Matson by Kehoe v. Anctil
| Decision Date | 01 October 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:96-CV-110.,2:96-CV-110. |
| Citation | 979 F.Supp. 1031 |
| Parties | Emily MATSON, a minor, by her legal guardian, Mary KEHOE, Plaintiff, v. Richard ANCTIL and Materiaux Blanchet, Inc., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Vermont |
Robert E. Manchester, Manchester Law Offices, P.C., Burlington, VT, for Plaintiff.
William Andrew O'Rourke, III, Ryan, Smith & Carbine Ltd., Rutland, VT, Douglas Dwight Le Brun, Dinse, Erdmann, Knapp & McAndrew, Burlington, VT, for Defendants.
In this personal injury action, Defendants Richard Anctil and Materiaux Blanchet, Inc. ("MBI") have moved for leave to assert third party claims against the parents of Plaintiff Emily Matson ("Emily"). Emily has moved for partial summary judgment, seeking this Court's ruling that as a matter of law the Defendants cannot prevail in their claim that her injuries "were the result of negligence on the part of the Plaintiff or other third parties, which negligence was greater in kind and degree than the negligence, if any, of the [Defendants1]." Amended Answers (paper 18 and attach. to paper 41). The Defendants have also moved for summary judgment and partial summary judgment, asserting that Emily lacks the capacity to sue through her guardian in this case, and that she is not entitled to recover damages for medical bills and related expenses incurred during her minority. For the reasons stated below, Defendants' motions (papers 33, 36, and 39) are denied. Plaintiff's motion (paper 22) is granted.
Emily Matson, who was born July 12, 1989, was badly injured in an automobile accident on May 22, 1992. At the time of the accident, Emily was a passenger in her parents' 1990 Dodge minivan, traveling north on Interstate 91 near Sheffield, Vermont. Her father was driving, and her mother held Emily in her lap in the front passenger seat. The accident occurred when the minivan struck the rear of a tractor trailer truck operated by Anctil, a citizen of Canada and resident of Quebec, who was also traveling north on the interstate. The complaint alleges that at the time, Anctil was acting as an agent for MBI, a trucking company with its principal place of business in Quebec.
Through a guardian appointed by the Probate Court for Chittenden County, Vermont, Emily has sued Anctil and MBI for damages for her injuries. At all times relevant to this action, Emily and her parents have been residents of Rhode Island.
In diversity cases, a federal court must follow the choice of law rules of the state in which it sits. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 1021-22, 85 L.Ed. 1477 (1941); Banker v. Nighswander, Martin & Mitchell, 37 F.3d 866, 871 (2d Cir.1994). Recently the Vermont Supreme Court adopted the "significant contacts" approach of the Restatement (Second) for choice of law decisions in tort cases, in Amiot v. Ames, 693 A.2d 675 (Vt.1997). See also Miller v. White, ___ Vt. ___, 702 A.2d 392 (1997).
The Defendants argue that, under Amiot, this Court should apply Rhode Island law to the issues of whether the Defendants may sue Emily's parents for contribution, and whether the Defendants' liability, if any, may be weighed against the parents' liability, if any. The Plaintiff asserts that Vermont law should apply.
According to the Restatement's section 145(1), "[t]he rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort will be determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the principles stated in § 6." Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145(1) (1971). In a personal injury action, the state or country with the most significant relationship will usually be that where the injury occurred. Amiot, 693 A.2d at 678.
Of the seven general choice of law principles set forth in section 6, only four factors are significant in the field of torts: the needs of the interstate systems; the relevant policies of the forum; the relevant policies of other interested states, and the relative interests of those states in the determination of the issue; and ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied. Id.; Miller, 702 A.2d at 393; Restatement (Second), § 6(2)(a)-(c), (g). In applying these factors, a trial court takes into account the following contacts: "(a) the place where the injury occurred, (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred, (c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered." Restatement (Second), § 145(2).
The injury and the conduct causing the injury occurred in Vermont. The minor Plaintiff Emily is a resident of Rhode Island and her guardian is a Vermont resident. Defendant Anctil is a resident of Quebec, Canada, and Defendant MBI is a company with its principal place of business in Quebec, Canada. The parents, whom the Defendants seek to implead, are residents of Rhode Island. The relationship between Emily and her parents is centered in Rhode Island. The relationship between Anctil and MBI is centered in Quebec. According to the Restatement, these contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue at stake. Id.
At issue here is whether the Defendants may sue Emily's parents for their alleged negligent conduct, and whether the Defendants' liability may be reduced or eliminated by the parents' negligence. The place where the injury and the conduct causing injury occurred is relatively more important on this issue than the place where either relationship is centered, or where the parties reside. See Restatement (Second), § 145, Comment on Subsection (2)(e), (f).
This case is distinguishable from LeBlanc v. Stuart, 342 F.Supp. 773 (D.Vt.1972), in which Chief Judge Holden held that where the family domicile was in Rhode Island, Rhode Island law would apply to the issue of whether a widow could sue her husband's estate for injuries sustained in Vermont in an automobile accident allegedly caused by her husband's negligence. In LeBlanc, the issue before the Court was disability and immunity from suit in an intra-family tort, and Rhode Island was deemed to have a more significant interest in the issue than Vermont. In this case, although the Plaintiff's decision not to sue her parents underlies the Defendants' request to implead the parents, the issue of whether the parents' negligence may be made part of this lawsuit has nothing to do with the family relationship.
In determining whether Rhode Island, Quebec or Vermont has the most significant relationship to the issue, the relevant section 145(2) contacts favor application of the law of Vermont, because both the injury and the conduct causing injury occurred in Vermont, and the other factors are relatively less important on the issue. With regard to the needs of interstate and international systems, Restatement (Second), § 6(a), it does not appear that either Quebec or Rhode Island would be offended by this Court's application of Vermont law to the issue. Quebec's only relationship to the issue is the fortuitous circumstance that the Defendants are citizens of that province. Rhode Island has adopted the principle that choice of law depends on a determination of which jurisdiction has the most significant interest in the litigation, and thus would likely reach the same result as this Court. Woodward v. Stewart, 104 R.I. 290, 243 A.2d 917, 922 (1968). See also Blais v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 526 A.2d 854, 856 (R.I.1987) ().
With regard to the relevant policies of the forum, section 6(2)(b), Vermont as the site of the accident has a strong and obvious interest in "regulating the conduct of persons within its territory and in providing redress for injuries that occurred there." Restatement (Second), § 145, Comment on Subsection (1)(d). With regard to the relevant policies of other interested states, and their relative interests, section 6(2)(c), the Defendants have not shown, nor can the Court discern, that either Rhode Island or Quebec has an equally strong or greater interest in regulating extraterritorially on this issue.
Finally, this Court's decision to apply Vermont law to this issue satisfies section 6(2)(g), ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied. Because Vermont has the most significant relationship to the issues of whether the Defendants may implead Emily's parents, and whether the Defendants may pursue a defense of comparative negligence, this Court will apply the law of Vermont to the issues.
Anctil and MBI seek to assert third party claims for contribution against Kevin and Pamela Matson based on negligent supervision and care for their daughter, and against Kevin Matson for negligent operation of a motor vehicle. Rule 14(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a defendant may implead as a third-party defendant a person "who is or may be liable to the third-party plaintiff for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against the third-party plaintiff." Impleader is proper " " Eagle Star Ins. Co. v. Metromedia, Inc., 578 F.Supp. 184, 187 (D.Vt.1984) (quoting 6 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1446 at 246-50 (1971))....
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