Mathis v. Mathis

• Decision Date: 09 November 2011
• Docket Number: No. 4–11–0301.,4–11–0301.
• Parties: In re the MARRIAGE OF Kenneth W. MATHIS, Petitioner–Appellant,andTerri D. Mathis, Respondent–Appellee.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

2011 IL App (4th) 110301

356 Ill.Dec. 96

960 N.E.2d 1219

In re the MARRIAGE OF Kenneth W. MATHIS, Petitioner–Appellant,andTerri D. Mathis, Respondent–Appellee.

No. 4–11–0301.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District.

Nov. 9, 2011.

Matthew P. Kuenning, Traci E. Nally (argued), Nally, Bauer, Feinen & Mann, P.C., Champaign, for Kenneth W. Mathis.

Sarah B. Tinney (argued), Erwin, Martinkus & Cole, Ltd., Champaign, for Terri D. Mathis.

OPINION

Justice TURNER delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

[356 Ill.Dec. 97] ¶ 1 In the dissolution-of-marriage proceedings of petitioner, Kenneth W. Mathis, and respondent, Terri D. Mathis, the Champaign County circuit court certified the following question for interlocutory review pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308 (eff. Feb. 26, 2010):

“In a bifurcated dissolution proceeding, when a grounds judgment has been entered, and when there is a lengthy delay between the date of the entry of the grounds judgment and the hearing on ancillary issues, is the appropriate date for valuation of marital property the date of dissolution or a date as close as practicable to the date of trial of the ancillary issues?”

We granted petitioner's application for leave to appeal and, as a matter of first impression, interpret the application of section 503(f) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Dissolution Act) (750 ILCS 5/503(f) (West 2000)) to bifurcated dissolution proceedings in which the ancillary issues are determined after the dissolution judgment on grounds. Our interpretation of section 503(f) demonstrates the appropriate valuation date for the situation presented is the date of trial on the property-distribution matter or some other date as close to the date of that trial as is practicable and we remand for further proceedings.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 The parties married in August 1977 and had three children, Corey (born in September 1984), Jamie (born in May 1986), and Aaron (born in August 1989). In November 2000, petitioner filed his petition for dissolution of the parties' marriage. At a March 26, 2001, hearing, the trial court awarded the parties a judgment of dissolution, reserved ruling on the ancillary issues, and noted a written judgment order on grounds would be entered. In October 2002, petitioner filed a motion for the entry of the dissolution judgment on grounds only, which the court denied in December 2002. In September 2003, petitioner filed a second motion for the entry of a dissolution judgment on grounds only.

¶ 4 On April 6, 2004, the trial court commenced the hearing on ancillary issues. The next day, the court continued the hearing until September 2004. On August 24, 2004, the court entered the dissolution judgment as to grounds only. The September 2004 hearing for the ancillary issues was continued.

¶ 5 In November 2005, petitioner filed a motion in limine to establish the valuation date of the marital property. After a December 2005 hearing on petitioner's motion, the trial court took the matter under advisement and ordered the parties to submit briefs on the issue. In February 2006, the court set the valuation date as January 1, 2006, citing section 503(f) of the Dissolution Act and the facts of the case. The hearing on the ancillary issues did not resume after that order, and, in fact, the docket sheets contain no entries between August 30, 2007, and February 3, 2010.

¶ 6 In May 2010, the trial court set the continued hearing on the ancillary issues for November 2010. In October 2010, respondent filed a motion to change the valuation date, and petitioner filed a motion to reconsider the valuation date. After a December 3, 2010, hearing, the court set a valuation date of December 31, 2010. On December 14, 2010, petitioner filed a motion for a Rule 308 finding. On February 11, 2011, the court granted petitioner's request and noted a Rule 308 order would be entered. On March 24, 2011, the court entered the written Rule 308 order, certifying the previously stated question. On April 6, 2011, petitioner filed his timely application for leave to appeal pursuant to Rule 308, and this court allowed the appeal on May 11, 2011. Thus, we have jurisdiction of this cause under Rule 308.

¶ 7 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 8 The question certified for review requires us to interpret section 503(f)'s applicability to bifurcated dissolution proceedings where the grounds judgment has been entered before a hearing on the ancillary issues. Despite the fact section 503(f) became effective on January 1, 1993 (Pub. Act 87–881, § 1 (eff. Jan. 1, 1993) (1992 Ill. Laws 1019, 1022–23)), no reviewing court has specifically addressed section 503(f)'s application to such proceedings. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Awan, 388 Ill.App.3d 204, 209, 327 Ill.Dec. 656, 902 N.E.2d 777, 783–84 (2009) (finding the date of dissolution is the proper valuation date for property in a bifurcated proceeding without mentioning section 503(f)); see also In re Marriage of Asher–Goettler, 378 Ill.App.3d 1023, 1033, 318 Ill.Dec. 333, 883 N.E.2d 564, 572 (2008) (citing section 503(f) in finding the trial court erred by using the separation date in determining the value of a mortgage in a nonbifurcated hearing); In re Marriage of Donovan, 361 Ill.App.3d 1059, 1064–65, 297 Ill.Dec. 823, 838 N.E.2d 310, 315–16 (2005) (citing section 503(f) in finding the trial court did not commit error in valuing a 401k account in a nonbifurcated hearing). Petitioner asserts section 503(f) does not apply to bifurcated dissolution proceedings, and thus that provision did not change the existing case law, which held the date of valuation was the date of the dissolution. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Rossi, 113 Ill.App.3d 55, 60, 68 Ill.Dec. 801, 446 N.E.2d 1198, 1202 (1983). Respondent disagrees and asserts the plain language of section 503(f) indicates the valuation date is a date as close as practicable to the date of trial on the ancillary issues. Respondent also argues a valuation date near trial is warranted based on petitioner's actions during these proceedings. However, we agree with petitioner the latter argument is irrelevant to the certified question at issue in this Rule 308 appeal.

¶ 9 The fundamental rule of statutory construction requires courts to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent. General Motors Corp. v. Pappas, 242 Ill.2d 163, 180, 351 Ill.Dec. 308, 950 N.E.2d 1136, 1146 (2011). The statutory language, given its plain and ordinary meaning, best indicates the legislature's intent. Pappas, 242 Ill.2d at 180, 351 Ill.Dec. 308, 950 N.E.2d at 1146. In interpreting a statutory provision, courts evaluate the statute as a whole, “with each provision construed in connection with every other section.” Pappas, 242 Ill.2d at 180, 351 Ill.Dec. 308, 950 N.E.2d at 1146. When the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, a court must give effect to the statute's plain meaning without resorting to extrinsic statutory-construction aids. Pappas, 242 Ill.2d at 180, 351 Ill.Dec. 308, 950 N.E.2d at 1146. Thus, a court may examine legislative history only when the legislature's intent is not clear from the statute's plain language. People v. Jones, 214 Ill.2d 187, 193, 291 Ill.Dec. 663, 824 N.E.2d 239, 242 (2005). Accordingly, petitioner's first several arguments regarding the history of section 503(f) and the existing case law at the time of its enactment are irrelevant unless this court finds an ambiguity exists. See Jones, 214 Ill.2d at 195–99, 291 Ill.Dec. 663, 824 N.E.2d at 243–46 (finding the statute's language was unclear before addressing the history of the statute and the presumptions related to the enactment of new legislation). “A statute is ambiguous if it is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation.” People ex rel. Department of Public Aid v. Smith, 212 Ill.2d 389, 397, 289 Ill.Dec. 1, 818 N.E.2d 1204, 1209 (2004).

¶ 10 Section 503 of the Dissolution Act addresses the disposition of property and its subsection (f) states the following:

“In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage or declaration of invalidity of marriage or in a proceeding for disposition of property following dissolution of marriage by a court that lacked personal jurisdiction over the absent spouse or lacked jurisdiction to dispose of the property, the court, in determining the value of the marital and non-marital property for purposes of dividing the property, shall value the property as of the date of trial or some other date as close to the date of trial as is practicable.” 750 ILCS 5/503(f) (West 2000).

¶ 11 Petitioner first argues section 503(f) is patently ambiguous, meaning the ambiguity arises out of the words themselves ( Hoglund v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 148 Ill.2d 272, 279, 170 Ill.Dec. 351, 592 N.E.2d 1031, 1035 (1992)) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 102 (3d ed. 1933)). Specifically, petitioner argues “the date of trial” language is ambiguous because in bifurcated proceedings more than one trial takes place. However, in interpreting a statute one must read the provision as a whole and not in isolation. Pappas, 242 Ill.2d at 180, 351 Ill.Dec. 308, 950 N.E.2d at 1146. Section 503 does not distinguish dissolution-of-marriage proceedings that are addressed all in one trial from those addressed in multiple trials. Moreover, section 503 addresses only the disposition of property and has nothing to do with the grounds for a dissolution. Thus, the only reasonable interpretation of section 503(f) is that it is referring to the trial in which the property distribution is to be decided. Accordingly, we find section 503(f) is not patently ambiguous.

¶ 12 Petitioner further asserts that, if section 503(f) is not patently ambiguous, then it produces a latent ambiguity. A latent ambiguity arises when the words of the legislation are clear but, due to external circumstances, the literal application of those words would create an absurdity the legislative body...