Mathis v. Ga. State Prison

• Decision Date: 14 January 2016
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO.: 6:15-cv-122
• Parties: DONEY MATHIS, Plaintiff, v. GEORGIA STATE PRISON; GEORGIA STATE PRISON MENTAL HEALTH DEPARTMENT; WARDEN CHATMAN; STANLEY WILLIAMS; MS. WEST; ROBERT TOOLE, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Georgia

DONEY MATHIS, Plaintiff, v. GEORGIA STATE PRISON; GEORGIA STATE PRISON MENTAL HEALTH DEPARTMENT;

WARDEN CHATMAN; STANLEY WILLIAMS; MS. WEST; ROBERT TOOLE, Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO.: 6:15-cv-122

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA STATESBORO DIVISION

January 14, 2016

ORDER and MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, who is currently housed at Georgia State Prison in Reidsville, Georgia, submitted a Complaint in the above captioned action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1.) For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's claims regarding denial of access to medical care should proceed against Defendants Warden Chatman, Stanley Williams, Robert Toole, and Ms. West, Mental Health Director of Georgia State Prison. However, I RECOMMEND that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Georgia State Prison and Georgia State Prison Mental Health Department. Additionally, the Court should DISMISS Plaintiff's claims for monetary relief against Defendants in their official capacities, DISMISS Plaintiff's claims for compensatory and punitive damages, and DISMISS his due process claims. I further RECOMMEND that the Court DENY Plaintiff's Motion for an Immediate Injunction. (Doc. 11.) The Court DIRECTS the United States Marshal to serve Defendants Chatman, Williams, Toole, and West with a copy of Plaintiff's Complaint, (doc. 1), and this Order.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff entered the custody of the Georgia Department of Corrections in 2006 and was diagnosed with depression. (Doc. 1, p. 7.) On September 5, 2013, Plaintiff was transferred to Georgia State Prison for a mental health evaluation. (Id. at p. 8.) Plaintiff was then placed in administrative segregation at Georgia State Prison due to his mental health status. Id. Plaintiff contends that, since that time, he has suffered several "mental seizures." (Id.at p. 10.) Plaintiff states that he has been in administrative segregation 475 days since transferring to GSP. (Id. at p. 11.) Plaintiff further alleges that, pursuant to a standard operating procedure, he must be held in "close security" due to his sentence of life without parole. Plaintiff contends that placing him in administrative segregation in a close security setting exacerbates his mental health issues.

Plaintiff contends that Defendant West has shown deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's mental health needs, including failing to have Plaintiff seen by a psychiatrist. (Id. at pp. 11-12.) He contends that he also written Defendants Chatman, Williams, and Poole regarding his denial of treatment to no avail. He states that his mental health issues have caused him high blood pressure and a "significant change in appearance." (Id. at p. 13.)¹

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Plaintiff seeks to bring this action in forma pauperis under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), the Court may authorize the filing of a civil lawsuit without the prepaymentof fees if the plaintiff submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all of his assets and shows an inability to pay the filing fee and also includes a statement of the nature of the action which shows that he is entitled to redress. Even if the plaintiff proves indigence, the Court must dismiss the action if it is frivolous or malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii). Additionally, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court must review a complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity. Upon such screening, the Court must dismiss a complaint, or any portion thereof, that is frivolous or malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or which seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

When reviewing a Complaint on an application to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court is guided by the instructions for pleading contained in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 ("A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain [among other things] . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."); Fed. R. Civ. P. 10 (requiring that claims be set forth in numbered paragraphs, each limited to a single set of circumstances). Further, a claim is frivolous under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) "if it is 'without arguable merit either in law or fact.'" Napier v. Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001)).

Whether a complaint fails to state a claim under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Thompson v. Rundle, 393 F. App'x 675, 678 (11th Cir. 2010). Under that standard, this Court must determine whether the complaint contains "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Aplaintiff must assert "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not" suffice. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Section 1915 also "accords judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint's factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless." Bilal, 251 F.3d at 1349 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)).

In its analysis, the Court will abide by the long-standing principle that the pleadings of unrepresented parties are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys and, therefore, must be liberally construed. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2006) ("Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys.") (emphasis omitted) (quoting Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1160 (11th Cir. 2003)). However, Plaintiff's unrepresented status will not excuse mistakes regarding procedural rules. McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) ("We have never suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel."). The requisite review of Plaintiff's Complaint raises several doctrines of law, which the Court discusses as follows.

DISCUSSION

I. Dismissal of Claims Against Georgia State Prison and Georgia State Prison Mental Health Department

In order to state a claim for relief under Section 1983, a plaintiff must satisfy two elements. First, a plaintiff must allege that an act or omission deprived him "of some right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Hale v. Tallapoosa Cty., 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 (11th Cir. 1995). Second, a plaintiff must allege that the actor omission was committed by "a person acting under color of state law." Id. While local governments qualify as "persons" under Section 1983, state agencies and penal institutions are generally not considered legal entities subject to suit. See Grech v. Clayton Cty. Ga., 335 F.3d 1326, 1343 (11th Cir. 2003); Darrough v. Allen, No. 1:13-CV-57 WLS, 2013 WL 5902792, at *3 (M.D. Ga. Oct. 8, 2013) ("[a] state and its agencies (such as the Georgia Department of Corrections) are not 'persons' who may be sued under § 1983."); see also Williams v. Georgia Dep't of Corr., No. CV612-050, 2012 WL 3911232, at *1 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 6, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV612-050, 2012 WL 3910834 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 6, 2012) ("Because the Georgia Department of Corrections is a state agency, it is not a 'person' subject to suit under § 1983.") A prison, such as Georgia State Prison, is a building, not a person, and, therefore, is not a viable defendant under Section 1983. Williams v. Chatham Cty. Sherriff's Complex, Case No. 4:07-cv-68, 2007 WL 2345243 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 14, 2007) ("The county jail, however, has no independent legal identity and therefore is not an entity that is subject to suit under Section 1983.").

Furthermore, states are immune from private suits pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment and traditional principles of state sovereignty. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712-13 (1999). Section 1983 does not abrogate the well-established immunities of a state from suit without its consent. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 67 (1989). Here, even if Georgia State Prison and the Georgia State Prison Mental Health Department were legal entities subject to suit pursuant to Section 1983, the State of Georgia would be the real party in interest. Accordingly, the Eleventh Amendment immunizes these Defendants from suit. See Free v. Granger, 887 F.2d 1552, 1557 (11th Cir. 1989).

For all of these reasons, the Court should DISMISS all claims against Georgia State Prison and Georgia State Prison Mental Health Department.

II. Dismissal of Claims for Monetary Damages Against Defendants in Their Official Capacities

Plaintiff cannot sustain a Section 1983 claim for monetary damages against Defendants in their official capacities. As laid out in Section I above, the Eleventh Amendment and traditional principles of state sovereignty immunize states from suit in federal court. Alden, 527 U.S. at 712-13. Section 1983 does not abrogate this immunity. Will, 491 U.S. at 67. A lawsuit against Defendants in their official capacities as employees of the Georgia Department of Corrections is "no different from a suit against the [s]tate itself." Id. at 71. Accordingly, the Eleventh Amendment immunizes them from suit in their official capacities. See Free, 887 F.2d at 1557. Plaintiff cannot sustain any constitutional claims against Defendants in their official capacities for monetary relief, and these claims should be DISMISSED.

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