Matney v. Blue Ribbon

• Decision Date: 02 March 1942
• Docket Number: 6401.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US
• Parties: MATNEY v. BLUE RIBBON, INC., ET AL.

12 So.2d 249

MATNEY v. BLUE RIBBON, INC., ET AL.

No. 6401.

Court of Appeals of Louisiana, Second Circuit

March 2, 1942

Rehearing Denied April 3, 1942.

Certiorari Granted May 25, 1942.

Booth & Lockard of Shreveport, for appellant.

E W. & P. N. Browne and Charles B. Emery, all of Shreveport, for appellees.

DREW, Judge.

The plaintiff, a married woman, domiciled in the state of Texas brought this suit on a cause of action arising in tort in the state of Louisiana, claiming damages as follows:

Pain and suffering $3,000.00

For disfigurement of arm 2,500.00

For impairment of physical

function of arm $5,000.00

Defendant filed an exception of no right of action which was sustained by the court below and plaintiff is prosecuting this appeal.

The theory of the exception of no right of action is that an action in damages is a personal right and attached to the person and follows her to her domicile, in this case the state of Texas, and that in Texas all the items of damage claimed would fall into the community. For the purpose of determining the question of no right of action, the following stipulation was made: "It is hereby stipulated between counsel of the respective parties to this action that for the purpose of determining the exception of no right of action filed herein by the defendants, the items of damage claimed by the plaintiff herein, under the laws of Texas, would belong to the community in Texas and in an action in the courts of Texas, could be sued for by the husband in his name only."

Under the authority of the case of Williams v. Pope Manufacturing Company, 52 La.Ann. 1417, 27 So. 851, 50 L.R.A. 816, 78 Am.St.Rep. 390, the lower court sustained the exception.

This case presents a question requiring application of the law relative to conflict of laws. Our state Supreme Court, in the case of Williams v. Pope Manufacturing Company, supra, laid down a rule which is correctly reflected by the syllabus of the case, to-wit: "A claim for damages ex delicto arising from a tort or trespass upon the person of a married woman while temporarily sojourning in the state of Louisiana, whose matrimonial domicile and residence were in the state of Mississippi, cannot be considered as property acquired in the former state, in the sense of its community statute; and, being completely and fully capacitated, under the statute law of Mississippi, to institute suit, and stand in judgment therefor in the courts of that state, she has like capacity to sue in her own name in a Louisiana court."

The identical case as is now presented was presented there only in reverse. At the time of the above-cited case the law of Louisiana was that a married woman could not sue for torts committed on her, such an action belonged to the community of acquets and gains and suit for such torts had to be brought by the husband who was head and master of the community. The above decision has never been overruled, so far as our search reveals.

The Supreme Court of the United States in the cases of, Texas & P. R. Company v. Humble, 181 U.S. 57, 21 S.Ct. 526, 45 L.Ed. 747; Northern Pac. R. Company v. Babcock, 154 U.S. 190, 14 S.Ct. 978, 38 L.Ed. 958; and the Federal Court of Appeal in the case of, Traglio v. Harris, 9 Cir., 104 F.2d 439, 127 A.L.R. 803, in which case a writ was refused by the Supreme Court (308 U.S. 629, 60 S.Ct. 125, 84 L.Ed. 524), has laid down a rule which is directly in conflict with that of the case of Williams v. Pope Manufacturing Company, supra.

In Texas & P. Ry. Company v. Humble, the Supreme Court of the United States, through Chief Justice Fuller, said [181 U.S. 57, 21 S.Ct. 527, 45 L.Ed. 747]:

"Plaintiff in error contends that the judgment should be reversed because the circuit court erred in declining to direct the joinder of the husband; in applying the law of Arkansas in the trial of the case, and not that of Louisiana; and in allowing impaired earning power to be considered as an element of recovery.

"The statutes of Arkansas provided that a married woman might 'maintain an action in her own name for or on account of her sole or separate estate or property, or for damages against any person or body corporate for any injury to her person, character, or property.' Sandels & Hill's Dig. � 5641.

"This action was brought in the state court, and removed on defendant's application. That transfer could not deprive plaintiff of the right secured to her by the local law to prosecute the suit in her own name and for her own benefit; and indeed by � 721 of the Revised Statutes, the law of Arkansas furnished the rule of decision. In some jurisdictions it is held under similar statutes that the wife must sue alone under such circumstances, and that to make the husband a co-plaintiff works a fatal misjoinder. The circuit court was right, then, in not attempting to compel a joinder which the statute had expressly dispensed with.

"But it is said that under the laws of Louisiana compensation for personal injuries to a married woman belongs to the husband; that he alone can sue therefor; and that, therefore, error was committed in the admission of evidence, the refusal of instructions, and in the charge of the court. We do not think the point as now presented was made below. The objection to evidence, the sixth instruction refused (which referred to the law of Louisiana), and the part of the charge excepted to, related to diminished capacity to labor. And the motion as to Humble was that he should be joined as a plaintiff. The answer simply raised the issue whether or not Mrs. Humble received any injuries to her person by reason of the acts complained of. It was nowhere insisted that the action could not be maintained because not brought by the husband alone.

"However, whether the objection be that under the laws of Louisiana she could not recover in her own name at all, or could not, except her husband was a coplaintiff, because the damages claimed were community property, we agree with the circuit court of appeals that plaintiff's rights in suing in Arkansas for an injury sustained there did not differ from those of any married woman domiciled in that state; that the legislature of Arkansas had determined by whom a suit might be brought for personal injuries sustained by a married woman; had enlarged the rights of married women in respect of damages recoverable by them on account of personal injuries sustained within the state; and that these laws necessarily inured to the benefit of every married woman who subsequently sued in the courts of the state for personal injuries there sustained, and must be held to have been intended to have, and to have, a uniform operation throughout the state.

"The argument ab inconvenienti is pressed that Humble might sue for the same injury in Louisiana, and that this judgment could not be pleaded in bar, although only covering damages particularly pertaining to the wife. In other words, that the Louisiana courts would decline to give any faith and credit to the recovery in Arkansas permitted by the jurisprudence of the latter state in the name of the wife only. We must decline to be moved by the supposed hardship suggested. These injuries were inflicted and this action was brought in the state of Arkansas. The place of the wrong and the place of the forum concurred, and the law of that place governed. If an action should be brought in Louisiana, the fact that the law of Arkansas differed from that of Louisiana would not prevent its application, unless opposed to some general public policy, the existence of which is not to be assumed. Northern P. R. Co. v. Babcock, 154 U.S. 190, 14 S.Ct. 978, 38 L.Ed. 958."

In Northern Pacific R. Company v. Babcock, supra, the Supreme Court, with Mr. Justice White as its organ, said [154 U.S. 190, 14 S.Ct. 980, 38 L.Ed. 958]: " 'The statute of another state has, of course, no extraterritorial force, but rights acquired under it will always, in comity, be enforced, if not against the public policy of the laws of the former. In such cases the law of the place where the right was acquired, or the liability was incurred, will govern as to the right of action; while all that pertains merely to the remedy will be controlled by the law of the state where the action is brought. And we think the principle is the same whether the right of action be ex contractu or ex delicto. * * *' "

And in Traglio v. Harris, supra, the Circuit Court of Appeal, Ninth Circuit, of date June 9, 1939 (writ refused), the court had the identical question before it as is presented in the case at bar. Appellee in that case was a resident of California and was injured in an automobile accident in the state of Oregon. She instituted suit in Oregon and, in part, the court said [[104 F.2d 441, 127 A.L.R. 803]:

"Appellants contend that we must look to the law of California to determine who owns the cause of action. Exactly in point, as to both propositions last mentioned, is Texas & P. Ry Co. v. Humble, 181 U.S. 57, 21 S.Ct. 526, 45 L.Ed. 747, where a married woman in Arkansas was traveling...