Mathis v. State

• Decision Date: 30 October 2002
• Docket Number: No. 49A02-0202-CR-172.,49A02-0202-CR-172.
• Citation: 776 N.E.2d 1283
• Parties: Namon MATHIS, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

776 N.E.2d 1283

Namon MATHIS, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.

No. 49A02-0202-CR-172.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

October 30, 2002.

Victoria Ursulskis, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Ellen H. Meilaender, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

OPINION

BAKER, Judge.

Appellant-defendant Namon Mathis appeals his convictions for Murder,¹ a felony, and Carrying a Handgun Without a License,² a class A misdemeanor. Specifically, Mathis argues that: (1) the trial court erred in excluding evidence demonstrating that another individual may have committed the murder; (2) double jeopardy principles were violated when the trial court entered judgments of conviction and sentenced Mathis on both counts; and (3) the trial court assessed a public defender fee and costs in excess of that permitted by statute. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for a reduction of the public defender fee that was assessed against Mathis.

FACTS

The facts most favorable to the verdict are that on April 14, 2001, Mathis and Patrice Osborne were passengers in a vehicle driven by Bryant Stone. At one point, Mathis accused Osborne of stealing some money from him. Mathis told Stone to stop the vehicle, whereupon Osborne stabbed Mathis with a small knife. Osborne then opened the car door and started to run. Mathis chased Osborne, armed with a semi-automatic 9mm gun, and shot her several times.

One of the bullets entered Osborne's lower back and traveled to the front of her abdomen, damaging her left kidney, spleen, stomach and small intestine. A second bullet entered Osborne's left buttock and traveled through an artery. This bullet damaged her bladder and rectum and caused severe internal bleeding. Osborne died from the wounds and it was determined that the injuries from either bullet would have been fatal.

After the shooting, Mathis went to the residence of Stone's sister. He told Tracy Blow, who was house-sitting, that he had been stabbed. Mathis then gave Blow the gun with which he shot Osborne and directed her to hide it in a bedroom closet. Mathis admitted to Blow that he chased Osborne and shot her.

Later that evening, one of the investigating detectives secured a search warrant for the house where Blow hid the gun. During the course of a search, the police found the loaded semi-automatic in the closet. It was subsequently discovered that Mathis's fingerprints were on the gun's magazine. Forensic evidence established that a bullet and two spent shell casings found near Osborne's body and some bullet fragments removed from the body had been fired from that gun.

As a result of the incident, Mathis was charged with the above offenses. Prior to trial, the State filed a motion in limine to prevent Mathis from introducing evidence that the gun involved in this instance had been used in an earlier, unrelated shooting. The trial court granted the motion, but indicated that it was leaning toward admitting the evidence if Mathis could demonstrate how it was relevant.

At trial, Mathis requested permission to elicit this evidence after establishing that the suspect's name in the prior shooting was "Anthony Stone" and that Bryant Stone's middle name was "Anthony." Tr. p. 100, 195-96. Thus, it was Mathis's objective to argue that Bryant had been the shooter in this instance. The trial court then determined that there was no evidence to connect anyone but Mathis to the gun on the evening of the shooting and, therefore, denied his request to admit the evidence. During Mathis's offer to prove, one of the investigating detectives testified that "Bryant" and "Anthony" were not the same person because "Anthony's" physical description did not match that of "Bryant." Moreover, identifying information including birth dates, social security numbers and addresses were different. Thus, the trial court affirmed its earlier ruling, stating that the evidence was too tenuous to show that Bryant and Anthony were the same person. As a result, it was determined that Bryant could not be linked to the earlier shooting.

Following the trial that concluded on November 27, 2001, the jury convicted Mathis on both counts. Thereafter, he was sentenced to concurrent terms of fifty-five years on the murder charge and one year on the handgun conviction. The trial court also imposed a $200 public defender fee upon Mathis and ordered him to pay $129 in court costs. He now appeals.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

I. Exclusion of Evidence

Mathis first claims that the trial court erred in excluding evidence that the gun used to kill Osborne had been used in a prior unrelated shooting. Specifically, Mathis contends that such evidence would have demonstrated that it was more likely that Stone, rather than he, had shot Osborne.

In resolving this issue, we first note that a reviewing court will reverse a trial court's determination of the admissibility of evidence only when the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Smith v. State, 754 N.E.2d 502, 504 (Ind.2001). Additionally, a trial court's ruling excluding evidence may not be challenged on appeal unless a substantial right of the party is affected. Lashbrook v. State, 762 N.E.2d 756, 758 (Ind.2002). Evidence is relevant when it has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Smith, 754 N.E.2d at 504. Evidence tending to show that someone else committed the crime in question meets this standard because, logically, such evidence makes it less probable that the defendant committed the crime. Joyner v. State, 678 N.E.2d 386, 389 (Ind. 1997).

Here, the evidence demonstrated that the Anthony Stone connected to the prior shooting was not the same person as the Bryant Stone who was a witness in this case. Moreover, the excluded evidence in no way indicated that Anthony Stone was present when Osborne was shot, much less that he was the individual who shot her. Merely showing that Anthony used the same gun a month earlier does not make it any less likely that Mathis shot Osborne, especially in the absence of any other evidence connecting Anthony to the circumstances here. See Lashbrook, 762 N.E.2d at 758

(holding that evidence that a person other than the defendant had stated that the victim "was gonna die" did not connect that other person to the crime or tend to show that that person had committed the crime); Smith, 754 N.E.2d at 505 (evidence that the victim had previously threatened other people besides the defendant did not tend to show that anyone other than the defendant had committed the murder).

We also note that the excluded evidence did not tend to show that either Anthony Stone or Bryant Stone had murdered Osborne. To the contrary, the State introduced substantial evidence demonstrating that Mathis was the shooter. Mathis admitted to Blow that he had shot a woman. He also had her hide the gun that was used in the shooting. Tr. p. 106-09. Moreover, as discussed in the FACTS, forensic evidence showed that Mathis's fingerprints were on the magazine found loaded in the gun that was used to shoot and kill Osborne. Bryant Stone's fingerprints were not on the weapon. Tr. p. 174-75, 177. As a result, any knowledge conveyed to the jury that a relative of Bryant Stone had previously used the same gun in an unrelated shooting would not have had any impact on the verdict in this case. Thus, the trial court properly excluded this evidence.

II. Double Jeopardy

Mathis next contends that his convictions and sentences for both murder and carrying a handgun without a license violate the prohibition against double jeopardy pursuant to Article I, Section Fourteen of the Indiana Constitution. Specifically, Mathis asserts that the handgun conviction may not stand because there was a reasonable possibility that the jury used the same evidence—Mathis's possession of a handgun during the episode of chasing and shooting at Osborne—in finding guilt on the murder charge. Appellant's Br. p. 11.

In addressing this claim, we note that our supreme court has held that Article I, Section Fourteen of the Indiana Constitution provides greater protection than the federal constitution. Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32, 49 (Ind.1999). Recently, our supreme court employed Justice Sullivan's analysis from Richardson and concluded that five situations will violate the double jeopardy prohibition of the Indiana Constitution. Guyton v. State, 771 N.E.2d 1141, 1143 (Ind.2002) (citing Richardson, 717 N.E.2d at 55 (Sullivan, J., concurring)). Quoting from Justice Sullivan's concurrence in Richardson, the Guyton court noted that the following situations violate Indiana's double jeopardy clause: (1) "conviction and punishment for a crime which is a lesser-included offense of another crime for which the defendant has been convicted and punished"; (2) "conviction and punishment for a crime which consists of the very same act as another crime for which the defendant has been convicted and punished"; (3) "conviction and punishment for a crime which consists of the very same act as an element of another crime for which the defendant has been convicted and punished"; (4) "conviction and punishment for the crime of conspiracy where the overt act that constitutes an element of the conspiracy charge is the very same act as another crime for which the defendant has been convicted and punished"; and (5) "conviction and punishment for an enhancement of a crime where the enhancement is imposed for the very same behavior or harm as another crime for which the defendant has been convicted and punished." Id.

In addition to the above, our supreme court has determined that convictions for murder and carrying a handgun without a license do not violate double jeopardy principles. Mickens v. State...