Matney v. City of North Adams, CIV.A. 03-30262-MAP.

• Citation: 359 F.Supp.2d 20
• Decision Date: 21 March 2005
• Docket Number: No. CIV.A. 03-30262-MAP.,CIV.A. 03-30262-MAP.
• Parties: Louis E. MATNEY, Plaintiff v. CITY OF NORTH ADAMS Jennifer Makcey Ethier, Treasurer, Vincent Lively, Building Inspector, Michael Sarkis, Director of Services Board of Health, Defendants
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

359 F.Supp.2d 20

Louis E. MATNEY, Plaintiff v. CITY OF NORTH ADAMS Jennifer Makcey Ethier, Treasurer, Vincent Lively, Building Inspector, Michael Sarkis, Director of Services Board of Health, Defendants

No. CIV.A. 03-30262-MAP.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

March 21, 2005.

William J. Pudlo, Springfield, MA, for Louis E. Matney, Plaintiff.

Nancy Frankel Pelletier, Robinson Donovan, PC, Springfield, MA, for North Adams, City of, Jennifer Makcey Ethier, Michael Sarkis, Vincent Lively, Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS (Docket No. 9)

PONSOR, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Charles Matney has brought this action against four defendants: the City of North Adams ("City"); Jennifer Makcey Ethier, City Treasurer; Vincent Lively, City Building Inspector, and Michael Sarkis, Director of Services for the City Board of Health. Plaintiff contends, in essence, that the actions of the defendants have constituted a concerted effort to interfere with his possession, use and enjoyment of property owned by him at 117 River St. in North Adams, Massachusetts. The complaint includes three counts: breach of contract, abuse of process, and violations of both state and federal civil rights statutes.

The defendants have moved to dismiss all counts for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. This memorandum will address in substance only the portion of Count III that alleges a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, since this claim is the only component of plaintiff's complaint that supports exercise of jurisdiction by this federal court. As will be seen below, viewing the facts as generously as possible to the plaintiff, the alleged actions taken by the defendants simply do not rise to the level of a violation of § 1983. Moreover, the three individual defendants named in the complaint are protected by the doctrine of qualified immunity against any claim under this statute.

The elimination of any foundation for federal jurisdiction gives this court discretion to dismiss the complaint's remaining state law claims without prejudice to their re-filing in state court. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726-727, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966). Dismissal without prejudice of the state law claims is especially appropriate in this case, where the First Circuit has repeatedly held that local real estate disputes of this sort are more properly reserved for state administrative and judicial processes, and where a pending appeal of a Massachusetts Land Court decision appears to raise all, or nearly all, the issues presented in this federal lawsuit.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND.

In considering a motion to dismiss, the court, of course, must accept as true the facts alleged within the four corners of the complaint to determine whether they set forth any possible claim pursuant to the federal civil rights statute. Although some of the complaint's allegations are difficult to follow, the essential facts necessary to consider defendants' motion emerge with sufficient clarity.

In 1968, the plaintiff purchased a parcel of land located at 117 Riverdale Street in the City of North Adams, Berkshire County, Massachusetts. By 1988 health problems began to compromise the plaintiff's ability to work, his income diminished, and as a result he fell behind on his payments of the real estate taxes. According to the complaint, in 1991, because of the plaintiff's failure to keep current, "the premises were taken for taxes by the City, resulting in the City obtaining a tax title." Complaint at ¶ 12.

Despite the City having "taken" the property, the plaintiff maintained an interest in it and continued making some periodic payments towards his current and back taxes. By 1998, however, a dispute apparently arose about the amount of taxes owed, in that "there was still an amount claimed by the City for delinquent real estate taxes in excess of $10,000, which the Plaintiff disputed." Complaint at ¶ 16.

Because of this dispute, "the City thereafter made another tax taking and threatened foreclosure of the Plaintiff's equity of redemption." Complaint at ¶ 17. Apparently in response to these threats, in April of 1998, the plaintiff filed a petition for bankruptcy, in which the City filed a claim for $16,000 in back real estate taxes. According to the complaint, the bankruptcy court eventually found that the City of North Adams was entitled to $5,090.66 on its claim.

Subsequently, according to the plaintiff, the City came to an agreement with plaintiff "whereby the plaintiff would make payments to the City of $400 each month towards the tax arrears and would further keep his real estate taxes current, and, the Plaintiff would voluntarily dismiss his bankruptcy proceedings." Complaint at ¶ 21. According to the complaint, if plaintiff did these things, the City agreed that "no further action would be taken to collect taxes." Complaint at ¶ 22.

Between August 25, 1999 and May of 2000, plaintiff, as per the agreement, made payments of $400 a month to the City. However, in May of 2000, "Plaintiff was advised by the Treasurer/Tax Collector's office that certain portions of his payments were being applied to the old `tax title' account and not to the current amount agreed." Complaint at ¶ 27. It is a little hard to know for certain what this means, but it is clear that plaintiff took the position that the City's action was "a breach of the agreement made in the bankruptcy proceedings and stopped his regular payments." Complaint at ¶ 28.

In 2001, apparently as a result of the cessation of payments, the City commenced proceedings in Land Court "to foreclose the Plaintiff's equity of redemption" and prevailed. Complaint at ¶ 29. Plaintiff has appealed the Land Court judgment, but he nevertheless contends that "the actions of the City place a cloud upon the Plaintiff's title." Complaint at ¶ 31. The City, plaintiff says, has failed to abide by the agreement entered into during the Bankruptcy proceedings and has engaged in a "wrongful commencement" of the action in Land Court.

The complaint also contains allegations that over the years City officials have taken various retaliatory actions against the plaintiff, including: refusing (due to his tax delinquency) to renew plaintiff's license to run a take-out restaurant called "Lou's Hot Dog Heaven"; citing plaintiff for displaying a sign improperly under the local zoning codes; demanding that he remove debris from his property that was in fact the responsibility of an adjacent owner; refusing to enforce the health code against this adjacent owner, and wrongfully forbidding the plaintiff from burning leaves and wood on his property.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Claim against the City of North Adams

Although 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not create substantive rights, it does provide a vehicle by which individuals may bring claims for violations of rights secured by the Constitution. To demonstrate a violation of § 1983, the plaintiff must establish both that the act complained of was carried out under color of state law and also that this conduct deprived him of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the laws or Constitution of the United States. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981).

While there is no dispute that the defendants here acted under color of state law, the facts as set forth in the complaint do not demonstrate that action taken by the City violated any right of the plaintiff protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. In reaching this conclusion, the court does not intend to offer any opinion, one way or the other,...