Mathurin v. Gov't of the Virgin Islands, Civil No. 97-1973
| Decision Date | 20 June 1975 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 97-1973,Civil No. 99-1973,Civil No. 98-1973 |
| Citation | 12 V.I. 24 |
| Parties | GILLIARD MATHURIN, Plaintiff v. GOVERNMENT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS, Defendant GILBERT SAMPSON, Plaintiff v. GOVERNMENT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS, Defendant WALCOTT STEELE, Plaintiff v. GOVERNMENT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS, Defendant |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Virgin Islands |
Action against government for damages caused when policemen beat plaintiffs while they were under arrest. The District Court Young, J., held that the government was liable under statute waiving governmental immunity from suit with respect to injury or death caused by the wrongful or negligent act or omission of an employee acting within the scope of his office or employment.EDWARD J. OCEAN, ESQ., Christiansted, St. Croix, V.I., for plaintiffs
DANIEL C. LEARNED, ESQ., St. Thomas, V.I., for defendant
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT
Each of the three above named plaintiffs filed his action under the Tort Claims Act against the Government of the Virgin Islands and against six named police officers* claiming $175,000.00 punitive and general damages, "jointly and severally against all defendants" to compensate them for beatings allegedly inflicted upon them by several police officers, employees of the Department of Public Safety. The circumstances which have culminated in this suit for personal injuries arose out of the kidnapping and brutal murder of an eight-year-old girl, Maria Felix, for which the three plaintiffs herein were twice tried. In the late evening of February 21, 1971, plaintiffs Gilliard Mathurin, Gilbert Sampson and Walcott Steele were separately apprehended by officers of the Department of Public Safety as part of the investigation of the Maria Felix case. A jury trial was conducted on April 20, 21, 22, 23 and 24, 1971, following which plaintiffs herein were found guilty of murder in the second degree (Count I) and kidnapping (Count II). Judge Christian then imposed a sentence of thirty-five (35) years on Count I and twenty (20) years on Count II, saidsentences to run concurrently. After a notice of appeal had been filed to the Third Circuit, the plaintiffs herein directed a motion to Judge Christian, requesting a new trial on the grounds of newly discovered evidence. Following a hearing on the issue of new evidence held on November 5, 1971, the motion was granted and a new trial ordered.
Due to the conspicuous conflict between the evidence presented at the first trial and that adduced at the subsequent hearing for a new trial, the Government requested that the three defendants (plaintiffs herein), along with several police officers involved in the case, undergo the administration of a polygraph test. On the basis of the results of the tests, the Government decided not to dismiss the charges against the individuals and proceeded with a second trial. More than one year later, on November 21, 22, 24, 25 and 27, 1972, plaintiffs herein were retried and acquitted on all counts.
The instant action focuses on the incidents surrounding the initial apprehension and subsequent interrogation of Mathurin, Sampson and Steele during the late evening, early morning hours of February 21-22, 1971. The Richmond Penitentiary log reveals that Steele and Sampson were brought to that institution at 10:45 p.m. on February 21 and 12:45 a.m. on February 22, respectively. Testimony of several prison guards and officers indicated that upon their initial admittance to Richmond, the two appeared to be in good physical condition and showed no signs of external injury. At 3:25 a.m., on February 22, according to subsequent notations in the prison log, Officers Navarro and Rivera came to the prison and accompanied Steele and Sampson to police headquarters in Christiansted, St. Croix. Mathurin, apparently, was taken directly to police headquarters following his arrest. The three prisoners were not returned to Richmond Peniten-tiary until approximately 1:15 the following afternoon; at that time the log reflected that "Steele had a swollen jaw, Sampson busted mouth". Several hours later, the three men were taken before Municipal Court Judge Antoine L. Joseph for advisement of rights and the preliminary setting of bail. Judge Joseph thereupon ordered that the prisoners be taken directly to the hospital for examination and treatment. An examination of the three ensued at the Charles Harwood Memorial Hospital at 6:15 p.m., revealing a number of superficial injuries on the faces and upper torsos of the three individuals.
The plaintiffs' account of their station house confrontation with various named police officers on the morning of February 22 propounds a tale of brutality which, if believed, goes far beyond any claim of zealous police work. Without dwelling at great length on the seemingly countless allegations of police maltreatment on that morning, I feel compelled to set forth some of the acts as related by the plaintiffs. They alleged, inter alia, that they were continuously beaten with fists, clubs, blackjacks and a plywood board; that while two officers inserted their revolvers in each of his ears, plaintiff Mathurin was tortured by having paper stuffed in his mouth and then burned, resulting in bums to his face and hair; that plaintiff Sampson was hung from a balcony under the threat of being dropped to the street below if he did not cooperate; that plaintiff Sampson was pushed down a stairway three times while handcuffed.
Following the presentation of the plaintiffs' case, the Government rested, thereby permitting plaintiffs' version of the police station encounter to remain essentially uncontroverted in the record. As part of his closing statement at trial, counsel for the Government submitted to the Court a "Summation Brief", which argues that the aforementioned conduct on the part of its employees wasof such an outrageous or aggravated nature as to be outside the scope of their employment.
On March 10, 1975, a stipulation for dismissal with prejudice was signed by counsel for plaintiffs and counsel for the individual police officers in this action. Although that stipulation renders the following discussion somewhat moot insofar as this particular action is concerned, a reconsideration of the Virgin Islands immunity law as it relates to governmental officials and employees will be undertaken at this point.
The local Tort Claims Act, upon which plaintiffs' claims against the Government are based, provides that:
[T]he Government of the Virgin Islands hereby waives its immunity from liability and action and hereby assumes liability with respect to injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the Government of the Virgin Islands while acting within the scope of his office or employment, if a private person would be liable to the claimant in accordance in the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.
33 V.I.C. § 3408 (emphasis added). Section 3408 constitutes an important diminution of the sweeping immunity afforded to the Virgin Islands Government by the Revised Organic Act of 1954. Section 2 (b) of the 1954 Act states "[t]hat no tort action shall be brought against the Government of the Virgin Islands or against any officer or employee thereof in his official capacity without the consent of the legislature constituted by this Act." Decisional authority in this jurisdiction has consistently held that although the Legislature in its promulgation of the Tort Claims Act clearly intended to waive sovereign immunity as to the Government itself, the official immunity of its employees nonetheless remains. See, e.g., Spissov. Tonkin, 2 St.XSupp. 502, 503 (D.C.V.I. Sept. 7, 1973); George v. Government of the Virgin Islands, Civ. No. 498-1973 (D.C.V.I. filed Jan. 23, 1975). Read together, Section 2(b) of the Revised Organic Act and 33 V.I.C. § 3408 suggest an unfortunate "either/or" situation in which a potential litigant cannot recover against both the Government and its servants arising out of a single wrong. For, a governmental employee is deprived of official immunity if, and only if, his actions are found to be outside the scope of his employment; and the Government is held liable for the acts of its employees, if, and only if, the latter are acting within the scope of their employment. What remains, then, is a mutually exclusive system of government/employee liability founded upon a waiver by the Virgin Islands of its immunity as a governmental entity and a continuance of said immunity as to its employees.
The flaw in the foregoing framework lies not so much with the waiver of governmental immunity afforded by the Tort Claims Act as with the virtual blanket immunity granted to all governmental employees by the 1954 Organic Act. To extend the protective aegis of the immunity doctrine to all acts of all governmental employees, which protection is forfeited only as to those limited number of acts which fall outside the scope of employment, is to ignore the policy considerations underlying the doctrine. The classical justification for the doctrine of official immunity is found in the nineteenth century Supreme Court opinion of Spaulding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896):
In exercising the functions of his office the head of an Executive Department, keeping within the limits of his authority, should not be under an apprehension that the motives that control his official conduct may, at any time, become the subject of inquiry in a civil suit for damages. It would seriously cripple the proper and effective administration of public affairs as entrusted to the executive branchof the government, if he were subjected to any such restraint. He may have legal authority to act, but he may have such large discretion in the premises that it will not always be his absolute duty to exercise the authority with which he is invested. But if he acts, having authority, his conduct cannot be made...
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