the company's contractual agreement to provide Plaintiff with income tax statements, other tax and employment related documentation and compensation for services rendered to and for the benefit of Comm Trans. (ECF No. 21 at ¶ 10.)

Count IX: Brunty breached the company's contractual agreement to provide Plaintiff with income tax statements, other tax and employment related documentation andcompensation for services rendered to and for the benefit of Comm Trans. (ECF No. 21 at ¶ 11.)

Count X: Comm Trans, through various scheduling and productivity measures, deprived Plaintiff of his lawfully allotted work breaks. (ECF No. 21 at ¶ 12.)

Count XI: Comm Trans knowingly and willfully subjected Plaintiff to a hazardous work environment where Plaintiff was required to engage in communications via a two-way radio, cellular phone and computer while operating a motor vehicle. These required operations jeopardized the life of Plaintiff and his passengers. (ECF No. 21 at ¶ 13.)

LEGAL STANDARD

PRO SE PLEADINGS

The Court must liberally construe the factual allegations of Plaintiff's Complaint because pro se pleadings, "however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). Further, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(e) requires that all pleadings be construed "so as to do justice." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e).

MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO RULE 12(b)(6)

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). A complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it does not allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (rejecting the traditional 12(b)(6) standard set forth in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1960 (May 18, 2009) (citing Twombly). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The Supreme Court further explained:

The plausibility standard is not akin to a "probability requirement," but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are "merely consistent with" a defendant's liability, it "stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 'entitlement to relief.'"

Id. (citing Twombly at 556-57). The court of appeals expounded on this standard in its decision in Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224 (3d Cir. 2008) (construing Twombly in a civil rights context), and the Supreme Court's recent decision in Iqbal:

After Iqbal, it is clear that conclusory or "bare-bones" allegations will no longer survive a motion to dismiss: "threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. To prevent dismissal, all civil complaints must now set out "sufficient factual matter" to show that the claim is facially plausible. This then "allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. at 1948. The Supreme Court's ruling in Iqbal emphasizes that a plaintiff must show that the allegations of his or her complaints are plausible. See Id. at 1949-50; see also Twombly, 505 U.S. at 555, & n. 3.

Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). In light of Iqbal, the Fowler court then set forth a two-prong test to be applied by the district courts in deciding motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. First, the district court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and discard any legal conclusions contained in the complaint. Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11 (citing Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949). Next, the court must consider whether the facts alleged in the Complaint sufficiently demonstrate that the plaintiff has a "plausible claim for relief." Id. at 211(citing Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must show an entitlement to relief through its facts. Id. (citing Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234-35). In applying this plausibility standard, the reviewing court makes a context-specific inquiry, drawing on its judicial experience and common sense. Id. (citing Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950).

Courts generally consider only the allegations of the complaint, the attached exhibits, and matters of public record in deciding motions to dismiss. Pension Benefit Guar. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Factual allegations within documents described or identified in the complaint may also be weighed if the Plaintiff's claims are based upon those documents. Id. (citations omitted). A district court may consult those documents without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997).

ANALYSIS³

Section 1983 Claims

Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act provides as follows:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or any other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the

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