Matilda Beasley v. Texas Pacific Railway Company

• Court: U.S. Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: Holmes
• Citation: Matilda Beasley v. Texas Pacific Railway Company, 191 U.S. 492, 24 S.Ct. 164, 48 L.Ed. 274 (1903)
• Decision Date: 14 December 1903
• Docket Number: No. 79,79
• Parties: MATILDA R. BEASLEY and Joseph C. Beasley, Appts. , v. TEXAS & PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY

191 U.S. 492

24 S.Ct. 164

48 L.Ed. 274

MATILDA R. BEASLEY and Joseph C. Beasley, Appts.,

v TEXAS & PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY.

No. 79.

Submitted December 3, 1903.

Decided December 14, 1903.

Messrs.E. B. Kruttschnitt and W. P. Hall for appellants.

Messrs. John F. Dillon, William Wirt Howe and Walker B. Spencer for appellee.

Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an appeal from a decree of the circuit court of appeals ordering a bill against a railway company incorporated under the laws of the United States to be dismissed. The bill seeks to enjoin the railway company from building a depot within 3 miles of one already built at Uni, in Louisiana, and alleges the following facts: Mrs. Beasley, the first-named plaintiff, conveyed to a Louisiana corporation—the Texarkana, Shreveport, & Natchez Railway Company—a strip of land 100 feet wide, for a railroad track through her plantation, habendum to the company and its assigns so long as the railroad was maintained and operated over the strip. By the act of sale, which was executed by both parties, it was declared to be a part of the consideration for the transfer 'that the grantee or its assigns shall not build . . . or establish any other depot along the line of said railroad within three miles north or south of the one stipulated for.' The defendant purchased the road from the grantee 'subject to the obligations and stipulations contained in' the act of sale. It now is constructing a depot on the road within a mile and a fraction of the one at Uni. The bill further alleges that there is no public necessity for a depot within the stipulated limits. There was a demurrer for the reason that there is an adequate remedy at law, and the demurrer was sustained by the circuit court, and the bill dismissed. This decree was reversed by the circuit court of appeals, and the bill was ordered to be dismissed for want of equity, without prejudice to an action at law. There is a motion to dismiss the appeal to this court on the ground that the decree was not final in form; but the decisions are the other way, and the case being one in which the decree of the circuit court of appeals can be reiewed in this court under the act of March 3, 1891 [26 Stat. at L. 826, chap. 517, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 547] we have jurisdiction, and the motion must be overruled. Merrill v. National Bank, 173 U. S. 131, 43 L. ed. 640, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 360. See Great Western Teleg. Co. v. Burnham, 162 U. S. 339, 342, 40 L. ed. 991, 992, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 850.

The act of sale gives its own definition of the word 'depot,' but no question is made that the depot intended to be built is within the prohibition of the instrument in that and other respects. We assume that if the plaintiff's grantee had built the structure it would have broken its agreement. We also assume, for the purposes of the case, without deciding, that the contract, as a contract, is not void, although similar contracts have been pronounced void in some of the cases cited below. On these assumptions the question is how far the burden of that agreement passed to the defendant, and whether, at least as against the defendant, equity will require it to be specifically performed.

Such a liability, wherever asserted, would have to be worked out, if at all, in terms of easement, covenant running with the land, implied contract, or equitable restriction.

Although the Louisiana Code recognizes such servitudes 'as the prohibition of building on an estate, or of building above a particular height' (Rev. Civil Code, art. 728 [724]; see art. 718 [714]), and although it has been held at common law that such a servitude for the benefit of neghboring land may be created within reasonable limits, and created by words of covenant (Ladd v. Boston, 151 Mass. 585, 588, 24 N. E. 858; Brown v. O'Brien, 168 Mass. 484, 47 N. E. 195; compare La. Rev. Civil Code, art. 743 [739]), it was not argued that there was an easement in this case. it would be questionable whether the obligation was 'not imposed on the person or in favor of the person, but only on an estate or in favor of an estate' (La. Rev. Civil Code, art. 709 [705]; Code Napoleon, 686); whether it was not, in the words of Marcad e, commenting on this article of the Code Napol eon, a servitude r eelle entach ee de personnalit e.' 2 Marcad e, 627. 'There can be no praedial servitude when the object is merely to satisfy the wants of the present owner.' Sohm, Inst. Roman Law, Ledlie's transl. § 56, II., p. 262. Apart from the peculiarities of Louisiana law, there would be almost equal difficulty in regarding the agreement as a covenant the burden of which ran with the land according to the principles of the common law, and for substantially the same reason. It is true that the covenant is negative, but it does not benefit the use and occupation of the plaintiff's land physically, and is not intended to. It is intended simply to improve the market value of that land by giving to it a right not to be competed with in the way of railway conveniences. Norcross v. James, 140 Mass. 188, 192, 2 N. E. 946. As to an implied contract, that would be a fiction, and the plaintiff's rights, so far as the question of policy is concerned, would not be enlarged by adopting that form. See Lincoln v. Burrage, 177 Mass. 378, 380, 52 L. R. A. 110, 59 N. E. 67.

Whether the true theory of equitable restrictions is the same as that of covenants running with the land, or different, as their historical antecedents are different in part, it would seem that the two must have somewhat similar limits. With regard to injunctions, we see in art. 298, 3, of the Code of Practice, cited by the plaintiff, no reason to suppose that the law of Louisiana is peculiar in any way affecting the present case. Whatever the form which the attempt to restrict may take, obviously it is not desirable to allow large tracts of land to be tied up and cut off from the ordinary incidents of ownership, according to the invention of the owner, in perpetuity, in favor of other large tracts which may come by division into many hands. La. Rev. Civil Code, art. 656 (652). See Parish v. Municipality, No. 2, 8 La. Ann. 145, 169. If such restrictions should be enforced without limit in equity as against all purchasers with notice, the practical result would be an unlimited extension of easements; since notice always can be secured by registration. Easements hitherto have been confined pretty narrowly, both in quality and in space. Equitable relief has been refused upon a covenant by a grantee not to open or work a quarry upon his land adjoining the land conveyed, in a suit between assignees of the original grantor and grantee. It was a mere covenant against competition. Norcross v. James, 140 Mass. 188, 2 N. E. 946. On...