Matlock v. Lock
| Decision Date | 26 January 1905 |
| Docket Number | No. 5,013.,5,013. |
| Citation | Matlock v. Lock , 38 Ind. App. 281, 73 N.E. 171 (Ind. App. 1905) |
| Parties | MATLOCK et al. v. LOCK et al. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Circuit Court, Rush County; Douglas Morris, Judge.
Action by Mellie Lock and others against Martha E. Matlock and others. From a decree in favor of complainants, defendants appeal. Reversed.
Smith, Cambern & Smith, for appellants. W. M. Sparks, W. A. Cullen, and J. D. Megee, for appellees.
Action by appellees against appellants for the construction of a will and to quiet title to real estate. The complaint was originally in three paragraphs, to the first of which a demurrer was overruled. An answer was filed in denial, and subsequently appellees dismissed their third paragraph of complaint, which asked for a partition of the real estate. Trial by the court, and upon proper request a special finding of facts was made and conclusions of law stated thereon. The substance of the conclusions of law is that, under the will in controversy, the appellee Mellie Lock took a fee-simple title to the real estate involved, upon the death of the decedent, who was her grandfather, and that certain provisions of the will which attempted to fix and designate specific conditions upon the contingency of which the fee-simple title should rest in Mellie Lock were invalid and void. The errors assigned are that the court erred in overruling the demurrer to the first paragraph of the amended complaint, and that the court erred in each of its conclusions of law.
It is questionable whether or not appellants are entitled to have the question considered, raised by overruling their demurrer to the first paragraph of the amended complaint, in that counsel have not specifically, in argument, stated any objections to the said paragraph, or cited any authorities in support of the contention that the paragraph is insufficient. The fact that the court made a special finding of facts, stating its conclusions of law thereon, is sufficient to present every question that affects the interests of the contending parties, and it is unnecessary, therefore, for us to consider or pass upon the sufficiency of the pleadings.
Elisha King was the testator, and the father of the appellant Martha E. Matlock, and the grandfather of the appellee Mellie Lock. At the time the testator executed his original will he had one daughter, the appellant Martha E. Matlock, and three grandchildren, living, one of whom was the appellee Mellie Lock, and a second, childless wife. In his original will he made certain bequests to all of the persons named. Before his death, however, two of his grandchildren died without issue, and upon the death of each of them he executed a codicil to his will. After his death the appellant Martha E. Matlock qualified as executrix and trustee under the will, and before the commencement of this action, by an agreement between all of the parties in interest, the widow elected to take under the law, and not the will, and in this controversy she has no interest. The appellee Mellie Lock is the mother of one child living. Martha E. Matlock was made a party both in her individual and fiduciary capacity.
The facts to which the law must be applied, and the respective rights of the parties determined, as disclosed by the special finding of the court, are as follows: That Elisha King died testate on the 6th day of February, 1902; that he left a will and two codicils, which were duly executed and probated; that he left, as his only heirs, the appellant Martha E. Matlock, his daughter, and the appellee Mellie Lock, his granddaughter. The court further found that the will and the two codicils of the testator had been duly filed and admitted to probate; that the appellant Martha E. Matlock had qualified and was acting as executrix and trustee under the will.
The special findings set out in full the will and the two codicils, but it is only necessary for us to refer to those provisions of the will that are to be construed in the determination of the rights of the respective legatees. But to do so it is important, so as to gather the full intent of the testator, to set out such provisions of the will and codicils at some length.
By item 2 of the will the testator made certain and specific provisions for his wife, which included, among other things, a life estate in certain real estate of which the testator died seised, and which is specifically described. After such provisions made for the wife, said item No. 2 continues as follows:
By item 3 the testator devises and bequeaths to appellant Martha E. Matlock certain described real estate, upon which he fixed the value of $13,000, and in said item he also devises and bequeaths to her “one equal one-fourth part” in value of all of the other real and personal estate belonging to him, not otherwise disposed of in said will.
By item 4 he devises and bequeaths to his grandson Ulysses King certain real estate, specifically describing it. Upon this bequest and in the same item he made the following provision:
By item 5 he devises and bequeaths to his granddaughter Tennie B. King certain property, both real and personal, specifically describing it, and places upon it the following conditions: “She to have all the above property both real and personal upon the same terms and conditions as my grandson Ulysses herein set forth.”
By item 6 he devises and bequeaths to his granddaughter Mellie McFatridge certain real and personal property, describing the same, upon which he places a value of $13,000, and the following further bequest: In this same item he charges all of the above-named heirs with specific advancements, giving the amount advanced to each one.
The final clause in the will is as follows: “My object in making this will is to make my said child and grandchildren equal in the final distribution of my estate.”
In codicil No. 1, executed on the 25th day of September, 1891, the testator recites the fact that, since the execution of his original will, his grandson Ulysses King had died, and by said codicil he made certain other provisions as follows: “I hereby devise and bequeath to my daughter Martha E. Matlock, all the real estate devised by Item 4 of said will to said Ulysses King and the same is to be charged to my said daughter at the sum of thirteen thousand dollars.” He then proceeds in said codicil to make certain devises and bequests to his granddaughters Tennie B. King and Mellie McFatridge in the following language:
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Fuehring v. Union Trust Co. of Indianapolis
...power to alienate cannot be suspended under the gift longer than her life, and she was in being at testator's death. Matlock v. Lock, 1905, 38 Ind.App. 281, 73 N.E. 171. Vaubel v. Lang, 1923, 81, Ind.App. 96, 140 N.E. 69, 71, the gift of real estate was to grandchildren Elizabeth and Hulda,......
- Matlock v. Lock
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Pritchett v. Turner
...a remainder over in case of her death under forty, was upheld upon the ground that a conditional fee was thereby created, in Matlock v. Lock (Ind.App.) 73 N.E. 171. "It is fully admitted in Anderson v. Cary, 36 Ohio St. 506, 38 Am.Rep. 602, that a grantor may restrain or limit the enjoyment......
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Sexton v. Cronkhite
...less estate may be granted to continue until the happening of a prescribed event, then to enlarge into an absolute fee. Matlock v. Lock, 38 Ind. App. 281, 73 N. E. 171;Shimer v. Mann, 99 Ind. 199, 50 Am. Rep. 82. It is clear that Winfield S. Cronkhite, by the terms of the will of his father......