Matshazi v. State

Decision Date22 March 2004
Docket NumberNo. 49A04-0307-CR-354.,49A04-0307-CR-354.
Citation804 N.E.2d 1232
PartiesSam MATSHAZI, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
CourtIndiana Appellate Court

Katherine A. Cornelius, Marion County Public Defender Agency, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, George P. Sherman, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

OPINION

RILEY, Judge.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellant-Defendant, Sam Matshazi (Matshazi), appeals his sentence for Counts I and II, rape, Class B felonies, Ind.Code § 35-42-4-1.

We affirm.

ISSUES

Matshazi raises one issue on appeal, which we restate as follows:

1. Whether the trial court properly evaluated his aggravating and mitigating factors when it imposed an enhanced sentence; and

2. Whether his sentence is appropriate in light of the nature of the offense and character of the offender.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In the spring of 2002, A.D. was a resident at New Hope assisted living home (New Hope) operated by St. Vincent's Hospital and located at 5444 North Arlington Avenue in Indianapolis, Indiana. She is twenty-seven years old and has had cerebral palsy since birth. A.D. is unable to feed herself, dress herself, or move in and out of her wheelchair on her own. A.D. also has problems communicating, and psycho-educational evaluations have revealed that she has an overall mental age of a six to eight year old.

During the spring of 2002, Matshazi was a part-time employee at St. Vincent's New Hope facility where A.D. was living. While working at New Hope, Matshazi had sexual intercourse with A.D. on two occasions. Specifically, on April 6, 2002, during his shift, Matshazi showered A.D. and rubbed her genital area. Approximately fifteen minutes later, Matshazi brought A.D. into her bedroom and continued rubbing her genital area. Later that afternoon, Matshazi entered A.D.'s room, removed her clothes, and began rubbing her genital area again. Matshazi then had sexual intercourse with A.D. Afterwards, Matshazi cleaned A.D. up and put her clothes back on her, and placed her back in her wheelchair.

On May 29, 2002, Matshazi worked the evening shift at New Hope. After the permanent staff members left for the evening, Matshazi entered A.D.'s room, removed her clothing, and again forced her to have sex. Matshazi told A.D. that he would kill her if she told anyone what happened between the two of them. In October of 2002, A.D. began to complain to the staff at New Hope about severe stomach pains. An on-call nurse at New Hope advised that A.D. should be taken to the hospital. While at the hospital, the doctors discovered that A.D. was pregnant.

On October 7, 2002, Indianapolis Police Officer Daryl Harden (Officer Harden) was dispatched to New Hope to conduct a rape investigation. While at New Hope, Officer Harden spoke to several of the employees. Officer Harden then spoke by phone to Sex Crime Detective Laura Russell (Detective Russell). Detective Russell subsequently drove to New Hope and also talked with the employees. Detective Russell was responsible for interviewing the male employees. When Detective Russell interviewed Matshazi, she informed him that A.D. stated that a man named Sam forced her to have sexual intercourse on two separate occasions. Detective Russell informed Matshazi that he, along with another employee whose first name is Sam, were under investigation. She then asked Matshazi if he had ever had any type of sexual contact with A.D. Matshazi responded negatively. Afterward, Detective Russell informed Matshazi that both he and the other employee named Sam were suspended from employment at the New Hope facility. Lastly, Detective Russell obtained blood samples from Matshazi, the other employee under investigation, and A.D.

On January 28, 2003, Detective Russell was notified that A.D. was transported to Vincent Family Life Center because she was going into labor. Detective Russell was present when A.D. gave birth by caesarean section, and requested that a blood sample from A.D.'s umbilical cord be taken. The blood sample was then tested in order to determine the paternity of the child. On February 11, 2003, Detective Russell received the paternity test results, which identified Matshazi as the father of A.D.'s child.

On February 12, 2003, the State filed an information against Matshazi charging him with Count I, rape, a Class B felony, I.C. § 35-42-4-1. On April 1, 2003, the State filed a Motion to Add a Count, adding Count II, rape, a Class B felony, I.C. § 35-42-4-1(a)(3). In its motion, the State argued that Matshazi knowingly or intentionally had sexual intercourse with A.D., when A.D. was so mentally disabled or deficient that consent by her to sexual intercourse could not have been given. On April 10, 2003, a hearing was held on the State's Motion to Add a Count. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court granted the State's motion. On April 24, 2003, a second blood sample was taken from Matshazi, which confirmed the test results of the first paternity test.

On May 19 through May 21, 2003, a jury trial was held. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Matshazi guilty as charged. On June 18, 2003, a sentencing hearing was held. At the hearing, the trial court stated the following:

The [c]ourt is required under Indiana law to consider several statutory factors. The first is the risk that the person will commit another crime. And based upon the [c]ourt's evaluation of the evidence of the case, most specifically [Matshazi's] testimony, the [c]ourt is extremely concerned about the risk that [Matshazi] will commit another crime, and the [c]ourt bases that on [Matshazi's] description of these encounters with [A.D.], which defy not only logic but also fact. His description that she put her arm around his head, which she's utterly incapable of doing. And I guess I, I may digress, but I need to make it clear-well, I'll, I'll do that in a minute. So[,] I am very concerned not only that [Matshazi will] commit another crime, I'm very concerned that the crime, the victim of that crime will be like [A.D.], another helpless and/or vulnerable person who's unable physically to defend themselves or verbally to articulate what's happened.
I then have to talk about the nature and circumstances of the crime committed under the law, and I'll first begin by the [c]ourt's own observations, as also supplemented by Mrs. Dixon's descriptions, of [A.D.'s] limitations. And I don't do this in any way to demean your daughter. I think it's very important for the people on the Court of Appeals who will likely be reviewing the sentence to know—they're going to see words on a piece of paper, and I've met the person, and I just want them to know what I've observed about [A.D.]. Physically[,] [A.D.'s] body is crippled. She cannot sit erect. She, her arms flail uncontrollable because she suffers from spasticity. Her hands are in a sort of clenched posture so that she does not have gripping ability, other than if her fingers might be rigidly gripped just through spasticity. You could probably put something in them, but she can't control the grasps on her hands. Her head moves uncontrollably on her body. She and does so more when she's upset than when she's calm. She, her speech is garbled, although I believe we all could discern the difference between yes and no. But it took the knowledge of the context of the statement she was making to realize that she was saying yes or no. Perhaps somewhat in contrast with that, one of the most poignant moments of the trial was when she was asked, in fact on cross examination, do you know why we're here. And she said in her voice, Sam raped me. And you could tell that that's what [A.D.] said. And it was somewhat surprising to me, but I could discern it at the time. [A.D.'s] mannerism is childlike in terms of her, what makes her laugh. You can, her intellectual level does not bespeak any age beyond the six to eight year upper range the doctors shared with us. And neither does her physical appearance, frankly, seem congruent with her, with her actual chronological age. [A.D.] could look like she's fifteen, sixteen years old. In part that's because she's small, and because her body isn't physically developed as it would be if she were a mature person. I asked her mom to describe some of the things that she could do to make it clear that this woman could not caress someone. This woman could not pull someone to them, a grown man especially, in an embrace. And so I, I want to set that setting about [A.D.], which is all visibly discernable upon immediately viewing [A.D.]. So, I want to set that setting to talk about the first rape that occurred in April.
I want to note that this is the first time [] Matshazi ever cared for [A.D.]. This isn't as though—and when you look at his defense, proffered defense of consent, this isn't as though this is a young woman with whom he's developed a relationship because he cared for her over time and saw her inner beauty, which I do know exists, but it exists in a childlike way. This is someone who upon, within an hour of coming to the home has sexual intercourse with a severely disabled girl, and by his own admission puts a wheelchair in front of the door so no one can come in. The State cross[-]examined [ ] Matshazi about when surrounding the acts of physical, or sexual intercourse she was diapered. Because I think that's a really significant fact about the, the lack of consent and the force used in this circumstance, and it also is part of who [A.D.] is. So that was the first time. And I think the State also has aptly pointed out within the home [A.D.] was the least able to communicate. As so the choice of [ ] Matshazi that day when he stood in the role of caretaker but acted more as a predator was to choose the most helpless. When I thought about [A.D.] over the months I thought how vulnerable. But
...

To continue reading

Request your trial
22 cases
  • Dickenson v. State, No. 12A04-0411-CR-605 (IN 10/13/2005)
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • October 13, 2005
    ...are within the trial court's discretion, and will be reversed only upon a showing of abuse of discretion. Matshazi v. State, 804 N.E.2d 1232, 1238 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied; Powell v. State, 751 N.E.2d 311, 314 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). The trial court's sentencing discretion includes......
  • Williams v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • January 17, 2006
    ...Sentencing decisions are within the trial court's discretion and will be reversed only for an abuse of discretion. Matshazi v. State, 804 N.E.2d 1232, 1237 (Ind.Ct.App.2004), trans. denied. The trial court must determine which aggravating and mitigating circumstances to consider when increa......
  • Vermillion v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • November 20, 2012
    ...at the sentencing hearing to determine whether the trial court adequately explained its reasons for the sentence. Matshazi v. State, 804 N.E.2d 1232, 1238 (Ind.Ct.App.2004), trans. denied. In sentencing Vermillion, the trial court identified two aggravators. The trial court first referred t......
  • Gornick v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • August 17, 2005
    ...decisions are generally within the trial court's discretion and will be reversed only for an abuse of discretion. Matshazi v. State, 804 N.E.2d 1232, 1237 (Ind.Ct.App.2004). The trial court must determine which aggravating and mitigating circumstances to consider when increasing or reducing......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT